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International Fisheries Agreements: A Game Theoretical Approach

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Abstract

This paper surveys the application of game theory to the economic analysis of international fisheries agreements. The relevance of this study comes not only from the existence of a vast literature on the topic but especially from the specific features of these agreements. The emphasis of the survey is on coalition games, an approach that has become prominent in the fisheries economics literature over the last decade. It is shown that coalition games were first applied to international fisheries agreements in the late 1990s addressing cooperative issues under the framework of characteristic function games. Then, progressively, this cooperative approach was combined with non-cooperative elements such as the stability analysis of the agreements. Finally, partition function games, which model coalition formation endogenously, were introduced and became the standard approach to study the formation and stability of international fisheries agreements. A key message that emerges from this literature strand is that self-enforcing cooperative management of internationally shared fish stocks is generally difficult to achieve. Hence, the international legal framework and regulations play a decisive role on ensuring cooperation over the use of these resources.

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Notes

  1. Hereafter, these stocks will be simply referred as internationally shared fish stocks. Thus, our analysis is restricted to marine capture fish stocks, which are by far the most important internationally shared fish resources. The main principles discussed also apply generally to shared inland water fisheries.

  2. This broad category includes what, in the terminology of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, is called highly migratory fish stocks, such as the main tuna species. According to Munro (2007), there is no meaningful difference between straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks as far as economic analysis is concerned.

  3. The number of sub-coalitions, \(2^{n}\), also includes the empty coalition (Ø) and the grand coalition.

  4. In addition to the \(\upgamma \)-characteristic functions there are the \(\upalpha \)- and ß-characteristic functions, which presume strategies to make the other players worse off.

  5. Finus (2003) also concludes that for the standard models on the formation of International Environmental Agreements (IEAs) the equilibrium coalition size and global welfare are at least as high under the Stackelberg than under the Nash-Cournot assumption, due to the strategic advantage of participants over non-participants.

  6. Thus whenever cooperation would be needed most, it achieves only little. This paradox was first described in the context of International Environmental Agreements by Barrett (1994).

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Acknowledgments

The authors gratefully acknowledge the suggestions of the editor, Michael Finus, and of two anonymous referees. Financial support from the Academy of Finland is acknowledged through the Project: “Comprehensive bioeconomic modelling of renewable resources: Integration of game theory, valuation and multi-species interactions”.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Faculty of Economics and Research Centre for Spatial and Organizational Dynamics, University of Algarve, Campus de Gambelas, 8005-139, Faro, Portugal

    Pedro Pintassilgo

  2. Department of Business and Economics, University of Southern Denmark, Odense, Denmark

    Lone Grønbæk Kronbak

  3. Department of Economics and Management, University of Helsinki, Helsinki, Finland

    Marko Lindroos

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  1. Pedro Pintassilgo
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  2. Lone Grønbæk Kronbak
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Correspondence to Pedro Pintassilgo.

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Pintassilgo, P., Kronbak, L.G. & Lindroos, M. International Fisheries Agreements: A Game Theoretical Approach. Environ Resource Econ 62, 689–709 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-014-9850-4

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