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Bank size, competition and risk in the Turkish banking industry

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Abstract

This paper investigates the impact of bank size and competition on earnings volatility and insolvency risk using quarterly data for commercial banks operating in the Turkish banking industry for the period 2002Q1–2012Q2. The main result of the paper indicates that bank size and earnings volatility are negatively related, suggesting that larger banks are less risky. The results also indicate that competition measured by the Boone indicator increases earnings volatility. The results further suggest that higher capitalized banks, banks with a higher share of non-interest income in total income and efficient banks face lower earnings volatility. Finally, insolvency risk measured by Z-score and bank size are positively related, suggesting that larger banks are more stable.

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Notes

  1. Losing control in financing fiscal deficits produced the financial crisis of 1994. The government interventions in the domestic debt market were the main reason of the crisis. The Turkish economy shrunk by 6 % and the inflation rate hit three digit levels. Moreover, the value of US dollar nearly doubled against Turkish lira and the Central Bank reserves decreased significantly. Three banks became insolvent and a full coverage deposit insurance system was introduced to restore financial stability.

  2. The problem started with the exchange rate-based stabilization program of 1999. The main aim of the program was to control inflation, correct macroeconomic fundamentals and decrease the fragility of the financial system. After some initial success, the Turkish economy suffered a liquidity crisis in November 2000. However, the country got into a deepening crisis period that reached to its peak with the abandonment of the pegged exchange rate regime in February 2001.

  3. The Turkish economy shrunk by 7.5 % and the Turkish lira depreciated around 11 % in real terms. As in the case of 1994 crisis, most of the Central Bank reserves eroded in managing the crisis. Banking system was the most affected by the crisis because of the high level of foreign currency dominated liabilities. Total assets of the system decreased about one-third in US dollar terms.

  4. 20 banks were taken over by the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund (SDIF) due to the weak financial positions during the period 1999–2003.

  5. The Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency (BRSA), which was founded in September 2000, changed its main objective from supervision to restructuring and rehabilitation. The main duties of the BRSA during the crisis period were strengthening the private banks’ capital structures, restructuring the state-owned banks, resolving the banks taken over by the SDIF, and improving the quality of supervision in the banking system (Al and Aysan 2006).

  6. The BAT stands for the Banks Association of Turkey. The BAT publishes annual reports called as the “banks in Turkey”. The figures have taken from the report published in 2012.

  7. We also checked the inflation adjusted figures with the suggestion of the referee. $40 billion and $10 billion in 2002 correspond to around $51 billion and $12.8 billion in 2012, respectively. There were still 7 banks with an asset size above $51 billion, 5 banks with an asset size between $12.7 billion and $51 billion, and the rest with an asset size lower than $12.7 billion. Hence, this supports the above statement regarding the significant increase in the number of large banks in the system during the sample period.

  8. Haselmann and Wachtel (2007) state that banks behave differently under different institutional settings.

  9. Interested readers could refer to Baltagi (2005) for the technical details of the dynamic panel data models.

  10. The System GMM estimator also eliminates the endogeneity problem that might arise due to the possible correlation between the bank-specific effects and the explanatory variables.

  11. We also used the standard deviation of returns on equity (ROE) as a proxy for earnings volatility for bank i for a robustness check.

  12. Market share for bank i is defined as \( ms_{i} = \frac{{q_{i} }}{{\sum\nolimits_{i = 1}^{n} {q_{i} } }} \), where \( q_{i} \) is the total loans of bank i. This measure is calculated for each quarter.

  13. The HHI is calculated by using bank total loans as inputs (\( HHI = \sum\nolimits_{i = 1}^{n} {s_{i}^{2} } \), where s represents the market share of each bank in total loans in the market).

  14. The H-statistic developed by Panzar and Rosse (1987) is another alternative measure used widely in the banking literature. It is computed as the sum of the estimated elasticities of revenues with respect to input prices. Hence, it provides an aggregate measure of competition. The main disadvantage of this statistic is that it maps the various degrees of market power only weakly and, therefore, cannot be viewed as a continuous variable (Bikker et al. 2012).

  15. The joint determination of cost and performance could be the case in this regression model. Hence, we also tested whether endogenity problem is present in our specification. The results of endogenity test show that marginal costs have been considered as exogenous at the conventional significance levels in the estimation of Eq. (4).

  16. Although not reported, the t values of each quarter are available upon request from the authors.

  17. As discussed before, the Boone indicator is inversely proportional to competition. That is, the more negative the measure is, the more competitive the banking market is.

  18. Following De Haan and Poghosyan (2012a) the interaction of competition and size is also added to investigate whether competition conditions the impact of size. Due to the high correlation between the interaction term and Boone indicator, coefficients of key variables were statistically insignificant. Hence, we dropped the interaction term from the regressions. Although not reported, they are available from the authors upon request.

  19. It should be noted that the relationship between ROA volatility and capitalization is mostly significantly positive, implying that higher capitalized banks face higher ROA volatility.

  20. Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2010) show that banks in developing countries have relatively more non-interest income share in total operating income (0.385) compared to developed countries (0.342).

