Identification in Games: Changing Places
- Darrell P. Rowbottom
- … show all 1 hide
Rent the article at a discountRent now
* Final gross prices may vary according to local VAT.Get Access
This paper offers a novel ‘changing places’ account of identification in games, where the consequences of role swapping are crucial. First, it illustrates how such an account is consistent with the view, in classical game theory, that only outcomes (and not pathways) are significant. Second, it argues that this account is superior to the ‘pooled resources’ alternative when it comes to dealing with some situations in which many players identify. Third, it shows how such a ‘changing places’ account can be used in games where some of the players identify with one another, but others do not. Finally, it illustrates how the model can handle the notion that identification comes in degrees.
- Bacharach, M. (2001). Superagency: Beyond an individualistic theory of games. In J. van Benthem (Ed.), Proceedings of the 8th conference on theoretical aspects of rationality and knowledge (pp. 333–337). San Francisco: Morgan Kaufmann.
- Bacharach, M. (2006). Beyond individual choice: Teams and frames in game theory. N. Gold and R. Sugden, eds. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Gillies, D. (2000). Philosophical theories of probability. London: Routledge.
- Goldman, A. I. (2006). Simulating minds. Oxford: Oxford University Press. CrossRef
- Harsanyi, J. C. (1953). Cardinal utility in welfare economics and in the theory of risk-taking. The Journal of Political Economy, 61, 434–435. CrossRef
- Harsanyi, J. C. (1955). Cardinal welfare, individualistic ethics, and interpersonal comparisons of utility. The Journal of Political Economy, 63, 309–321. CrossRef
- Harsanyi, J. C. (1975). Can the maximin principle serve as a basis for morality? A critique of John Rawls’s theory. The American Political Science Review, 69, 594–606. CrossRef
- Iacoboni, M., Woods, R. P., Brass, M., Bekkering, H., Mazziotta, J. C., & Rizzolatti, G. (1999). Cortical mechanisms of human imitation. Science, 286, 2526–2528. CrossRef
- Jaynes, E. T. (2003). Probability theory: The logic of science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. CrossRef
- Keynes, J. M. (1921). A treatise on probability. London: Macmillan.
- Kuhn, T. S. (1977). Objectivity, value judgment and theory choice. In The essential tension: Selected studies in scientific tradition and change. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Rawls, J. (1971). A theory of justice. Cambridge: Belknap.
- Rowbottom, D. P. (2008). On the proximity of the logical and “objective Bayesian” interpretations of probability. Erkenntnis, 69(3), 335–349. CrossRef
- Rowbottom, D. P. (2011). Popper’s critical rationalism: A philosophical investigation. London: Routledge.
- Rowbottom, D. P. (in press). The instrumentalist’s new clothes. Philosophy of Science.
- Sally, D. (1995). Conversation and cooperation in social dilemmas: A meta-analysis of experiments from 1958 to 1992. Rationality and Society, 7, 58–92. CrossRef
- Seidenfeld, T. (1986). Entropy and uncertainty. Philosophy of Science, 53, 467–491. CrossRef
- Sugden, R. (1993). Thinking as a team: Towards an explanation of nonselfish behavior. Social Philosophy and Policy, 10, 69–89. CrossRef
- Sugden, R. (2000). Team preferences. Economics and Philosophy, 16, 175–204. CrossRef
- Vickrey, W. (1945). Measuring marginal utility by reactions to risk. Econometrica, 13, 319–333. CrossRef
- Williamson, J. (2010). In defence of objective Bayesianism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. CrossRef
- Williamson, T. (2007). How probable is an infinite sequence of heads? Analysis, 67, 173–180.
- Identification in Games: Changing Places
Volume 77, Issue 2 , pp 197-206
- Cover Date
- Print ISSN
- Online ISSN
- Springer Netherlands
- Additional Links
- Author Affiliations
- 1. Department of Philosophy, Lingnan University, 8 Castle Peak Road, Tuen Mun, Hong Kong