Abstract
This paper studies greenhouse-gas emission (GHG) controls in the presence of international carbon leakage through international firm relocation. In a new economic geography model with two countries (‘North’ and ‘South’), only North sets a target for GHG emissions. We compare the consequences of emission quotas and emission taxes under trade liberalization on location of two manufacturing sectors with different emission intensities and degrees of carbon leakage. With low trade costs, further trade liberalization increases global emissions by facilitating carbon leakage. Regulation by quotas leads to spatial sorting, resulting in less carbon leakage and less global emissions than regulation by taxes.
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Notes
International carbon leakage may also occur through fuel price changes (e.g., Felder and Rutherford 1993; Burniaux and Martins 2000; Ishikawa and Kiyono 2000; Kiyono and Ishikawa 2004, 2013). When a country adopts policies to reduce GHG emissions, its demand for fossil fuels is likely to decrease. If the world prices of fossil fuels fall as a result of this decrease in a country attempting to reduce its GHG emissions, the demand for fossil fuels rises in other countries with weak regulations.
In Markusen et al. (1993), two polluting firms (one is domestic and the other is foreign) choose the number of plants and plant locations when only the home country adopts emission taxes. They are primarily concerned with market structures induced by taxes. In Markusen et al. (1995), a single firm decides the plant number and locations when both countries adopt environmental policies non-cooperatively. See also Rauscher (1995) and Ulph and Valentini (2001).
According to Jaffe et al. (1995), differences in environmental policies have little or no effect on trade patterns, investment or firm location. However, Henderson (1996), Becker and Henderson (2000), Greenstone (2002), List et al. (2003), Dean et al. (2009) and Duvivier and Xiong (2013) find that pollution-intensive plants are responding to environmental regulations. Javorcik and Wei (2004) discuss factors that may make the evidence of the hypothesis weak. Levinson and Taylor (2008) point out that the pollution haven effect has been underestimated.
Keller and Levinson (2002), Eskeland and Harrison (2003), Fredriksson et al. (2003), Cole and Elliott (2005), Cole et al. (2006, 2014) and Javorcik and Wei (2004) study the impact of environmental regulations on FDI and trade. Turning to inter-regional analysis, Cai et al. (2016) investigates the impact of regulations by central government on pollution across Chinese counties.
For example, in the Kyoto protocol, the industrialized countries, referred to as Annex I Parties, made a commitment to decrease their GHG emissions by 5.2 % compared to their 1990 baseline levels over the 2008 to 2012 period. Meanwhile, developing countries such as China and India had no obligation to undertake the reduction.
The early version of this paper, Ishikawa and Okubo (2008), examines the case with an agricultural sector and a single manufacturing sector.
When a country adopts exceedingly lax environmental policies in order to keep its competitive advantage, its strategy is sometimes called “environmental (or ecological) dumping.” On the other hand, when a country adopts overly stringent environmental policies in order to reduce local pollution, this strategy is called “Not in my back yard (NIMBY).” There are a number of studies which, following Markusen et al. (1995), analyze environmental dumping and NIMBY strategies (e.g., Rauscher 1995; Ulph and Valentini 2001).
Venables (2001) studies the impact of an ad valorem tax on equilibrium in a vertical linkage model. In the case of energy taxes that are unilaterally introduced in one country, he discusses hysteresis in location but does not investigate quotas. Elbers and Withagen (2004) study the impact of an emission tax on agglomeration in the presence of labor migration. Ishikawa and Okubo (2011) explore the effect of environmental product standards on the environment.
Ishikawa et al. (2012) extend the analysis of emission quotas in Ishikawa and Kiyono (2006) by incorporating South’s emission quotas into the model. Kiyono and Ishikawa (2004, 2013) focus on the international interdependence of environmental management policies in the presence of international carbon leakage.
Here the income effect means that higher income results in lower emissions. Evidence of the income effect is also mixed. See, for example, Barbier (1997).
The total number of households (population) is one in the world, because each individual has one unit of labor, K-capital and H-capital. The level of demand depends on population size rather than income.
