Abstract
In the wake of recent corporate scandals, this paper examines the claim made by John Boatright that business ethics, as it is currently conceived, “rests on a mistake.” Ethics in business should not be achieved through managerial vision, discretion or responsibility; rather, ethics should shape the design of institutions that regulate business from the outside. What ethicists should advocate for, according to Boatright, are moral markets not moral managers. I explore the empirical and normative dimensions of his claim with special attention paid to the extent to which Boatright’s development of the economic theory of the firm supports his position. I conclude by suggesting some reasons why moral markets and moral management are compatible frameworks for corporate reform.
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Smith, J.D. Moral Markets and Moral Managers Revisited. J Bus Ethics 61, 129–141 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-005-8713-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-005-8713-x