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How to misidentify a type specimen

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Abstract

Type specimens are used to designate species. What is the nature of the relation between a type specimen and the species it designates? If species names are rigid designators, and type specimens ostensively define species, then that relation is, at the very least, a close one. Levine (Biol Philos 16(3):325–338, 2001) argues that the relationship of type specimen to a named species is one of necessity—and that this presents problems for the individuality thesis. Namely, it seems odd that a contingently selected specimen should belong to a species of necessity. In considering Levine’s argument, LaPorte (Biol Philos 18:583–588, 2003) suggests that recognizing the distinction between de re and de dicto necessity resolves Levine’s worries. I reconsider the motivating question: does a type specimen belong of necessity to the species that it designates? In light of taxonomic cases and practice the answer is clear: definitively not. This is particularly clear in the case of re-designation of types by taxonomic decree. I explain how this helps reveal how taxonomists prioritize competing (and sometimes conflicting) theoretical commitments, and offer a defense of the individuality thesis as applied to these particular cases. In short, I demonstrate how to misidentify a type specimen.

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Notes

  1. Now called holotypes, lectotypes, or neotypes. For a practical guide to naming taxa see Winston (1999).

  2. A species is one kind of taxon. Other kinds of taxa are also defined by types, e.g., sub-species, genera and families. Most of the discussion here about species names will be generalizable to other taxa, though this leaves aside worries about higher taxa (Ereshefsky 2001).

  3. This is informally described as the principle of taxonomic freedom. Roughly, this simply means that codes of nomenclature are silent on the criteria of belonging to a taxon, i.e., it is left to individual researchers to decide what species concept to apply to determine the taxonomic boundaries about a type specimen.

  4. Article #’s from ICZN (1999).

  5. In case of a taxon boundary including multiple type specimens, the principle of priority is applied [Art. 23]. More on this below.

  6. A quick response: I think this ambiguity is resolved by specification and application of relevant theoretical concepts, e.g., species concepts provide a means of specifying boundaries, dissolving the ambiguity Levine is concerned about. Speciality training includes learning how to correctly apply these concepts, though there may still be uncertainty about a taxon’s boundary. In such cases, this is generally an epistemic problem. Metaphysical and conceptual debates may also persist, as disagreements over which concepts ought to be adopted or how they ought to be applied. Ereshefsky (2007, p. 300) addresses a similar concern raised by Nixon and Carpenter (2000), arguing that:

    concepts are involved in every instance of ostension in science. For example, the ostension of a taxon name involves such basic concepts as the notion of being a single organism (the type specimen) and the concept of being a monophyletic taxon. Ostension in science turns on robust background theories and assumptions.

    Disambiguation by appeal to theoretically justified concepts generalizes over scientific practice, and offers a means by which entities may be specified precisely—or, at least, identifies the terms of ambiguity at stake and in conflict, e.g., debates over what is among the largest organism may hinge upon the concept of organism specified as much as the empirical facts regarding the size of the biological entity in question (e.g., Smith et al. 1992; Brasier 1992). This is not to deny the qua-problem; something like it likely captures problems of unambiguously specifying higher (Linnaean) taxa. However, this is symptomatic of the lack of an underlying ontology or theory of higher taxonomic ranks, and how this undermines reference (Ereshefsky 2001). To my mind, this does not undermine treatment of species names as rigid designators, so much as it supports a move away from traditional ranked nomenclature and towards one that provides a more sure-footed theoretical basis, e.g., rank-free phylogenetic nomenclature.

  7. This may be a special case of Mark Johnston’s missing explanation argument (1998).

  8. One might ask what belongs to might mean if not framed in terms of set membership or mereological part-hood. This is a central (though often misunderstood) component of the individuality thesis, which takes the part/whole relation to be biological, not logical. For example, where mereological part-hood is transitive, biological part-hood might not be. This suggests the part/whole relation of logical individuals is not the same as biological individuals, and each carry different modal implications—notably of when identity conditions hold. Varzi (2006) distinguishes between (proper mereological) ‘parts’ and ‘ϕ-parts’, where ϕ is a predicate modifier that may generate a non-mereological part/whole relation. I’ll simply suggest here that ‘biological-part’ ought to be understood as a (or many) possible ϕ-part(s) specified by biological theory that may have various complexities with regard to transitivity and the varying strength of belongs to, and is poorly analyzed in mereological terms. Ghiselin (1997, p. 40 and elsewhere) concurs, arguing that “Unfortunately the efforts of logicians … have not produced the sort of logic (mereology) that would seem useful for our purposes …. We need something that treats individuals as more than just the sums of their parts.” Elsewhere I have offered a brief account of how the biological part/whole relation ought to be construed (Haber 2013), and will return to this below. Ereshefsky and Matthen (2005) provide one example (population structure theory) of how the biological part/whole relation may be articulated.

