Abstract
The invasion by spreading species is one of the most serious threats to biodiversity and ecosystem functioning. Despite a number of empirical and theoretical studies, there is still no general model about why or when settlement becomes an invasion. The purpose of this work is to test a model of Bayesian population dynamics relying on best-response strategies that could help in resource management and bioeconomic modeling. Given the species survival probability, our static game unveils a breaking-level probability in mixed strategies, where the best response for exotic species is to invade and the best response for native species is to resist. In a dynamic setting, we introduce a stochastic version of the balance equation based on conditional probabilities. We find that when the species survival probability and the availability of resources in the ecosystem are respectively high and low, the population rebalancing dynamics operates at a high pace.
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Notes
Spreading means that there is a dominant colonization of a habitat from the loss of natural controls such as resistance from the autochthonous species.
In their study, Sebert-Cuvillier et al. [29] show that the species strong competition for space and light ends up at a point of high mortality.
Although asymmetric games occur between organisms competing for territories, we use symmetric payoff matrix, notably in terms of interaction costs, for three reasons: (1) we are interested in the best response of a species valuing the contested resource up to a certain cost of competition; (2) should the costs be species-indexed, the game would be immediately solved and the dynamic analysis would be futile; (3) if the payoff matrix were asymmetric, we would not be able to distinguish between payoff asymmetry and semi-discrete population dynamics when analyzing the long-term population values.
In evolutionary game theory, the rational choice of a strategy—originally implied in game theory—is replaced by the fact that the strategy has been successful during the evolutionary process.
Comparing the costs to the benefits obtained following an interaction determines the net gain or loss, and this value is referred to as the payoff. Different strategies result in different payoffs. Evolutionary ecologists treat these strategies as phenotypes. The most successful species, due to their specific strategies, maximize their payoffs and increase their abilities to reproduce. The organism with the best interaction strategy will end up with the highest fitness. According to MacDougall et al. [20], when competition between exotic and native species emerges, fitness inequality determines which species will be competitively excluded.
Negative Jacobian matrix eigenvalues signify that states are stable, positive that they are unstable, and nil mean that we cannot conclude.
Davies and Johnson [7] point out that quantifying the biotic resistance of various states would be extremely valuable.
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Acknowledgments
This work was supported by the French National Research Agency through the Laboratory of Excellence ARBRE, a part of the Investments for the Future Program (ANR 11 - LABX-0002-01). The author is indebted to Matias Nunez (CNRS) and Serge Garcia (INRA) for their comments and feedback on different versions of the manuscript. The author would also like to thank the associate editor and the anonymous referee for their thorough reviews and suggestions.
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Appendix
Appendix
1.1 System 17
Solving the dynamical equation \( {s}_{t+1}={s}_t\left(2\tilde{q}-2{\tilde{q}}^2\right)+{\left(\tilde{q}-1\right)}^2 \) reduces to solving the nonhomogeneous recurrence relation \( {s}_t={c}_1\left(2\tilde{q}-2{\tilde{q}}^2\right)+{\left(\tilde{q}-1\right)}^2 \).Withinthisrelation, \( {s}_t={c}_1\left(2\tilde{q}-2{\tilde{q}}^2\right) \) is the associated homogeneous recurrence relation, which solution is \( {s}_t={c}_1{\left(2\tilde{q}-2{\tilde{q}}^2\right)}^{t-1} \). The nonhomogeneous part c 2 yields \( {c}_2={\scriptscriptstyle \frac{{\left(\tilde{q}-1\right)}^2}{1-{\left(2\tilde{q}-2{\tilde{q}}^2\right)}^{t-1}}} \) from which we obtain \( {c}_1={\scriptscriptstyle \frac{{\left(\tilde{q}-1\right)}^2}{\left[1-{\left(2\tilde{q}-2{\tilde{q}}^2\right)}^{t-1}\left]\kern0.5em \right[{\left(2\tilde{q}-2{\tilde{q}}^2\right)}^t-{\left(2\tilde{q}-2{\tilde{q}}^2\right)}^{t-1}\right]}} \) and finally \( {s}_t^{*}={\scriptscriptstyle \frac{{\left(\tilde{q}-1\right)}^2{\left(2\tilde{q}-2{\tilde{q}}^2\right)}^t}{\left[1-{\left(2\tilde{q}-2{\tilde{q}}^2\right)}^{t-1}\left]\kern0.5em \right[{\left(2\tilde{q}-2{\tilde{q}}^2\right)}^t-{\left(2\tilde{q}-2{\tilde{q}}^2\right)}^{t-1}\right]}} \). The final condition is \( {s}_t^{\prime }>0\iff {\scriptscriptstyle \frac{-4{\left(\tilde{q}-1\right)}^4{\tilde{q}}^2{\left(2\tilde{q}-2{\tilde{q}}^2\right)}^t \ln \left(2\tilde{q}-2{\tilde{q}}^2\right)}{\left(2{\tilde{q}}^2-2\tilde{q}+1\right){\left[{\left(2\tilde{q}-2{\tilde{q}}^2\right)}^t+2{\tilde{q}}^2-2\tilde{q}\right]}^2}}>0 \). The same rationale applies to r t + 1.
