Abstract
I distinguish three theses associated with the new mechanistic philosophy—concerning causation, explanation and scientific methodology. Advocates of each thesis are identified and relationships among them are outlined. I then look at some recent work on natural selection and mechanisms. Framing that debate in terms of different kinds of New Mechanism significantly affects what is at stake.
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Notes
Nicholson (2012) also recognizes three kinds of Mechanist views. There are some similarities to my discussion, but Nicholson’s approach is both more historical and more polemical.
Glennan, it should be noted, is not averse to counterfactuals. Indeed, over time he has incorporated into his account some central elements of Woodward’s (2003) theory.
Machamer et al. (2000) use the language of “production”, but in a largely non-committal way. In a short subsection (3.1) they hint at a deflationary attitude. In any event, as I explain in more detail below, the goal of MDC’s paper isn’t to give an account of causation.
This is not to say that Glennan does not believe in EM. Indeed he develops a version of it himself (Glennan 2005). But as I read Glennan, the first order of business for him is providing a mechanistic account of causation. I return to this below, in my discussion of the relation between different kinds of Mechanism.
There is no tension between this point and the earlier claim that EM shuns law-based explanation. The former has to do with the explanans; the latter concerns explananda.
For instance: “In many fields of science what is taken to be a satisfactory explanation requires providing a description of a mechanism." (MDC 2000, 1). And: “Whether it is geology or molecular biology, biochemistry or cosmology, what is taken to be a causal explanation often consists of the description of a mechanism.” (Tabery 2009, 1). And also: “In many areas of science, explanations are said to be adequate to the extent, and only to the extent, that they describe the causal mechanisms that maintain, produce, or underlie the phenomenon to be explained, the explanandum phenomenon.” (Kaplan and Craver 2011, 601).
Skipper and Millstein do indeed speak of natural selection in causal terms throughout. They describe their schematic graphic as “laying bare the causal crux of selection” (2005, 329).
Skipper and Millstein speak in terms of explanation at several points in the paper, but they never quite say whether they regard explanation-talk as different from causation-talk and if so, how.
Skipper and Millstein’s discussion does not make explicit reference to methods and strategies. But their choice to represent natural selection in graphic form—a relatively unusual attempt—suggests that such issues are in the back of their minds.
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Acknowledgments
Jens Harbecke provided insightful comments on an earlier version of the paper. Written comments from an anonymous referee for this journal, as well as the editor, were very helpful and I am grateful to them.
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My title and some terminological choices gesture at Peter Godfrey-Smith’s (2001) paper “Three kinds of Adaptationism”. The topics are unrelated, but the aims are analogous.
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Levy, A. Three kinds of new mechanism. Biol Philos 28, 99–114 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10539-012-9337-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10539-012-9337-z