Abstract
In (Tullock, The organization of inquiry, Duke University Press, Durham, NC, 1966), Gordon Tullock sets out to establish how knowledge is developed and dispersed in science, to such a high degree of reliability, despite the lack of formal organizational structure. He contrasts this against the unreliability of the “non-sciences”. In this essay, I review his perspective and consider the validity of his proposed reforms.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
On the other hand, perhaps not. Gordon once stopped me outside of another scholar’s office and told me not to go in because “it would just make the both of you dumber”.
“Sociology, oddly enough, involves a lot of repetitive research without real repetition. The conundrum results from the fact that sociologists apparently do not have very original minds and tend to partially copy each other’s research. They almost never, however, copy the previous research completely, with the consequence that their work never constitutes a real repetition”. (p. 122).
While working on my dissertation, I expressed concern to an economic history professor over the quality of the historical data I was reconstructing. I was then informed by him that “all data are crap; its just that economic historians know their data are crap”.
Even more disheartening, this is about double the rates they report for the fields of management and marketing.
Somewhat surprisingly, McCullough (2009) notes that the recently created “open-access” journals typically do not have policies requiring archiving data and code on their websites.
Sandler (2015) discusses extensions to Olson which include heterogeneous contributions.
As explained below, Tullock himself falls prey to a similar error.
Tullock added an opening footnote, the likes of which I have never seen before or since, to the published paper stating: “The editor of the journal has accepted and published this article because he feels it is important to get research started in the area. The weaknesses of Laband’s approach, which are fully recognized by Laband, are obvious, but the editor at the moment can think of no way of doing better. Can the readers do better than both Laband and the editor?” In fact, this statement remains the only publicly-viewable part of the paper on the journal website.
In an advice piece for reviewers, Choi (1998/2002) suggested to be timely, but not too timely, because a reputation for timeliness will impose upon the reviewer the private cost of receiving additional requests to review.
References
Breit, W. (1987). Creating the ‘Virginia School’: Charlottesville as an academic environment in the 1960s. Economic Inquiry, 25, 645–657.
Buchanan, J. M. (1987). The qualities of a natural economist. In C. Rowley (Ed.), Democracy and public choice: Essays in honor of Gordon Tullock (pp. 9–19). Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd.
Buchanan, J. M., & Tullock, G. (1962). The calculus of consent. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Caldwell, B. (2008). Gordon Tullock’s the organization of inquiry: A critical appraisal. Public Choice, 135, 23–34.
Chang, J., & Lai, C.-C. (2001). Is it worthwhile to pay referees? Southern Economic Journal, 68, 457–463.
Choi, K. (1998/2002). How to publish in top journals. http://www.bus.lsu.edu/hill/writing/choi.
Coase, R. H. (1981). How should economists choose? In The G. Warren Nutter lectures in political economy. American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. (Reprinted in: Essays on economics and economists, edited by R. H. Coase, 1994, Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press.)
Feigenbaum, S., & Levy, D. M. (1993). The market for (ir)reproducible econometrics. Social Epistomology, 7, 215–232.
Ferson, W. E., Sarkissian, S., & Simin, T. T. (2003). Spurious regressions in financial economics? Journal of Finance, 58, 1393–1414.
Hillman, A. L., & Katz, E. (1984). Risk-averse rent seekers and the social cost of monopoly power. Economic Journal, 94, 104–110.
Hamermesh, D. S. (1994). Facts and myths about refereeing. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 8, 153–163.
Hubbard, R., & Vetter, D. E. (1996). An empirical comparison of published replication research in accounting, economics, finance, management, and marketing. Journal of Business Research, 35, 153–164.
Krueger, A. O. (1974). The political economy of the rent-seeking society. American Economic Review, 64, 291–303.
Laband, D. N., & Sophocleus, J. P. (1988). The social cost of rent-seeking: First estimates. Public Choice, 58, 269–275.
Levy, D. M., & Peart, S. J. (2012). Tullock on motivated inquiry: Expert-induced uncertainty disguised as risk. Public Choice, 152, 163–180.
Mayer, T. (1980). Economics as a hard science: Realistic goal or wishful thinking? Economic Inquiry, 18, 165–178.
McCullough, B. D. (2009). Open access economics journals and the market for reproducible economic research. Economic Analysis and Policy, 39, 117–126.
Meltzer, A. H., & Richard, S. F. (1983a). Tests of a rational theory of the size of government. Public Choice, 41, 403–418.
Meltzer, A. H., & Richard, S. F. (1983b). Rejoinder to Gordon Tullock. Public Choice, 41, 423–426.
Olson, M. (1983). Towards a mature social science. International Studies Quarterly, 27, 29–37.
Olson, M. (1982). The rise and decline of nations. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Olson, M. (1965). The logic of collective action. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Samuelson, P. A. (1962). Economists and the history of ideas. American Economic Review, 52, 1–18.
Sandler, T. (2015). Collective action: Fifty years later. Public Choice, 164, 195–216.
Tullock, G. (2003). The origin rent-seeking concept. International Journal of Business and Economics, 2, 1–8.
Tullock, G. (1993). Are scientists different? Journal of Economic Studies, 20, 90–106.
Tullock, G. (1991). Casual reflections of an editor. Public Choice, 71, 129–139.
Tullock, G. (1988). Rent-seeking and tax reform. Contemporary Policy Issues, 6, 37–47. (Reprinted in Readings in public choice economics, pp. 40–52, by Jac C. Heckelman, Ed., 2004, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.)
Tullock, G. (1983). Further tests of a rational theory of the size of government. Public Choice, 41, 419–421.
Tullock, G. (1967). The welfare costs of tariffs, monopolies, and theft. Western Economic Journal, 5, 224–232.
Tullock, G. (1966). The organization of inquiry. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
Tullock, G. (1965). The politics of bureaucracy. Washington, DC: Public Affairs Press.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Additional information
I thank Roger Congleton for suggesting this topic to me and Dan Hammond for his comments on the first draft of this paper.
