Erkenntnis

, Volume 78, Issue 5, pp 979–990

Ideal Negative Conceivability and the Halting Problem

Original Paper

DOI: 10.1007/s10670-012-9363-x

Cite this article as:
Martínez, M. Erkenn (2013) 78: 979. doi:10.1007/s10670-012-9363-x

Abstract

Our limited a priori-reasoning skills open a gap between our finding a proposition conceivable and its metaphysical possibility. A prominent strategy for closing this gap is the postulation of ideal conceivers, who suffer from no such limitations. In this paper I argue that, under many, maybe all, plausible unpackings of the notion of ideal conceiver, it is false that ideal negative conceivability entails possibility.

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Departament de Lògica, Història i Filosofia de la Ciència C/ Montalegre, 6Universitat de BarcelonaBarcelonaSpain