1.2 Proposition 3 and Proposition 4
We construct the Jacobian matrix for the dynamical system D t + 1 from the partial derivatives over the availability of resources and the survival rate. The eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix of five steady-state configurations S yield as follows.
where
For S = (0, 0)
which gives
α|μ | 0.00 | 0.01 | 0.10 | 0.25 | 0.50 | 0.75 | 0.90 | 0.99 | 1.00 |
0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | − |
0.01 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | − | 0.00 |
0.10 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | − | 0.00 | 0.00 |
0.25 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | − | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
0.50 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | − | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
0.75 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | − | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
0.90 | 0.00 | 0.00 | − | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
0.99 | 0.00 | − | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
1.00 | − | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
α|μ | 0.00 | 0.01 | 0.10 | 0.25 | 0.50 | 0.75 | 0.90 | 0.99 | 1.00 |
0.00 | +0.04 | +0.04 | +0.09 | +1.17 | +0.29 | +0.17 | −0.07 | −923.62 | − |
0.01 | +0.04 | +0.04 | +0.09 | +1.16 | +0.29 | +0.18 | −0.25 | − | +1,057.52 |
0.10 | +0.04 | +0.04 | +0.08 | +1.03 | +0.26 | +0.17 | − | +1.81 | +1.37 |
0.25 | +0.03 | +0.03 | +0.06 | +0.62 | +0.13 | − | +0.27 | +0.09 | +0.08 |
0.50 | +0.00 | −0.00 | −0.05 | −2.69 | − | −0.10 | −0.01 | −0.00 | +0.00 |
0.75 | −0.08 | −0.10 | −0.82 | − | −1.15 | −0.03 | −0.01 | −0.00 | −0.00 |
0.90 | −0.32 | −0.47 | − | −6.59 | −0.35 | −0.02 | −0.00 | −0.00 | −0.00 |
0.99 | −3.92 | − | −1.00 | −2.17 | −0.17 | −0.01 | −0.00 | −0.00 | −0.00 |
1.00 | – | −4.21 | −0.73 | −1.92 | −0.16 | −0.01 | −0.00 | −0.00 | +0.00 |
For S = (0, 1)
which gives
α|μ | 0.00 | 0.01 | 0.10 | 0.25 | 0.50 | 0.75 | 0.90 | 0.99 | 1.00 |
0.00 | 0.00 | −0.00 | −0.01 | −0.57 | −0.16 | −0.07 | +0.01 | +18.64 | − |
0.01 | 0.00 | −0.00 | −0.01 | −0.58 | −0.16 | −0.07 | +0.05 | − | −960.50 |
0.10 | 0.00 | −0.00 | −0.01 | −0.66 | −0.22 | −0.11 | − | −0.89 | −0.65 |
0.25 | 0.00 | −0.00 | −0.01 | −0.85 | −0.41 | − | −0.20 | −0.02 | −0.02 |
0.50 | 0.00 | −0.00 | −0.05 | −2.69 | − | −0.10 | −0.01 | −0.00 | 0.00 |
0.75 | 0.00 | −0.01 | −0.36 | − | −0.82 | −0.02 | −0.00 | −0.00 | 0.00 |
0.90 | 0.00 | −0.05 | − | −4.27 | −0.27 | −0.01 | −0.00 | −0.00 | 0.00 |
0.99 | 0.00 | − | −0.90 | −2.07 | −0.17 | −0.01 | −0.00 | −0.00 | 0.00 |
1.00 | – | −4.21 | −0.73 | −1.92 | −0.16 | −0.01 | −0.00 | −0.00 | 0.00 |
