Abstract
This paper provides two illustrative examples on how a choice of social welfare criterion (conditional vs. unconditional utility) can generate different welfare implications. The first example is based on the standard linear-quadratic permanent income model, and the other example uses a simple two-country DSGE model under autarky and under complete markets. When the conditional welfare criterion is used—with the social discount factor set at the private discount factor—we obtain the well-known results that the government should not intervene when there are no market imperfections and that complete markets generate risk sharing gains over autarky. In contrast, using an unconditional welfare criterion—which effectively implies that the social discount factor is set to unity—can generate unconventional welfare results.
Notes
In an intertemporal general equilibrium model in which agents discount the future, a majority of papers have used the conditional utility as a welfare criterion.
One criticism for using conditional welfare is that the results depend on the specific values for the initial states in an optimizing model where some constraints involve future expectations of endogenous variables. In such an environment of time inconsistency due to forward-looking constraints, Jensen and McCallum (2010) argue that “it is preferable for policy makers to commit to implementing the time-invariant policy that maximizes the unconditional expected value of their objective, rather than the timeless-perspective policy.” In contrast, the timeless perspective is based on the maximization of the discounted sum of the expected utility conditional on certain initial states. This paper deals with models without any forward-looking constraints and therefore is not subject to such criticism.
See, for example, Damjanovic et al. (2008).
See Sect. 2.6 in Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004).
One can easily prove this by taking a derivative of this expression w.r.t. \( \varphi .\)
As \(\beta \rightarrow 1\), the optimal positive subsidy derived from the unconditional welfare criterion would yield the level of conditional welfare at \(\left( -\frac{4}{3}\sigma _{Y}^{2}\right) \) while the policy with no subsidy would amount to the level of conditional welfare at \(\left( -\sigma _{Y}^{2}\right) \).
Risk-sharing gains with different \(\gamma \) are calculated by endogenizing \( \sigma _{a}^{2}\) to maintain \(\sigma _{y}^{2}\) constant at 0.027\(^{2}\) under autarky. We use the following conventional parameter values for simulation: \( \beta =0.95,\alpha =0.8,\delta =0.1.\)
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Acknowledgements
This work was supported by the National Research Foundation of Korea Grant funded by the Korean Government (NRF-2014S1A5B8060964).
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Appendix
Appendix
1.1 Autarky
We assume that log productivity shock follows an i.i.d. process with mean zero and variance \(\sigma _{a}^{2}\), and the lower case represents the log deviation from the deterministic steady state (i.e. \(x=\log X-\log \bar{X}\) ). From the Euler equation (21) and the budget constraint (20), we can calculate the second-order solution as
where the first-order coefficients are
and
The second-order coefficients are
Taking expectations of these two second-order solutions generate the mean and variance of \(k_{t}\) and \(c_{t}.\)
Unconditional mean and variance of consumption become
where superscript U denotes unconditional. Unconditional welfare and the certainty equivalent consumption can be calculated as follows
1.2 Complete Markets Economy
Solution for the complete markets model implies that consumption should be equal across countries: \(C_{1s}=C_{2s}\) for all \(s\ge t\). Also, due to the independence assumption of the shocks, the social planner allocates the same amount of capital: \(K_{1s}=K_{2s}\) for all \(s\ge t+1\).
Using the information that the solution is symmetric between the two countries, we compute the second-order solution as follows:
where the coefficients \(\eta ^{\prime }\)s are
Mean and variance of \(k_{t}\) and \(c_{t}\) follow:
Unconditional mean and variance of consumption become
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Kim, J., Kim, S. Conditional Versus Unconditional Utility as Welfare Criterion: Two Examples. Comput Econ 51, 719–730 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10614-016-9635-7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10614-016-9635-7