Univocal Reasoning and Inferential Presuppositions
- Mikkel Gerken
- … show all 1 hide
Rent the article at a discountRent now
* Final gross prices may vary according to local VAT.Get Access
I pursue an answer to the psychological question “what is it for S to presuppose that p?” I will not attempt a general answer. Rather, I will explore a particular kind of presuppositions that are constituted by the mental act of reasoning: Inferential presuppositions. Indeed, I will consider a specific kind of inferential presuppositions—one that is constituted by a specific reasoning competence: The univocality competence. Roughly, this is the competence that reliably governs the univocal thought-components’ operation as univocal in a line of reasoning. I will argue that the exercise of this reasoning competence constitutes certain inferential presuppositions. More specifically, I outline a conception of an inferential presupposition as a non-attitudinal but genuinely psychological and rationally committing relation that holds between a reasoner and a proposition. Thus, inferential presuppositions may be distinguished from tacit or standing attitudes that function as premise-beliefs in reasoning. Likewise inferential presuppositions may be distinguished from other kinds of presuppositions. In conclusion, I note some features of inferential presuppositions that bear on the epistemology of inference.
- Boghossian, P. (1992). Externalism and inference. Philosophical issues, 2, Rationality in Epistemology, pp. 11–28.
- Boghossian, P. (1994). The transparency of mental content. Philosophical perspectives, 8, Logic and Language, pp. 33–50.
- Boghossian, P. (Forthcoming). The transparency of mental content revisited. Philosophical studies.
- Brown, J (2004) Anti-individualism and knowledge. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA
- Burge, T (1988) Individualism and self-knowledge. Journal of Philosophy 85: pp. 649-663
- Burge, T (1996) Our entitlement to self-knowledge. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96: pp. 91-116
- Burge, T (2003) Perceptual entitlement. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67: pp. 503-548 CrossRef
- Burge, T (2005) Disjunctionism and perceptual psychology. Philosophical Topics 33: pp. 1-78
- Burge, T. (2009) Five theses on de re states and attitudes. In J. Almog & P. Leonardi (Eds.), The Philosophy of David Kaplan. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Camp, JL (2002) Confusion: A study in the theory of knowledge. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA
- Campbell, J. (1987). Is sense transparent? Aristotelian society supplementary volume LXI, pp. 273–292.
- Campbell, J. (2002). Reference and consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Evans, JSBT (1998) Matching bias in conditional reasoning: Do we understand it after 25 years?. Thinking and Reasoning 4: pp. 45-110 CrossRef
- Evans, JSBT (2003) In two minds: dual-process accounts of reasoning. TRENDS in Cognitive Sciences 7: pp. 454-459 CrossRef
- Gerken, M. (2007a). Epistemic reasoning and the mental. UCLA Dissertation.
- Gerken, M (2007) A false dilemma for anti-individualism. American Philosophical Quarterly 44: pp. 329-342
- Gerken, M (2009) Conceptual equivocation and epistemic relevance. Dialectica 63: pp. 117-132 CrossRef
- Gerken, M. (2011): Conceptual equivocation and warrant by reasoning. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Published online, June 4th 2010.
- Gerken, M. (Forthcoming). Internalism and externalism in the epistemology of testimony. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
- Kaplan, D Demonstratives. In: Almog, J eds. (1989) Themes from Kaplan. Oxford University Press, Oxford
- Kaplan, D (1991) Words. Proceedings of Aristotelian Society Supplementary 69: pp. 93-119
- Kripke, S (1980) Naming and necessity. Harvard University Press, Cambridge
- Lawlor, K (2001) New thoughts about old things: Cognitive policies as the ground of singular concepts. Garland Publishing, New York
- Lawlor, K (2005) Confused thought and modes of presentation. The Philosophical Quarterly 55: pp. 21-37 CrossRef
- Lawlor, K (2007) A notational worlds approach to confusion. Mind and Language 22: pp. 150-172 CrossRef
- Millikan, R. (1993). On mentalese orthography. In White queen psychology and other essays for Alice. A Bradford Book. Cambridge: The MIT Press, pp. 103–122.
- Millikan, R (1997) Images of identity. Mind 106: pp. 499-519 CrossRef
- Millikan, R (2000) On clear and confused concepts. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge CrossRef
- Oaksford, M, Chater, N (2009) Precis of Bayesian rationality: The probabilistic approach to human reasoning. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32: pp. 69-84 CrossRef
- Over, DE (2009) New paradigm psychology of reasoning. Thinking and Reasoning 15: pp. 431-438 CrossRef
- Stalnaker, R (1973) Presuppositions. Journal of Philosophical Logic 2: pp. 447-457 CrossRef
- Stalnaker, R (2008) Our knowledge of the internal world. Oxford University Press, Oxford CrossRef
- Stalnaker, R. (Forthcoming). Responses to Stoljar, Weatherson and Boghossian. Philosophical Studies.
- Wittgenstein, L (1953) Philosophical investigations. Macmillan, New York
- Univocal Reasoning and Inferential Presuppositions
Volume 76, Issue 3 , pp 373-394
- Cover Date
- Print ISSN
- Online ISSN
- Springer Netherlands
- Additional Links
- Mikkel Gerken (1)
- Author Affiliations
- 1. Department of Philosophy, University of Copenhagen, Njalsgade 80, 2300 KBH S, Copenhagen, Denmark