This normalization is not crucial for our main results, though the value of \(\sigma \) is bound to \(\upmu \) and vice versa. Even if we do not employ this normalization, all main results remain valid.
Note that each firm’s profit is \(1/\sigma \) times firm revenue. The (1 – \(1/\sigma \)) terms cancel out in the price of a product variety and in CES composition.
Full agglomeration is not necessarily assumed in the initial equilibrium without emission policies.
In Fig. 1, we have \(s=0.6\), \(\sigma =1.5\), \(\gamma =1.2\), \(t=0.02\), \(\mu =1/3\), and \(\bar{{\chi }}=2.1522\).
Figure 2 assumes s=0.6, \(\sigma =1.5\) and \(\gamma =2\).
In Figs. 3 and 4, we have \(s=0.6\), \(\sigma =2\), \(\gamma =1.2\), \(t=0.5\), \(\mu =0.45\) and \(\bar{{\chi }}=17/12\).
Since 4(1 – s)\(s <\) 1 for \(s >\) 1/2 and \(1>(1+t)^{2(1-\sigma )}>(1+\gamma t)^{2(1-\sigma )}\), \(1-4s(1-s)(1+t)^{2(1-\sigma )}>0\) and \(1-4s(1-s)(1+\gamma t)^{2(1-\sigma )}>0\) always hold. Thus, \(\phi ^S \)in each sector is a real number.
Inherently, this stems from so-called the hump-shaped agglomeration rent (Baldwin and Krugman 2002; Baldwin et al. 2003).
There exists the bifurcation point, \(\phi ^{B}>0\) under the condition of \(\overline{\chi }>\mu (1+\gamma )s\). This indicates that as North emission policy becomes less stringent, the quota is less likely to be binding and the bifurcation point rises, and vice versa. Note that \(\phi ^{B}<1\) always holds due to \(\hbox {s}>0.5\).
The level of the quota could be less than the total emissions by all C-sector firms.
Here, we assume tax and quota revenues are distributed to individuals in a lump-sum manner.
Our model sets the same maximum level of North emissions between emission taxes and quotas as in (7). If all C-sector and D-sector firms locate in North under quotas, the permit price \(\bar{{q}}\) is determined by: \(\bar{{\chi }}\equiv \frac{1}{1+t}+\frac{\gamma }{1+\gamma t}=\frac{1}{1+\bar{{q}}}+\frac{\gamma }{1+\gamma \bar{{q}}}\). However, full agglomerate of the D-sector in North would not arise in the case of quotas, while it does in the case of taxes for some trade costs. This indicates that the permit price is always lower than the corresponding tax rate t (and \(\bar{{q}}\)) in equilibrium.
By contrast, Copeland (1996) imposes a tax on imports without refunding taxes to domestic exporters.
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We are grateful to Richard Baldwin, Masahisa Fujita an anonymous referee and an editor for their helpful comments and suggestions. This research is supported by Japan Society for Promotion of Science KAKENHI. Any remaining errors are our own responsibility.
Appendices
Appendix 1
In this appendix, we prove Proposition 2. First, note that the relocation of firms from North to South under trade liberalization means \(\frac{dn}{d\phi }<0\) and \(\frac{dm}{d\phi }<0\).
Differentiating global emissions in sector C with respect to \(\phi \), we can derive
where \(B_C \equiv \frac{s}{\Delta _C }\) and \(B_C ^{*}\equiv \frac{1-s}{\Delta _C ^{*}}\). We now focus on emissions by C-sector firms. D-sector is isomorphic. Here we omit subscript “C” for simplicity.
The first term can be rewritten as
where \(T_C \equiv (1+t)^{-\sigma }\). The second term can be given as \(\frac{d\chi ^{W}}{d\phi }=nB^{*}T_C +(1-n)B\). The third and fourth terms are
where \(\tilde{T}\equiv (1+t)^{1-\sigma }>T_C \).