α|μ | 0.00 | 0.01 | 0.10 | 0.25 | 0.50 | 0.75 | 0.90 | 0.99 | 1.00 |
0.00 | 0.00 | −0.00 | −0.00 | −0.00 | +0.32 | +0.23 | +1.46 | +1,026.52 | − |
0.01 | 0.00 | −0.00 | −0.00 | −0.00 | +0.32 | +0.24 | +1.90 | − | 0.00 |
0.10 | 0.00 | −0.00 | −0.00 | −0.00 | +0.41 | +0.64 | − | −0.05 | 0.00 |
0.25 | 0.00 | −0.00 | −0.01 | −0.07 | +0.73 | − | −0.00 | −0.01 | 0.00 |
0.50 | 0.00 | −0.00 | −0.00 | −0.00 | − | +0.00 | −0.00 | +0.00 | 0.00 |
0.75 | 0.00 | +0.00 | 0.04 | − | +0.12 | +0.00 | +0.00 | +0.00 | +0.00 |
0.90 | 0.00 | +0.00 | − | −0.66 | +0.01 | +0.00 | +0.00 | +0.00 | +0.00 |
0.99 | 0.00 | − | −0.00 | −0.00 | +0.00 | +0.00 | +0.00 | +0.00 | +0.00 |
1.00 | − | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
For S = (1, 0)
which gives
α|μ | 0.00 | 0.01 | 0.10 | 0.25 | 0.50 | 0.75 | 0.90 | 0.99 | 1.00 |
0.00 | 0.00 | −0.00 | −0.00 | +0.00 | −0.00 | +0.00 | −0.21 | −943.11 | − |
0.01 | 0.00 | −0.00 | +0.00 | −0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | −0.45 | − | +0.00 |
0.10 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | −0.00 | +0.00 | 0.00 | − | 0.00 | −0.00 |
0.25 | 0.00 | −0.00 | +0.00 | −0.00 | 0.00 | − | +0.00 | +0.00 | −0.00 |
0.50 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | − | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
0.75 | −0.08 | −0.09 | −0.46 | − | −0.26 | −0.01 | −0.00 | −0.00 | −0.00 |
0.90 | −0.32 | −0.42 | − | −2.68 | −0.07 | −0.00 | −0.00 | −0.00 | −0.00 |
0.99 | −3.92 | − | −0.10 | −0.13 | −0.01 | −0.00 | −0.00 | −0.00 | −0.00 |
1.00 | − | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
α|μ | 0.00 | 0.01 | 0.10 | 0.25 | 0.50 | 0.75 | 0.90 | 0.99 | 1.00 |
0.00 | +0.04 | +0.04 | +0.10 | +1.50 | +0.32 | +0.18 | +0.00 | 0.00 | − |
0.01 | +0.04 | +0.04 | +0.10 | +1.50 | +0.32 | +0.18 | 0.00 | − | +1,057.52 |
0.10 | +0.04 | +0.04 | +0.10 | +1.47 | +0.28 | +0.08 | − | +1.85 | +1.37 |
0.25 | +0.03 | +0.03 | +0.08 | +1.39 | 0.00 | − | +0.38 | +0.09 | +0.08 |
0.50 | 0.00 | +0.00 | +0.00 | +0.77 | − | +0.02 | +0.00 | +0.00 | − |
0.75 | 0.00 | +0.00 | 0.00 | − | 0.00 | −0.00 | −0.00 | −0.00 | −0.00 |
0.90 | 0.00 | −0.00 | − | +0.00 | +0.00 | −0.00 | +0.00 | −0.00 | +0.00 |
0.99 | 0.00 | − | +0.00 | −0.00 | +0.00 | +0.00 | +0.00 | +0.00 | +0.00 |
1.00 | − | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
For S = (1, 1)
which gives
α|μ | 0.00 | 0.01 | 0.10 | 0.25 | 0.50 | 0.75 | 0.90 | 0.99 | 1.00 |
0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | − |
0.01 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | − | 0.00 |
0.10 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | − | 0.00 | 0.00 |
0.25 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | − | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
