Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Context Effects in a Negatively Framed Social Dilemma Experiment

  • Published:
Environmental and Resource Economics Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

A number of studies of the positively-framed voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM) public goods game have examined the role of context on participant behavior. Relatively little attention, however, has been given to the effects of context in negatively-framed VCM games even though this setting is relevant to a wide array of real world challenges, such as common pool resource use and pollution externalities. This study uses a carefully-controlled laboratory experiment to investigate the degree to which the context in which decisions are made influences decision making in a negatively-framed VCM laboratory experiment. The context treatments that we evaluate vary communication, voting, and the status quo of the initial endowment. Results indicate that providing groups the opportunity to communicate and vote significantly reduces choices that impose external costs. Importantly, the pro-social effects of communication and voting are strongest when the status quo endowment is the private account, which generates costs on other participants. This result suggests that the effect of the status quo endowment is a function of whether the social dilemma is framed positively or negatively when communication between participants is allowed.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Fig. 1
Fig. 2
Fig. 3

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. The typical distinction between a CPR and a public good is whether use of the good reduces the quantity or quality of the good available to other users. By altering the framing of resource use, however, one could express conservation in the use of a CPR as improving resource availability for all other users, or free-riding in a public good situation as reducing the quantity of the good available to others.

  2. Note that this is functionally equivalent to the payoff function used in Messer et al. (2007)

    $$\begin{aligned} \pi _{i} =x_i +\frac{1.5}{7}g_i +\frac{1.5}{7}\sum _{j\ne i} g_{j}, \text{ where} x_i +g_i =1. \end{aligned}$$

    .

  3. To provide a concrete example of the payoff calculations in the negative and positive frame, suppose that each of the seven participants in a group chooses to allocate half of their experimental dollar to the private account and half to the public account. In the negative frame that we utilize in the experiments, each participant would receive 1.25 in earnings from the private account (\(2.5*0.5=1.25\)), 0.75 in earnings from the public account (\(1.5*0.5=0.75\)), and would be assessed a 0.75 loss from the aggregate allocations to the private account (\(0.214*0.5*7=0.75\)). Each participant’s earnings for that round would therefore be 1.25 experiment dollars (\(1.25+0.75-0.75=1.25\)). This is equivalent to the 1.25 experimental dollar payout from the positively-framed experiment under the same contribution conditions. In this case each participant would earn 0.50 from the allocation to their private account, 0.107 from their allocation to the public account (\(0.214*0.5=0.107\)), and 0.643 from the contributions to the public account from other members of the group (\(0.214*0.5*6=0.643\)).

  4. The actual terminology used in the instructions for the communication sessions stated that the “discussion is free and open, except that no deals or threats are allowed.” While this could potentially be interpreted as precluding any form of verbal agreement regarding the allocation of endowments, the actual discussions between participants in the communication sessions suggests that participants did not interpret the word “deal” in this broad a fashion.

  5. The OLS model was estimated using the cluster option in STATA 11.

References

  • Alm J, McClelland GH, Schulze WD (1999) Changing the social norm of tax compliance by voting. Kyklos 52:141–171

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Anderson SP, Goeree JK, Holt CA (1998) A theoretical analysis of altruism and decision error in public goods games. J Public Econ 70:297–323

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Anderson LR, Stafford SL (2003) Punishment in a regulatory setting: experimental evidence from the VCM. J Regul Econ 24:91–110

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Andreoni J (1995a) Warm-glow versus cold-prickle: the effect of positive and negative framing on cooperation in experiments. Q J Econ 110:1–21

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Andreoni J (1995b) Cooperation in public-goods experiments: kindness or confusion. Am Econ Rev 85: 891–904

    Google Scholar 

  • Bochet O, Page T, Putterman L (2006) Communication and punishment in voluntary contribution experiments. J Econ Behav Organ 60:11–26

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Brandts J, Schwieren C (2007) Frames and games. UFAE and IAE Working Papers 695.07, Unitat de Fonaments de l’Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d’Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).

  • Brosig J, Weimann J, Ockenfels A (2003) The effect of communication media on cooperation. Ger Econ Rev 4:217–242

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bruce C and Clark JE (2010) The effect of entitlements and equality on cooperative bargaining with private, unverifiable information. University of Canterbury, Department of Economics and Finance, Working Papers in Economics

  • Cookson R (2000) Framing effects in public goods experiments. Exp Econ 3:55–79

    Google Scholar 

  • Croson R, Fatas E, Neugebauer T (2005) Reciprocity, matching and conditional cooperation in two public goods games. Econ Lett 87:95–101

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fisher J, Isaac RM, Schatzberg JW, Walker JM (1995) Heterogeneous demand for public goods: behavior in the voluntary contribution mechanism. Public Choice 85:249–266