Then we can reorganize the above four terms into the following three parts. The first and second parts are given as
where \(\alpha \equiv \frac{nT_C +(1-n)\phi }{n\tilde{T}+(1-n)\phi }<1\) and \(\beta \equiv \frac{n\phi T_C +(1-n)}{n\phi \tilde{T}+(1-n)}<1\). This is because \(\tilde{T}>T_C \quad T_C -\alpha \tilde{T}=\frac{(1-n)\phi (T_C -\tilde{T})}{n\tilde{T}+(1-n)\phi }<0\) and \(T_C -\beta \tilde{T}=\frac{(1-n)(T_C -\tilde{T})}{n\phi \tilde{T}+(1-n)}<0\). The third part is given by
Note that B\(>\)B* and \(\Delta <\Delta ^{*}\). Since all of these three parts are positive and the same is true for D-sector, \(\frac{d\chi ^{W}}{d\phi }>0\) always holds when \(\frac{dn}{d\phi }<0\).
Appendix 2
In this appendix, we prove Proposition 4. South emissions are given by\(\chi ^{*}=(1-n)(\phi B_C +B_C ^{*})+(1-m)(\phi B_D +B_D ^{*})\). Differentiating South emissions with respect to \(\phi \), we get
Note that \(\frac{d\chi ^{*}}{dn}<0\) and \(\frac{d\chi ^{*}}{dm}<0\).
Now we consider two extreme cases, (i) the bifurcation point and (ii) free trade.
1.1 At the Bifurcation Point
Note that in the following, we consider D-sector only, because C-sector is in isomorphic expression. First of all, we prove \(\frac{dm}{dq}<0\). We can derive
where \(Q\equiv (1+\gamma q)^{1-\sigma }\) and \(\frac{dQ}{dq}<0\). At the bifurcation point, as discussed in main text, the permit price is zero, i.e. Q=1, \(\frac{dm}{dq}=\left( {\frac{\phi }{(1-\phi )^{2}}} \right) \frac{dQ}{dq}<0\). Since the bifurcation point is assumed to be small (i.e., \(\phi ^{B}\) is assumed to be small), \(\frac{dm}{dq}\) is close to zero. In the same manner, we can derive \(\frac{dn}{dq}<0\) which is close to zero. Next, we prove \(\frac{dm}{d\phi }>0\). With Q=1, we have
Thus, \(\frac{dm}{d\phi }>0\) always holds. \(\frac{dn}{d\phi }>0\) for sector C can be derived in the same manner. Using these results, we have
Then the other three terms for D-sector are given as\((1-m)B_D \),
and \(\frac{d\chi ^{*}}{dB_D ^{*}}\left( {\frac{dB_D ^{*}}{d\Delta _D ^{*}}\left( {\frac{d\Delta _D ^{*}}{d\phi }+\frac{d\Delta _D ^{*}}{dm}\frac{dm}{d\phi }+\frac{d\Delta _D ^{*}}{dm}\frac{dm}{dq}\frac{dq}{d\phi }} \right) } \right) \cong \frac{d\chi ^{*}}{dB_D ^{*}}\left( {\frac{dB_D ^{*}}{d\Delta _D ^{*}}\left( {\frac{d\Delta _D ^{*}}{d\phi }+\frac{d\Delta _D ^{*}}{dm}\frac{dm}{d\phi }} \right) } \right) \)
The last term can be decomposed as \(\frac{d\chi ^{*}}{dB_D ^{*}}\left( {\frac{dB_D ^{*}}{d\Delta _D ^{*}}\frac{d\Delta _D ^{*}}{d\phi }} \right) <0\) and \(\frac{d\chi ^{*}}{dB_D ^{*}}\left( {\frac{dB_D ^{*}}{d\Delta _D ^{*}}\frac{d\Delta _D ^{*}}{dm}\frac{dm}{d\phi }} \right) =(1-m)\frac{B^{*}}{\Delta ^{*}}(1-Q\phi )\frac{dm}{d\phi }>0\). Here the subscript “D” is omitted for simplicity.