0.50 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | − | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
0.75 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | − | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
0.90 | 0.00 | 0.00 | − | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
0.99 | 0.00 | − | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
1.00 | − | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
α|μ | 0.00 | 0.01 | 0.10 | 0.25 | 0.50 | 0.75 | 0.90 | 0.99 | 1.00 |
0.00 | 0.00 | +0.00 | +0.00 | +0.25 | −0.19 | −0.16 | −1.33 | −1,025.67 | − |
0.01 | 0.00 | +0.00 | +0.00 | +0.24 | −0.19 | −0.17 | −1.75 | − | +960.50 |
0.10 | 0.00 | +0.00 | +0.00 | +0.22 | −0.21 | −0.44 | − | +0.91 | +0.65 |
0.25 | 0.00 | +0.00 | +0.00 | +0.14 | −0.19 | − | +0.09 | +0.02 | +0.02 |
0.50 | 0.00 | −0.00 | −0.00 | −0.77 | − | −0.02 | −0.00 | −0.00 | 0.00 |
0.75 | 0.00 | −0.00 | −0.04 | − | −0.19 | −0.00 | −0.00 | −0.00 | −0.00 |
0.90 | 0.00 | −0.00 | − | +1.01 | −0.02 | −0.00 | −0.00 | −0.00 | −0.00 |
0.99 | 0.00 | − | +0.00 | +0.02 | −0.00 | −0.00 | −0.00 | −0.00 | −0.00 |
1.00 | − | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
For S = (s ∗, r ∗)
which gives
α|μ | 0.00 | 0.01 | 0.10 | 0.25 | 0.50 | 0.75 | 0.90 | 0.99 | 1.00 |
0.00 | +0.02 | − | − | −2.94 | − | − | − | −933.66 | − |
0.01 | +0.02 | − | − | −2.87 | − | − | − | − | 1,029.80 |
0.10 | +0.02 | − | − | −2.26 | − | − | − | − | 1.27 |
0.25 | +0.01 | − | − | − | − | − | − | − | − |
0.50 | 0.00 | −0.00 | −0.02 | −0.24 | − | −0.06 | −0.01 | −0.00 | 0.00 |
0.75 | −0.04 | −0.04 | −0.20 | − | − | −0.01 | − | − | − |
0.90 | − | −0.16 | − | − | − | −0.01 | − | − | − |
0.99 | − | − | −0.35 | − | − | −0.00 | − | − | − |
1.00 | − | −2.10 | −0.37 | − | − | − | − | − | − |
α|μ | 0.00 | 0.01 | 0.10 | 0.25 | 0.50 | 0.75 | 0.90 | 0.99 | 1.00 |
0.00 | +0.02 | − | − | −3.31 | − | − | − | −1,006.19 | − |
0.01 | +0.02 | − | − | −3.24 | − | − | − | − | 1,029.80 |
0.10 | +0.02 | − | − | −2.64 | − | − | − | − | 1.27 |
0.25 | +0.01 | − | − | − | − | − | − | − | − |
0.50 | − | −0.00 | −0.02 | −0.24 | − | −0.01 | −0.01 | −0.01 | 0.00 |
0.75 | −0.04 | −0.06 | −0.59 | − | − | − | − | − | − |
0.90 | − | −0.32 | − | − | − | − | − | − | − |
0.99 | − | − | −0.65 | − | − | − | − | − | − |
1.00 | − | −2.10 | −0.37 | − | − | − | − | − | − |
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Dragicevic, A.Z. Bayesian Population Dynamics of Spreading Species. Environ Model Assess 20, 17–27 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10666-014-9416-4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10666-014-9416-4