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gintis H (2000) Beyond Homo economicus: evidence from experimental economics. Ecol Econ 35:311–322

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hartman RS, Doane MJ, Woo CK (1991) Consumer rationality and the status quo. Q J Econ 106:141–162

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hsu LC (2003) Effects of framing, group size, and the contribution mechanism on cooperation in threshold public goods and common resources experiments. Academia Economic Papers 31:1–31

    Google Scholar 

  • Isaac RM, Walker JM (1988a) Group size effects in public goods provision: the voluntary contribution mechanism. Q J Econ 103:179–199

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Isaac RM, Walker JM (1988b) Communication and free-riding behavior: the voluntary contribution mechanism. Econ Inq 26:585–608

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kahneman D, Knetsch JL, Thaler RH (1991) Anomalies, the endowment effect, loss aversion, and status quo bias. J Econ Perspect 5:193–206

    Google Scholar 

  • Kotani K, Managi S, Tanaka K (2008) Further investigations of framing effects on cooperative choices in a provision point mechanism. Econ Bull 51:1–9

    Google Scholar 

  • Kroll S, Cherry TL, Shogren JF (2007) Voting, punishment, and public goods. Econ Inq 45:557–570

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Marwell G, Ames R (1979) Experiments on the provision of public goods I: resources, interest, group size, and the free rider problem. Am J Sociol 84:1335–1360

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Marwell G, Ames R (1980) Experiments on the provision of public goods II: provision points, stakes, experience, and the free rider problem. Am J Sociol 85:926–937

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Messer KD, Kaiser HM, Schulze WD (2008) The problem of free riding in voluntary generic advertising: parallelism and possible solutions from the lab. Am J Agric Econ 90:540–552

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Messer KD, Schmit TM, Kaiser HM (2005) Optimal institution designs for generic advertising: an experimental analysis. Am J Agric Econ 87:1046–1060

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Messer KD, Zarghamee H, Kaiser HM, Schulze WD (2007) New hope for the voluntary contributions mechanism: the effect of context. J Public Econ 91:1783–1799

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ostrom E, Walker J, Gardner R (1992) Covenants with and without a sword: self-governance is possible. Am Political Sci Rev 86:404–417

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ostrom E, Gardner R, Walker J (1994) Rules, games, and common pool resources. The University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor

    Google Scholar 

  • Park ES (2000) Warm-glow versus cold-prickle: a further experimental study of framing effects on free-riding. J Econ Behav Organ 43:405–421

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Samuelson W, Zeckhauser R (1988) Status quo bias in decision making. J Risk Uncertain 1:7–59

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sutter M, Haigner S, Kocher MG (2010) Choosing the carrot or the stick? Endogenous institutional choice in social dilemma situations. Rev Econ Stud 77:1540–1566

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Willinger M, Ziegelmever A (1999) Framing and cooperation in public good games: an experiment with an interior solution. Econ Lett 65:323–328

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Applied Economics and Statistics, University of Delaware, Newark, DE, 19716, USA

    Kent D. Messer

  2. Department of Economics, Oberlin College, Oberlin, OH, 44074, USA

    Jordan F. Suter

  3. Department of Applied Economics and Management, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, 14850 , USA

    Jubo Yan

Authors
  1. Kent D. Messer
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  2. Jordan F. Suter
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  3. Jubo Yan
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Kent D. Messer.

Appendix: Experiment Instructions and Screenshot

Appendix: Experiment Instructions and Screenshot

1.1 Instructions: Treatment 1 (baseline)

Welcome to an experiment in the economics of decision making. In the course of the experiment, you will have opportunities to earn money. Any money earned during this experiment is yours to keep. Please read these instructions carefully and do not communicate with any other participants during the experiment.

In today’s experiment, you will participate in a number of rounds. The number of rounds has been determined prior to the start of the experiment. Throughout the experiment, you will be in a group of seven participants.

At the start of reach round, you and everyone else in your group will initially have $1.00 allocated to your Account B. Therefore, initially $7.00 has been allocated to Account B in total ($1.00 \(\times \) 7 subjects). You, and everyone else in your group, will need to decide whether to give a contribution of this allocation by moving some or all of the $1.00 from Account B to Account A. For each round, three different items will determine the payoff for you and everyone else in your group:

The Account A Payoff is the amount of money that you contribute to Account A multiplied by 3/2 (=1.5).

The Account B Payoff is the amount of money that you do not give as a contribution to Account A, and thus keep in Account B, multiplied by 5/2 (=2.5).

The Account B Loss is the total amount of money that your group keeps in Account B multiplied by 3/14 (\(\sim \)0.214). The table on the right shows how the Account B Loss varies depending upon the total amount of money in Account B at the end of the round.