Now we combine two parts \(\frac{d\chi ^{*}}{dB^{*}}\left( {\frac{dB^{*}}{d\Delta ^{*}}\frac{d\Delta ^{*}}{dm}\frac{dm}{d\phi }} \right) >0\) and \(\frac{d\chi ^{*}}{dm}\left( {\frac{dm}{d\phi }} \right) <0\). Then we finally get\(\left( {\frac{d\chi ^{*}}{dB^{*}}\frac{dB^{*}}{d\Delta ^{*}}\frac{d\Delta ^{*}}{dm}+\frac{d\chi ^{*}}{dm}} \right) \left( {\frac{dm}{d\phi }} \right) =\left( {(1-m)\frac{B^{*}}{\Delta ^{*}}(1-Q\phi )-(\phi B+B^{*})} \right) \frac{dm}{d\phi }<0\)
because \(\frac{(1-m)(1-Q\phi )}{\Delta ^{*}}<1\).
Next, the remaining parts are combined as
The same is true for C-sector. Thus, we can conclude that \(\frac{d\chi ^{*}}{d\phi }<0\) always holds at the bifurcation point.
1.2 Free Trade
To examine the case of free trade, we first show that the permit price is hump-shaped in \(\phi \). The hump-shaped permit price indicates that \(\frac{dq}{d\phi }\) is first positive, then negative and finally goes to zero at \(\phi =1\). It is obvious that \(\frac{dq}{d\phi }>0\) when quota is binding at the bifurcation point. Thus, here we prove \(\lim _{\phi \rightarrow 1} \frac{dq}{d\phi }=-0\). Defining the quota constraint (15) as a function F, we differentiate (15) with respect to q:
where \(\Omega \equiv (1+\gamma q)^{-\sigma }\left( {B+\phi B^{*}} \right) \). Note that the first term is from North emissions by C-firms, \(\frac{1}{1+q}\).
C-firms already concentrate in North at the sustain point and trade cost reduction at\(\phi \)=1 does not influence C-firms’ location. The change of the permit price affects only total C-firm emissions. Setting m=0, we can get \(\frac{dF}{dq}=-\frac{1}{(1+q)^{2}}<0\) and \(\lim \limits _{m\rightarrow +0} \frac{dF}{dq}=-\frac{1}{(1+q)^{2}}<0\). Likewise we derive
and \(\lim \limits _{m\rightarrow +0} \frac{dF}{d\phi }=0\). Using \(\frac{dq}{d\phi }=-\frac{\frac{dF}{d\phi }}{\frac{dF}{dq}}\), we obtain \(\frac{dq}{d\phi }<0\) and \(\lim \limits _{\phi \rightarrow 1} \frac{dq}{d\phi }=-0\).
Since all C-sector firms already concentrate in North at the sustain point, the marginal change of trade costs at \(\phi \)=1 affects only D-sector firms. Thus, the differentiation in terms of\(\phi \)is only for D-sector firms:
where the subscript “D” is omitted. We now prove \(\frac{dm}{d\phi }<0\).
Note that \(2Q(1-s)\phi -1<0\). Keeping \(Q>\phi \), as Q and \(\phi \) converge to one, we can get \(Q(s+(1-s)\phi ^{2})-\phi \cong \phi (s+(1-s)\phi ^{2})-\phi <0\). Thus, we have \(\frac{dm}{d\phi }<0\). Using these results, we can derive \(\frac{d\chi ^{*}}{dm}\left( {\frac{dm}{d\phi }+\frac{dm}{dq}\frac{dq}{d\phi }} \right) =\frac{d\chi ^{*}}{dm}\left( {\frac{dm}{d\phi }} \right) >0\).
Then, converging Q and \(\phi \) to one, we can simplify other terms:
The last term is (1-m)B = B\(>\)0. Based on all of these results, \(\frac{d\chi ^{*}}{d\phi }>0\) always holds at \(\phi \)=1.
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Ishikawa, J., Okubo, T. Greenhouse-Gas Emission Controls and Firm Locations in North–South Trade. Environ Resource Econ 67, 637–660 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-015-9991-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-015-9991-0