Abstract
Humans are causing global climate change (GCC), and such climate change causes harms. Robin Attfield explained how individuals should be understood to be culpable for these harms. In this paper, I use a critical analysis of Attfield’s explanatory framework to explore further difficulties in accounting for corporate responsibility for these harms. I begin by arguing that there are some problems with his framework as it is applied to individuals that emit greenhouse gases (GHGs). I then show that it will be very difficult to extend this framework to corporations. This is not a criticism of Attfield’s work (as he does not discuss corporate responsibility for those harms associated with GCC), but it will serve to show the difficulty in philosophically explaining corporations’ moral culpability when it comes to these harms. In fact, one positive conclusion of this paper is that it highlights a new area of concern that has been ignored in discussions of corporate responsibilities—that of mediated responsibilities—which is how Attfield understands our responsibilities regarding GCC. The discussion of this concern will draw attention to another positive conclusion of this paper: the harms associated with CO2 are very unlike the harms associated with other airborne-emitted substances, which will indicate that we will need new ways of understanding how individuals and corporations are philosophically responsible for these harms. The final positive conclusion of this paper will be a discussion of what the constraints should be on new approaches to explaining our culpability.
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Notes
Parfit actually acknowledges in a later paper (1986) that the Six Steps Framework ought to be scrapped. This is because he takes Gruzalski’s criticism (1986) of step (4) to be successful. Suppose Gruzalski is right that (4) fails. Parfit intends for steps (1)–(5) to be individually necessary and jointly sufficient for explaining the wrongness in question. If so, and if (4) supposedly fails, then that is why Parfit acknowledges that the Framework ought to be scrapped. Gruzalski’s criticism of (4) is that it does not appear that the torturers would cause the victims to suffer most if they all pressed the buttons. If just one torturer out of the thousand decided not to press his button, then the victims would not suffer any less precisely because the effects of each individual button pressing are imperceptible, ex hypothesi. But why does Parfit need (4) to explain the wrongness? It seems that the other steps are enough, where (3)—the torturers would cause the victims to suffer if enough of them press their buttons—is crucial here. The perceived pain in this case is a threshold issue, that is, if enough of the torturers press their buttons, then the victims will experience severe pain. Now, maybe (4) helps us to explain why we would blame the torturers even more (as the victims’ pain would be even more severe if all the torturers pressed their buttons rather than just enough of them pressing their buttons), but it does not seem necessary to explain the wrongness (as the victims are already in severe pain if enough of the torturers press their buttons). Hence, if (1)–(5) (sans 4) are sufficient, then Gruzalski's criticism falls short, as his criticism is only directed at (4). And if Gruzalski’s criticism falls short, then Parfit does not need to scrap the Six Steps Framework. I will proceed here under the supposition that the Framework need not be scrapped (at least not for reasons Gruzalski rehearsed). The target of my article, Attfield’s article, also proceeds under this supposition (whether Attfield intended to proceed under this assumption or not—it is not clear that Attfield was aware of Parfit’s article from 1986).
I have reviewed five of the six common air pollutants that are regulated by the Clean Air Act—carbon monoxide, nitrogen dioxide, sulfur dioxide, lead, and particulate matter. The other is ozone. This does not fit our analysis easily; ground-level ozone is not usually emitted from an identifiable point source (or sources), but rather is “created by a chemical reaction between oxides of nitrogen and volatile organic compounds (VOC) in the presence of sunlight” (EPA 2010). All of the other substances I have been discussing are directly emitted from identifiable point sources.
According to the EPA, the greenhouse effect is what makes life as we know it possible; without the greenhouse effect, the average temperature of the earth would be 60 °F colder than it is now (2009).
Sinnott-Armstrong (2005) argues along similar lines against one who might claim that we have a moral obligation not to expel GHGs into the atmosphere.
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Acknowledgments
I want to thank audiences at the 17th Annual International Vincentian Conference Promoting Business Ethics (especially Ben Almassi), Pacific Lutheran University (especially Erin McKenna, Gregory Johnson, and Paul Menzel), and Metropolitan State University of Denver’s Environmental Ethics Conference (especially Mary Lyn Stoll) for their very useful feedback. I also want to thank Leslie Francis, Kara Schrader, Nelson Eby, and Avram Hiller for their helpful comments on this project.
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Smith, I.A. On Explaining Individual and Corporate Culpability in the Global Climate Change Era. J Bus Ethics 112, 551–558 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-012-1556-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-012-1556-3