Biology & Philosophy

, Volume 30, Issue 2, pp 211–225

Relativizing innateness: innateness as the insensitivity of the appearance of a trait with respect to specified environmental variation

Article

DOI: 10.1007/s10539-014-9465-8

Cite this article as:
O’Neill, E. Biol Philos (2015) 30: 211. doi:10.1007/s10539-014-9465-8

Abstract

I object to eliminativism about innateness and André Ariew’s identification of innateness with canalization, and I propose a new treatment of innateness. I first argue that the concept of innateness is serving a valuable function in a diverse set of research contexts, and in these contexts, claims about innateness are best understood as claims about the insensitivity of the appearance of a trait to certain variations in the environment. I then argue that innateness claims, like claims about canalization, should be explicitly relativized to the specific range of environmental variations of interest to the scientist. My account characterizes an important way in which scientists are employing the concept and offers a way for scientists to carry on using the concept in their research while minimizing confusion and miscommunication. There is a fruitful research program, I claim, in which scientists employ the concept of innateness to help distinguish environmental factors of interest that have a causal influence on the appearance of a trait from those that do not.

Keywords

Innateness Canalization Insensitivity Traits André Ariew Eliminativism 

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of History and Philosophy of ScienceUniversity of PittsburghPittsburghUSA