In summary, your earnings in each round are equal to your Account A Payoff, plus your Account B Payoff, minus the Account B Loss.

To give a contribution from Account B to Account A, enter the amount, if any, into the yellow cell in your spreadsheet, hit “Enter” on the keyboard, and then click the “Submit” button. After every participant has submitted their decision, the administrator will calculate the Account B Loss, which you can view once you are instructed to click the “Update” button.

Your earnings will be calculated automatically. You will then proceed to the next round and follow the same procedures.

At the end of the experiment, your earnings will be converted to US dollars with an exchange rate of 2. (If you make $30 in the experiment, you will get $15 US dollars).

1.2 Instructions: Treatment 2 (Status Quo)

Welcome to an experiment in the economics of decision making. In the course of the experiment, you will have opportunities to earn money. Any money earned during this experiment is yours to keep. Please read these instructions carefully and do not communicate with any other participants during the experiment.

In today’s experiment, you will participate in a number of rounds. The number of rounds has been determined prior to the start of the experiment. Throughout the experiment, you will be in a group of seven participants.

At the start of reach round, you and everyone else in your group will initially have $1.00 allocated to your Account A. Therefore, initially $7.00 has been allocated to Account A in total ($1.00 \(\times \) 7 subjects). You, and everyone else in your group, will need to decide whether to request a refund of this allocation by moving some or all of the $1.00 from Account A to Account B. For each round, three different items will determine the payoff for you and everyone else in your group:

The Account A Payoff is the amount of money that you do not request as a refund to Account B, and thus keep in Account A, multiplied by 3/2 (=1.5).

The Account B Payoff is the amount of money that you request as a refund from Account A to Account B, multiplied by 5/2 (=2.5).

The Account B Loss is the total amount of money that your group requests as a refund from Account A to Account B multiplied by 3/14 (\(\sim \)0.214). The table on the right shows how the Account B Loss varies depending upon the total amount of money in Account B at the end of the round.

In summary, your earnings in each round are equal to your Account A Payoff, plus your Account B Payoff, minus the Account B Loss.

To request a refund from Account A to Account B, enter the amount, if any, into the yellow cell in your spreadsheet, hit “Enter” on the keyboard, and then click the “Submit” button. After every participant has submitted their decision, the administrator will calculate the Account B Loss, which you can view once you are instructed to click the “Update” button.

Your earnings will be calculated automatically. You will then proceed to the next round and follow the same procedures.

At the end of the experiment, your earnings will be converted to US dollars with an exchange rate of 2. (If you make $30 in the experiment, you will get $15 US dollars)

1.3 Instructions: Treatment 5 (Communication/Voting)

(Other parts of instructions are the same as treatment 1)

\(\ldots \)

In today’s experiment, you will participate in a number of rounds. The number of rounds has been determined prior to the start of the experiment. Throughout the experiment, you will be in a group of seven participants. First, you will have the opportunity to vote on which market rules will be used for your group for the proceeding trading periods. A majority vote will determine which market rules will be implemented. Your vote will be confidential and will not be shared with any other members of the experiment. Before the vote, you will be given up to 5 min to discuss your opinions about the vote and donations to Account A with other subjects in your group. This discussion is free and open, except that no deals or threats are allowed. After the discussion, you will select your preference in your spreadsheet and click the “Submit Vote” button. After all of the votes have been submitted, the administrators will announce the outcome. There are two possible sets of market rules:

  1. (1)

    Private Lottery. Initially, you and everyone else in your group will be given a lottery ticket in each round. At the start of each round, you will need to decide whether you would like to keep the lottery ticket or sell it. If you decide to sell the lottery ticket, you will be paid $1.00. If you keep the lottery ticket, a coin toss will determine the payoff for this lottery ticket. If the coin toss is heads, the payoff is $2.00. If the coin toss is tails, the payoff is $0.00. The coin will be provided and flipped by a volunteer subject; therefore the odds for either a heads or a tails are equal.

  2. (2)

    Group Activity. At the start of reach round, you and everyone else in your group will initially have $1.00 allocated to your Account B. Therefore, initially $7.00 has been allocated to Account B in total ($1.00 \(\times \) 7 subjects). You, and everyone else in your group, will need to decide whether to give a contribution of this allocation by moving some or all of the $1.00 from Account B to Account A. For each round, three different items will determine the payoff for you and everyone else in your group.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Messer, K.D., Suter, J.F. & Yan, J. Context Effects in a Negatively Framed Social Dilemma Experiment. Environ Resource Econ 55, 387–405 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-012-9631-x

Download citation

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-012-9631-x

Keywords

Search

Navigation