Abstract
The Cherokees wrote a constitution in 1827; in contrast, the Yokuts tribe on the Santa Rosa Rancheria Reservation adopted theirs in 2014. As Native American tribal constitutions are common, I examine determinants of establishing these written constitutions. During their formation, some reservations had bands of the same tribe forced onto the same land. These reservations of forced coexistence wrote constitutions at an earlier date. More homogeneous, centralized tribes tended to adopt their constitutions at a later date, although this finding is less robust. The implication is that coordination costs were less than the benefits from constraining a potential rival band, and that social norms of centralization made having a written constitution less necessary. Additionally, a positive correlation is found between having a written constitution and economic output, similar to other studies.
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Notes
The remaining tribes were emailed about the status of an official constitution but did not respond.
The Iroquois (Seneca Nation of Indians) constitution passed in 1848 and is used for the Allegheny and Cattaraugus Reservations and the Cherokee passed a constitution in 1827.
As an example, the Winnebago’s constitution reads: “The membership of the Winnebago Tribe of Nebraska shall consist as follows… All children born to an enrolled member of the Winnebago Tribe of Nebraska, provided such children possess at least one-fourth (1/4) degree Indian blood, including both Winnebago Indian blood and blood of another federally recognized Indian tribe.” This is coded as a 0.25 requirement, not lineal descent..
Miller (2012: 102–3) describes in greater detail the problems with tribal business in an uncertain environment. He notes that a turnover in the tribal councils leads to cancelations of ongoing contracts and that “one reporter stated that everyone in Indian Country knows of business projects that were cancelled after the latest election.” Some tribes have started to include constitutional provisions to ban changing preexisting contracts upon the election of a new council.
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The author would like to thank participants at the 2016 Public Choice Society meetings in Fort Lauderdale Florida, Roger Congleton and the referee.
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Anderson, R.W. Native American reservation constitutions. Const Polit Econ 27, 377–398 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10602-016-9225-7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10602-016-9225-7