Explaining Perceptual Entitlement
- Nicholas Silins
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This paper evaluates the prospects of harnessing “anti-individualism” about the contents of perceptual states to give an account of the epistemology of perception, making special reference to Tyler Burge’s (2003) paper, “Perceptual Entitlement”. I start by clarifying what kind of warrant is provided by perceptual experience, and I go on to survey different ways one might explain the warrant provided by perceptual experience in terms of anti-individualist views about the individuation of perceptual states. I close by motivating accounts which instead give a more prominent role to consciousness.
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- Explaining Perceptual Entitlement
Volume 76, Issue 2 , pp 243-261
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- Springer Netherlands
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- Nicholas Silins (1)
- Author Affiliations
- 1. Sage School of Philosophy, Cornell University, 218 Goldwin Smith Hall, Ithaca, NY, 14853, USA