Skip to main content
Log in

Does Ownership Structure Matter? The Effects of Insider and Institutional Ownership on Corporate Social Responsibility

  • Published:
Journal of Business Ethics Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

The extant literature has examined the effects of ownership structures on corporate social responsibility (CSR), yet it has overlooked the non-linear and interactive effects among major shareholder groups. In this study, we examine the non-linear effects of insider and institutional ownerships on CSR. We also examine whether it is necessary to have both incentive alignment and monitoring mechanisms (complementary view) or it is sufficient to have either mechanism (substitutive view) to promote CSR. Using a sample of the U.S. Fortune 1000 firms, our results suggest that insider and institutional ownerships have non-linear effects on CSR. We also find support for the complementary mechanisms view, in that the highest CSR rating is observed when both ownership levels are high. Therefore, firms need to maintain strong governance structures to realize synergistic effects in promoting CSR. Our findings provide a more in-depth understanding of the relationships between ownership structures and corporate social outcomes.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Fig. 1
Fig. 2
Fig. 3

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  • Agrawal, A., & Mandelker, G. N. (1992). Shark repellents and the role of institutional investors in corporate governance. Managerial and Decision Economics, 13, 15–22.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Aguilera, R., Desender, K., & Kabbach de Castro, L. (2012). A bundle perspective to comparative corporate governance. In T. Clarke & D. Branson (Eds.), The SAGE handbook of corporate governance (pp. 379–405). London: Sage Publications.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Arora, P., & Dharwadkar, R. (2011). Corporate governance and corporate social responsibility (CSR): The moderating roles of attainment discrepancy and organization slack. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 19, 136–152.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Barnea, A., & Rubin, A. (2010). Corporate social responsibility as a conflict between shareholders. Journal of Business Ethics, 97, 71–86.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Baysinger, B. D., Kosnik, R. D., & Turk, T. A. (1991). Effects of board and ownership structure on corporate R&D strategy. Academy of Management Journal, 34, 205–214.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Beurden, P. V., & Gössling, T. (2008). The worth of values: A literature review on the relation between corporate social and financial performance. Journal of Business Ethics, 82, 407–424.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bhabra, G. S. (2007). Insider ownership and firm value in New Zealand. Journal of Multinational Financial Management, 17, 142–154.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Brickley, J. A., Lease, R. C., & Smith, C. W, Jr. (1988). Ownership structure and voting on antitakeover amendments. Journal of Financial Economics, 20, 267–291.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Burke, L., & Logsdon, J. M. (1996). How corporate social responsibility pays off. Long Range Planning, 29, 495–502.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Chaganti, R., & Damanpour, F. (1991). Institutional ownership, capital structure, and firm performance. Strategic Management Journal, 12, 479–491.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Chang, Y. K., Oh, W. Y., Jung, J. C., & Lee, J. Y. (2012). Firm size and corporate social performance: The mediating role of outside director representation. Journal of Leadership & Organizational Studies, 19, 486–500.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Chang, Y. K., Oh, W. Y., & Messersmith, J. G. (2013). Translating corporate social performance into financial performance: Exploring the moderating role of high-performance work practices. International Journal of Human Resource Management, 24, 3738–3756.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cochran, P. L., & Wood, R. A. (1984). Corporate social responsibility and financial performance. Academy of Management Journal, 27, 42–56.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Coffey, B. S., & Fryxell, G. E. (1991). Institutional ownership of stock and dimensions of corporate social performance: An empirical examination. Journal of Business Ethics, 10, 437–444.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cohen, J., & Cohen, P. (1983). Applied multiple regression/correlation analysis for the behavioral sciences (2nd ed.). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.

    Google Scholar 

  • Connelly, B. L., Hoskisson, R. E., Tihanyi, L., & Certo, S. T. (2010). Ownership as a form of corporate governance. Journal of Management Studies, 47, 1561–1589.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dalton, D. R., Daily, C. M., Certo, S. T., & Roengpitya, R. (2003). Meta-analyses of financial performance and equity: Fusion or confusion? Academy of Management Journal, 46, 13–26.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • David, P., Kochhar, R., & Levitas, E. (1998). The effect of institutional investors on the level and mix of CEO compensation. Academy of Management Journal, 41, 200–208.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Edwards, J. R., & Parry, M. E. (1993). On the use of polynomial regression equations as an alternative to difference scores in organizational research. Academy of Management Journal, 36, 1577–1613.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Eisenhardt, K. M. (1989). Agency theory: An assessment and review. Academy of Management Review, 1, 57–74.

    Google Scholar 

  • Eisenmann, T. R. (2002). The effects of CEO equity ownership and firm diversification on risk taking. Strategic Management Journal, 23, 513–534.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gedajlovic, E., & Shapiro, D. M. (2002). Ownership structure and firm profitability in Japan. Academy of Management Journal, 45, 565–575.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Godfrey, P. C., Merrill, C. B., & Hansen, J. M. (2009). The relationship between corporate social responsibility and shareholder value: An empirical test of the risk management hypothesis. Strategic Management Journal, 30, 425–445.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Graves, S. B., & Waddock, S. A. (1994). Institutional owners and corporate social performance. Academy of Management Journal, 37, 1034–1046.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hatfield, G., Worrell, D. L., Davidson, W. N, I. I. I., & Bland, E. (1999). Turbulence at the top: Antecedents of key executive dismissal. Quarterly Journal of Business and Economics, 38, 3–24.