  21. We also include dummy variables to control for global crisis and foreign ownership in the regression. Our aim was to check whether global financial crisis and foreign ownership have impacts on earnings volatility and insolvency risk. Coefficients of these dummies were statistically insignificant at the conventional levels. In addition, following the suggestion of one of the referees, we also exercised the Chow test to check whether there is a structural break in the relationship between earnings volatility and explanatory variables. For this purpose, the sample period was divided into two sub-periods: 2002:Q1–2007:Q4 and 2008:Q1–2012:Q2 (pre- and post-global crisis period). The test result produced an F-statistic value that was insignificant at the conventional significance levels. Therefore, the null hypothesis which asserted that the model parameters were stable during the sample period was not rejected.

  22. Bank non-traditional activities such as off-balance sheet and non-interest income have commonly been used as an additional bank output in the banking literature in recent years (see for example Lozano-Vivas and Pasiouras 2010).

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Acknowledgments

We would like to acknowledge the financial support provided by the Turkish Scientific and Technological Research Council under the Project No. SOBAG-112K039.

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Correspondence to Adnan Kasman.

Appendix

Appendix

To estimate Eq. (4) we need the computation of marginal costs for each bank and quarter. As marginal costs cannot be directly observed, we estimate them by using a translog cost function, which is common in the related literature since it does not require too many restrictive assumptions about the nature of the technology. The multi-product cost function for a given bank s at time t can be specified as follows:

$$ \begin{aligned} \ln tc_{st} & = \alpha_{0} + \sum\limits_{i = 1}^{3} {\alpha_{i} \ln y_{ist} } + \frac{1}{2}\sum\limits_{i = 1}^{3} {\sum\limits_{k = 1}^{3} {\alpha_{ik} \ln y_{ist} \ln y_{kst} } } + \sum\limits_{j = 1}^{2} {\beta_{j} \ln w_{jst} } \\ \quad + \frac{1}{2}\sum\limits_{j = 1}^{2} {\sum\limits_{m = 1}^{2} {\beta_{jm} \ln w_{jst} \ln w_{mst} + \sum\limits_{i = 1}^{3} {\sum\limits_{j = 1}^{2} {\delta_{ij} \ln y_{ist} \ln w_{jst} } + \sum\limits_{t = 1}^{T - 1} {\theta_{t} } D_{t} } } } + \varepsilon_{st} \\ \end{aligned} $$
(5)

where tc is the total cost and y denotes three outputs; total loans, other earning assets and non-interest income. The last output is a proxy for bank non-traditional activity.Footnote 22 w represents two input prices: price of funds and a common price of labor and capital. Since personnel expenses are not reported in some quarters, we calculate a common price for labor and capital (see Hasan and Marton 2003). The common price is calculated as the ratio between operating costs and total assets. The price of funds is calculated by dividing total interest expenses by total deposits. Both financial and operating costs are included in the estimation of the cost function. In addition, D, which represents time dummies for each quarter, is included to capture technological progress, and \( \varepsilon = v + u \) is a composite error term where v represents standard statistical noise and u captures inefficiency. To ensure that the estimated cost frontier is well-behaved, two standard properties of the cost function, symmetry and linear homogeneity, are imposed via parameter restrictions. The linear homogeneity conditions are imposed by normalizing total cost (tc) and the price of labor (\( w_{1} \)) by the price of funds (\( w_{2} \)). The symmetry condition requires \( \alpha_{ik} = \alpha_{ki\;} \forall \;i,\;k \) and \( \beta_{jm} = \beta_{mj\;} \forall \;j,\;m \).

The marginal costs for loans (l) can be obtained by taking the first derivative of the dependent variable in Eq. (5) with respect to output \( y_{lst} \) as follows:

$$ MC_{st} = \frac{{\partial \ln (tc_{st} /w_{2} )}}{{\ln y_{lst} }} = \frac{{(tc_{st} /w_{2} )}}{{y_{lst} }}\left[ {\alpha_{l} + \alpha_{il} \ln y_{lst} + \sum\limits_{k = 1, \ldots ,K;k \ne l} {\alpha_{ik} \ln y_{ist} + } \phi_{j} \ln \left(\frac{{w_{1} }}{{w_{2} }}\right)} \right] $$
(6)

We also estimate cost efficiency using Jondrow et al. (1982) approach. Bank-specific estimates of inefficiency, u, can be computed by using the distribution of the inefficiency term conditional on the estimate of the composite error term. The random error term (v) is assumed to be normally distributed and the inefficiency term (u) is assumed to be one-sided.

The descriptive statistics of variables used in the translog cost function are reported in Table 4.

Table 4 Descriptive statistics
Table 5 Definitions, expected signs and data sources of the variables used in the analysis
Fig. 2
figure 2figure 2

Earnings volatility (SD), bank stability (Z-score), capitalization, diversification, inefficiency, and size over the period 2003Q1–2012Q1. Standard deviations of earnings (ROA) are computed using a four-quarter rolling time windows. Total assets are in millions of US dollars. a Earnings volatility. b Bank stability. c Bank capitalization and diversification. d Bank inefficiency. e Total assets

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Kasman, A., Kasman, S. Bank size, competition and risk in the Turkish banking industry. Empirica 43, 607–631 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10663-015-9307-1

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