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A typology of cybercriminal networks: from low-tech all-rounders to high-tech specialists

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Abstract

Case studies show that there are at least two types of groups involved in phishing: low-tech all-rounders and high-tech specialists. However, empirical criminological research into cybercriminal networks is scarce. This article presents a taxonomy of cybercriminal phishing networks, based on analysis of 18 Dutch police investigations into phishing and banking malware networks. There appears to be greater variety than shown by previous studies. The analyzed networks cannot easily be divided into two sharply defined categories. However, characteristics such as technology use and offender-victim interaction can be used to construct a typology with four overlapping categories: from low-tech attacks with a high degree of direct offender-victim interaction to high-tech attacks without such interaction. Furthermore, clear differences can be distinguished between networks carrying out low-tech attacks and high-tech attacks. Low-tech networks, for example, make no victims in other countries and core members and facilitators generally operate from the same country. High-tech networks, on the contrary, have more international components. Finally, networks with specialists focusing on one type of crime are present in both low-tech and high-tech networks. These specialist networks have more often a local than an international focus.

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Notes

  1. In cybercrime literature, the term ‘money mule’ is often used to describe these offenders (see Choo [2]; McCombie [17]; Aston et al. [1]; [15, 20]). In our opinion, ‘money mule’ is not entirely the right term as these offenders are not used to physically move money from one place to another, but instead solely to disguise the financial trail from victims’ bank accounts leading back to the core members (see Leukfeldt et al. [16] for a more comprehensive description). As the term money mule is so widely used, we have chosen to use it in this article.

  2. Money from the victims’ accounts can also be cashed in other ways. Criminals, for example, also buy goods or Bitcoins directly from the victims’ accounts. However, all networks mainly used accounts of bogus men to get the money.

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Correspondence to E. Rutger Leukfeldt.

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Leukfeldt, E.R., Kleemans, E.R. & Stol, W.P. A typology of cybercriminal networks: from low-tech all-rounders to high-tech specialists. Crime Law Soc Change 67, 21–37 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10611-016-9662-2

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