Generalized Conditionalization and the Sleeping Beauty Problem
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- Horgan, T. & Mahtani, A. Erkenn (2013) 78: 333. doi:10.1007/s10670-011-9316-9
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We present a new argument for the claim that in the Sleeping Beauty problem, the probability that the coin comes up heads is 1/3. Our argument depends on a principle for the updating of probabilities that we call ‘generalized conditionalization’, and on a species of generalized conditionalization we call ‘synchronic conditionalization on old information’. We set forth a rationale for the legitimacy of generalized conditionalization, and we explain why our new argument for thirdism is immune to two attacks that Pust (Synthese 160:97–101, 2008) has leveled at other arguments for thirdism.