Abstract
Recently, Ernest Sosa (2007) has proposed two novel solutions to the problem of dream skepticism. In the present paper, I argue that Sosa’s first solution falls prey to what I will refer to as the conditionality problem, i.e., the problem of only establishing a conditional—in this case, “if x, then I am awake,” x being a placeholder for a condition incompatible with dreaming—in a context where it also needs to be established that we can know that the antecedent holds, and as such can infer the consequent, i.e., “I am awake.” Sosa’s second solution, in terms of so-called reflective knowledge, is shown to land him in the dilemma of either facing yet another conditionality problem, or violating an internalist constraint that he explicitly grants the skeptic with respect to what kind of factors can be legitimately invoked in our account of how we may know the relevant antecedent. For these reasons, I conclude that Sosa has not solved the problem of dream skepticism.
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Notes
Henceforth, all page references in the body of the text are to this book, unless otherwise stated.
See, e.g., Hobson (1999, p. 5).
Cf. Stroud (1989, p. 47), who discusses a similar problem, albeit specifically in relation to the issue of externalism about knowledge. In §5, I will return to the relation between externalism and the conditionality problem. However, as I hope to show in the present section, the problem is not restricted to the issue of externalism, since one may be susceptible to the problem even if one is not committed to externalism.
Cf. Williams (1978).
Cf. Jonathan Ichikawa (2008), who endorses Sosa’s imagination model of dreaming, while arguing (in my view, correctly) that the imagination model, rather than providing a solution to the problem of dream skepticism, makes the problem even more daunting. As such, Ichikawa takes the relevant anti-skeptical project to be that of explaining how we can know the difference between believing and imagining. Ichikawa’s approach is refreshing in its clear view of the implications, although I take it that there is still legitimate room for wondering whether the imagination model is a plausible model in the first place, particularly in light of empirical research on dreaming (e.g., Hobson 1999). However, as made clear earlier, I will not pursue this point further presently, but instead be concerned with evaluating the prospects of Sosa’s solutions on his own terms.
At the same time, it would be an exaggeration to say that Sosa is perfectly consistent on this point. In the chapter immediately following the one in which he claims that a disposition to assent is sufficient for reflective knowledge, he suggests that “One’s belief amounts to reflective knowledge only if one can say that one does know, not just arbitrarily, but with adequate justification” (Sosa 2007, p. 117; emphasis added).
Cf. Descartes (1984/1641, pp. 61–62, AT 89–90).
Perhaps Sosa could attempt a combination of components from his two solutions, by suggesting that (a) in dreams, we form no beliefs (as per his first solution), (b) the internalist constraint is to be understood in psychologistic rather than introspectionist terms (as per his second solution), and (c) there, hence, is a great doxastic difference between me and my deceived, dreaming counterpart. (Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for highlighting this possibility.) As such, the argument (like Sosa’s second solution) rejects (1) of the skeptical argument. But it is less clear that it answers the skeptic, at least as far as Sosa’s project is concerned. Remember, Sosa does not just want to say that the skeptic is wrong in suggesting that we do not know things, but also that the skeptic is wrong because we know things in a manner that is best accounted for in virtue theoretic terms. And while we might be able to account for a difference between me and my deceived counterpart in purely psychological terms in the manner outlined above, it is far less clear that we can do the same for the kind of difference that has me (as opposed to my counterpart) come out as a knower as a result of employing my virtues or competencies, given that the relevant properties of those virtues cannot be spelled out in purely psychological terms, for reasons discussed above.
This is neither to suggest that rejecting the internalist constraint is necessary for responding to the skeptic, nor that it is sufficient. As for the necessity claim, what I have argued here is that Sosa fails to avoid the problem when staying true to the constraint, not that no theory could both meet the constraint and avoid the conditionality problem. (That such a theory is forthcoming seems doubtful, but I have no argument to show that this would be impossible in principle, which is why I am staying clear of the necessity claim.) Rejecting the constraint also would not be sufficient for avoiding the conditionality problem, since you would (at the very least) also need a plausible account of how we may know something—perhaps in accordance with some relevantly sophisticated externalist analysis of knowledge—pertaining not only to the relevant conditional but also to its antecedent. That said, I think there is a real question as to whether you have really answered the skeptic rather than changed the subject if you reject the internalist constraint. And as we have seen, Sosa seems to agree.
References
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Hobson, J. A. (1999). Dreaming as delirium: How the brain goes out of its mind. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Ichikawa, J. (2008). Scepticism and the imagination model of dreaming. The Philosophical Quarterly, 58(232), 519–527.
Putnam, H. (1981). Reason, truth and history. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Sosa, E. (1997). Reflective knowledge in the best circles. The Journal of Philosophy, 94(8), 410–430.
Sosa, E. (2007). A virtue epistemology: Apt belief and reflective knowledge (Vol. 1). Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Stroud, B. (1989). Understanding human knowledge in general. In M. Clay & K. Lehrer (Eds.), Knowledge and skepticism (pp. 31–50). Boulder: Westview.
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Acknowledgments
The author would like to express his deep gratitude to Hilary Kornblith, Louise Antony, and two anonymous referees for this journal for valuable feedback on previous versions of this paper. Research underlying the present paper was conducted with generous support from the Fornander Foundation and the Hagendahl Commemoration Fund.
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Ahlstrom, K. Dream Skepticism and the Conditionality Problem. Erkenn 75, 45–60 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-010-9268-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-010-9268-5