Abstract
This paper investigates the applicability of reliabilism to scientific knowledge, and especially focuses on two doubts about the applicability: one about its difficulty in accounting for the epistemological role of scientific instruments, and the other about scientific theories. To respond to the two doubts, we extend virtue reliabilism, a reliabilist-based virtue epistemology, with a distinction of two types of epistemic virtues and the extended mind thesis from Clark and Chalmers (Analysis 58:7–19, 1998). We also present a case study on the quantitative research methodology of social sciences to show that the methodology is actually an extended virtue reliabilism on how social science instruments and theories contribute to the formation of social scientific knowledge.
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Notes
Though only in a rough sketch, Kitcher (2002) also proposes that reliabilism is a possible candidate for an analysis of scientific knowledge.
In raising the first doubt, we shall only focus on the issues from scientific instruments. The import of mathematics, as a part of theories, shall be discussed in raising the second doubt.
Humphreys (2004) differentiates three senses in which scientific instruments extend our ways of perceiving the world: scientific instruments can “extrapolate” our existing modalities, e.g. for us to see sharply; scientific instruments can “convert” accessible phenomena to be accessible to another modality, e.g. converting what can be heard to what can be seen; scientific instruments can “augment” our modalities, e.g. for us to detect what cannot be perceived, like electrons.
Of course, this is not to say that scientific theories cannot be deductively valid or defeasibly valid. Deductive or defeasible validity is an inferential notion, while reliable truth-conduciveness is not an inferential notion.
Kitcher (2002) does not consider the epistemological significance of scientific instruments, not even from the perspective of reliabilism.
There are of course other types of epistemic virtues given that there are other types of cognitive faculties, but the two types that we shall discuss suffice for the purposes of this paper.
Like other substantive theses in philosophy, the extended mind thesis has its proponents and opponents. For objections to the thesis, see, among others, Adams and Aizawa (2001, 2007), Block (2005), Gillett (2007), Rupert (2004), and various papers in Menary (2010). Since we mainly use the thesis to develop our proposal for scientific knowledge, for arguments defending the thesis, see, among others, Clark (2005), Hurley (1998, 2001), Noe (2004), Rowlands (1999), Wilson (2004), and various papers in Menary (2010).
Some may consider taking external tools as cognitive faculties to be in conflict with the standard neuro-scientific methodological principle that the study of cognitive faculties is confined to the study of what is in the head or body. We believe that, given the extended mind thesis, neuro-scientists can still maintain their research on neuro-based cognitive faculties, but leave the extended cognitive faculties to scientists in other fields like physics, computer science, optics, etc. Nonetheless, as indicated in Clark (2005, pp. 8–9), it is also of interest for the neuro-based cognitive investigation that our biological brains entertain the neural plasticity of being capable of coupling with various external tools to build up new cognitive routines.
Our account for the role of scientific instruments and theories in scientific knowledge requires the “composition” of external tools and cognitive faculties in the head. Gillett (2007) indicates that if the composition is considered as metaphysically sufficient for cognitive functions or properties, then the composition is scientifically inappropriate, since it leads to undesirable consequences in conflict with actual scientific methodology (cf. Gillett 2007, Section IV and V). On the other hand, Gillies also indicates the composition can be sympathetically interpreted as presenting an adequate explanation for cognitive functions (cf. Gillett 2007, Section VI). Under this understanding, the composition is legitimate in scientific reasoning and its explanatory adequacy can be subject to scientific securitization. Since our proposal is to account for scientific knowledge from the reliabilist perspective, the composition we need can be understood from its explanatory adequacy.
Of course, rationalism can also be “extended” by instruments, e.g. by computer-based proofs of mathematical theorems.
Our illustration of Classic Test Theory is mostly based on Furr and Bacharach (2008).
There are, of course, debates about what is an appropriate way to calculate the reliability of a test (scale) in Classic Test Theory (cf. Streiner and Norman 2008, pp. 183–189). There are also alternatives to the notion of reliability in Classic Test Theory, e.g. the Generalizability Theory (cf. Streiner and Norman 2008, ch. 9; Furr and Bacharach 2008, ch. 12).
See Streiner and Norman (2008, p. 251) for a historical remark on the two views.
Here, the test-validation view is only about tests in the narrowly construed sense, according to which a test is just an instrument with testing results. If one adopt a widely construed notion of tests, which includes interpretation of the test results, then the test-validation view is not so different from the hypothesis-validation view.
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Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank Norman Teng and two anonymous reviewers for very helpful comments. Thanks are also due to audiences at the Fourth Workshop of Body, Meaning, and Cognition. Funding for this study was supported by research grants of Taiwan National Science Council (NSC-97-2628-H-194-063-MY3, NSC-98-2410-H-031-002-MY3, NSC-98-2314-B-039-017-MY2, NSC-100-2410-H-194-085 -MY3), and China Medical University (CMU99-S-36).
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Wang, L., Ma, WF. Scientific Knowledge and Extended Epistemic Virtues. Erkenn 77, 273–295 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-012-9369-4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-012-9369-4