    Google Scholar 

  • Himmelberg, C. P., Hubbard, R. G., & Palia, D. (1999). Understanding the determinants of managerial ownership and the link between ownership and performance. Journal of Financial Economics, 53, 353–384.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hoskisson, R. E., Castleton, M. W., & Withers, M. C. (2009). Complementarity in monitoring and bonding: More intense monitoring leads to higher executive compensation. Academy of Management Perspectives, 23, 57–74.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hoskisson, R. E., Hitt, M. A., Johnson, R. A., & Grossman, W. (2002). Conflicting voices: The effects of institutional ownership heterogeneity and internal governance on corporate innovation strategies. Academy of Management Journal, 45, 697–716.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Huber, P. J. (1967). The behavior of maximum likelihood estimates under nonstandard conditions. In Proceedings of the Fifth Berkeley Symposium on Mathematical Statistics and Probability.

  • Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3, 305–360.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Johnson, R. A., & Greening, D. W. (1999). The effects of corporate governance and institutional ownership types on corporate social performance. Academy of Management Journal, 42, 564–576.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kochhar, R., & David, P. (1996). Institutional investors and firm innovation: A test of competing hypotheses. Strategic Management Journal, 17, 73–84.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kock, C. J., Santaló, J., & Diestre, L. (2012). Corporate governance and the environment: What type of governance creates greener companies? Journal of Management Studies, 49, 492–514.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kosnik, R. D. (1987). Greenmail: A study of board performance in corporate governance. Administrative Science Quarterly, 32, 163–185.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Margolis, J. D., & Walsh, J. P. (2003). Misery loves companies: Rethinking social initiatives by business. Administrative Science Quarterly, 48, 268–305.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Mattingly, J. E., & Berman, S. L. (2006). Measurement of corporate social action. Business and Society, 45, 20–46.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • McClelland, P. L., Barker, V. L., & Oh, W. Y. (2012). CEO career horizon and tenure: Future performance implications under different contingencies. Journal of Business Research, 65, 1387–1393.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • McWilliams, A., & Siegel, D. (2001). Corporate social responsibility: A theory of the firm perspective. Academy of Management Review, 26, 117–127.

    Google Scholar 

  • Morck, R., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1988). Management ownership and market valuation: An empirical analysis. Journal of Financial Economics, 20, 293–315.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Oh, W. Y., Chang, Y. K., & Cheng, Z. (2014). When CEO career horizon problems matter for corporate social responsibility: The moderating roles of industry-level discretion and blockholder ownership. Journal of Business Ethics,. doi:10.1007/s10551-014-2397-z.

    Google Scholar 

  • Oh, W. Y., Chang, Y. K., & Martynov, A. (2011). The effect of ownership structure on corporate social responsibility: Empirical evidence from Korea. Journal of Business Ethics, 104, 283–297.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Orlitzky, M., Schmidt, F., & Ryne, S. (2003). Corporate social and financial performance: A meta-analysis. Organization Studies, 24, 403–441.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rediker, K. J., & Seth, A. (1995). Boards of directors and substitution effects of alternative governance mechanisms. Strategic Management Journal, 16, 85–99.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Schepker, D. J., & Oh, W. Y. (2013). Complementary or substitutive effects? Corporate governance mechanisms and poison pill repeal. Journal of Management, 39, 1729–1759.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Schnatterly, K., Shaw, K. W., & Jennings, W. W. (2008). Information advantages of large institutional owners. Strategic Management Journal, 29, 219–227.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sethi, S. P. (2005). Investing in socially responsible companies is a must for public pension funds—because there is no better alternative. Journal of Business Ethics, 56, 99–129.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1989). Management entrenchment: The case of manager specific investments. Journal of Financial Economics, 25, 123–140.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1997). A survey of corporate governance. Journal of Finance, 52, 737–783.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Teoh, H. Y., & Shiu, G. Y. (1990). Attitudes towards corporate social responsibility and perceived importance of social responsibility information characteristics in a decision context. Journal of Business Ethics, 9, 71–77.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Waddock, S. A., & Graves, S. B. (1997). The corporate social performance-financial performance link. Strategic Management Journal, 8, 303–319.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Walsh, J. P., Weber, K., & Margolis, J. D. (2003). Social issues and management: Our lost cause found. Journal of Management, 29, 859–881.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • White, H. (1982). Maximum likelihood estimation of misspecified models. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 53, 1–25.

    Google Scholar 

  • Zahra, S. A., & Pearce, J. A. (1989). Boards of directors and corporate financial performance: A review and integrative model. Journal of Management, 15, 291–334.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Zajac, E. J., & Westphal, J. D. (1994). The costs and benefits of managerial incentives and monitoring in large US corporations: When is more not better? Strategic Management Journal, 15, 121–142.

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgement

This research was funded by the Haskayne School of Business, University of Calgary and Hansung University.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Young Kyun Chang.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Oh, WY., Cha, J. & Chang, Y.K. Does Ownership Structure Matter? The Effects of Insider and Institutional Ownership on Corporate Social Responsibility. J Bus Ethics 146, 111–124 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-015-2914-8

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-015-2914-8

Keywords

Navigation