  9. Two quick notes on my formalization. (1) I am treating species as individuals, rather than kinds. This is both because that is part of what is being evaluated, and also because I hold the view that species are individuals. Still, I recognize it may be unusual to see particular species falling under the scope of predicates, as opposed to simply being predicates. My own preference is to treat species as falling within the scope of relations like these, regardless of whether they are conceived of as individuals, kinds, sums, sets, etc. I acknowledge this is a non-standard view (but see Jubien 2009). Anyways, it is easy enough to re-formulate these treating species as predicates, e.g., \(\square\forall x(Tx \supset Bx)\) and \(\forall x (Tx \supset \square Bx)\). (2) Belongs to is approximated and poorly captured by formal logical relations. This was briefly touched on above, but bears repeating. I take belongs to to capture biological part/whole relations specified by biological theories, concepts, practice, data, etc. One reason it is poorly captured by logical relations is that a biological part/whole relation may be stronger or weaker, producing a gradient along which something may belong to a biological object. This sort of gradient belongs to is not captured well by the categorical belongs to typically rendered in logic.

  10. Alternatively, “membership” may entail the treatment of species as natural kinds. This is a slightly different issue, though closely related and often conflated with how to disambiguate belongs to. For various reasons, I prefer my interpretation of Levine’s usage, e.g., his stated aim includes the evaluation of the individuality thesis, and adopting a kinds view here undermines that goal. Like many others, Levine appears to be taking the individuality thesis to imply a constituent (i.e., extensional) definition, and so is likely taking his formulation as neutral (though it is not). In other words, though constituent definitions often accompany a natural kinds treatment of species, they need not. Regardless, taking “membership” to imply natural kinds also entails a complicated set of commitments, which I would argue should be similarly discharged. (see note 13)

  11. Notice how easy it is to generate taxonomic incommensurability on an extensional definition of species (Ereshefsky 2007 makes a similar point). Given the priority placed on the principle of stability in nomenclatural codes, it should hardly be surprising that taxonomists tend to reject constituent (or extensional) definitions in favor of population (and phylogenetic) thinking.

  12. The individuality thesis makes this explicit, which is one reason I favor it.

  13. Or, if you prefer the natural kinds interpretation of “membership”, this can be reformulated as something like, “the identity conditions of Xus yus are not tied to possession of an essential property, some set of properties, or distribution of variation of those properties.”

  14. In general, petitions to the ICZN requesting designation of a neotype are not uncommon. At the time of writing there were twelve such cases pending, rulings on which will be published in the Bulletin of Zoological Nomenclature.

  15. A fascinating example of this is human tetragametic chimerism (Yu et al. 2002). This occurs when two separate ova are fertilized by distinct sperm, yet rather than developing into fraternal twins the zygotes end up fusing. The result is a person born with two distinct gametic cell lines, i.e., congenital chimerism.

  16. In the language of the individuality thesis the preferred phrasing would be something like, ‘species concepts treat species as historical entities, whose parts (organisms) belong to it by virtue of relation to other relevant parts (organisms).

  17. Like Hull (1986) and Ghiselin (1997), I am not rejecting essentialism or the importance of scientific/natural kinds. Only that these are misapplied to species.

  18. Famously, Darwin drew upon just this sort of conflict to develop his theory of natural selection (Darwin 1964 [1859]).

  19. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer and participants at POBAM for raising this objection.

  20. These are distinct concerns from those raised by a phylogenetic nomenclature (see Ereshefsky 2001), and would persist in such systems. Authors of the PhyloCode, for example, have adopted ostensive definitions (de Queiroz 1992, 1995), and the current PhyloCode delegates species naming to traditional codes (Cantino and de Queiroz 2010).

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Acknowledgments

Sean Barry for sharing details of petitioning the ICZN and the case in question; Joseph LaPorte; Alex Levine; Michael Ghiselin; Arthur Shapiro; Matthew Slater; Elijah Millgram; Spring 2012 PHIL 5400/6400; Sarah George; Randall Irmis; Natural History Museum of Utah Faculty, Staff & Volunteers; Sam Murray for images of T. s. infernalis and T. s. tetrataenia; and the participants and organizers of POBAM 2012.

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    Matthew H. Haber

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Haber, M.H. How to misidentify a type specimen. Biol Philos 27, 767–784 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10539-012-9336-0

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