Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

An evolutionary perspective on the long-term efficiency of costly punishment

  • Published:
Biology & Philosophy Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

Many studies show that punishment, although able to stabilize cooperation at high levels, destroys gains which makes it less efficient than alternatives with no punishment. Standard public goods games (PGGs) in fact show exactly these patterns. However, both evolutionary theory and real world institutions give reason to expect institutions with punishment to be more efficient, particularly in the long run. Long-term cooperative partnerships with punishment threats for non-cooperation should outperform defection prone non-punishing ones. This article demonstrates that fieldwork data from hunter-gatherers, common pool resource management cases and even PGGs support this hypothesis. Although earnings in PGGs with a punishment option may be lower at the beginning, efficiency increases dramatically over time. Most ten-period PGGs cannot capture this change because their time horizon is too short.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Fig. 1
Fig. 2
Fig. 3
Fig. 4
Fig. 5

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  • Aktipis CA (2011) Is cooperation viable in mobile organisms? Simple Walk Away rule favors the evolution of cooperation in groups. Evolut Hum Behav. doi: 10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2011.01.002

  • Andreoni J (1988) Why free ride? Strategies and learning in public goods experiments. J Public Econom 37(3):291–304

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Axelrod R (1984/2000) Die Evolution der Kooperation. Oldenbourg, München

  • Binmore K (2006) Why do people cooperate? J Polit Philos Econ 5(1):81–96

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bochet O, Page T, Putterman L (2006) Communication and punishment in contribution experiments. J Econ Behav Organ 60(1):11–26. doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2003.06.006

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bowles S (2006) Group competition, reproductive leveling, and the evolution of human altruism. Science 314(5805):1569–1572. doi:10.1126/science.1134829

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bowles S (2009) Did warfare among ancestral hunter-gatherers affect the evolution of human social behaviors? Science 324(5932):1293–1298. doi:10.1126/science.1168112

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Boyd R, Gintis H, Bowles S, Richerson PJ (2003) The evolution of altruistic punishment. Proc Nat Acad Sci 100(6):3531–3535

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Brockhurst MA, Buckling A, Racey D, Gardner A (2008) Resource supply and the evolution of public-goods cooperation in bacteria. BMC Biol 6:20–26

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Burnham TC, Johnson DDP (2005) The biological and evolutionary logic of human cooperation. Analyse und Kritik 27:113–135

    Google Scholar 

  • Buss DM (2004) Evolutionary psychology: the new science of the mind. Pearson, Boston

    Google Scholar 

  • Cardenas S (2000) How do groups solve local commons dilemmas? Lessons from experimental economics in the field. Environ Dev Sustain 2(3–4):305–322

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cardenas J (2003) Real wealth and experimental cooperation: experiments in the field lab. J Dev Econ 70:263–289. doi:10.1016/S0304-3878(02)00098-6

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Casari M (2003) Decentralized management of common property resources: experiments with a centuries-old institution. J Econ Behav Organ 51(2):217–247. doi:10.1016/S0167-2681(02)00098-7

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Chaudhuri A (2011) Sustaining cooperation in laboratory public goods experiments: a selective survey of the literature. Exp Econ 14(1):47–83

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Chhatre A, Agrawal A (2008) Forest commons and local enforcement. Proc Nat Acad Sci 105(36):13286–13291. doi:10.1073/pnas.0803399105

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Clutton-Brock TH, Parker GA (1995) Punishment in animal societies. Nature 373(6511):209–216. doi:10.1038/373209a0

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dreber A, Rand DG, Fudenberg D, Nowak MA, Rand DG, Nowak MA (2008) Winners don’t punish. Nature 452(7185):348–351. doi:10.1038/nature06723

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Egas M, Riedl A (2008) The economics of altruistic punishment and the maintenance of cooperation. Proc R Soc B Biol Sci 275:871–878. doi:10.1098/rspb.2007.1558

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ember CR (1978) Myths about Hunter-Gatherers. Ethnology 17(4):439–448

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fehr E, Fischbacher U (2003) The nature of human altruism. Nature 425(6960):785–791. doi:10.1038/nature02043

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fehr E, Gächter S (2000) Cooperation and punishment in public goods experiments. Am Econ Rev 90(4):980–994

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fehr E, Gächter S (2002) Altruistic punishment in humans. Nature 415(6868):137–140

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Frey U (2007) Der blinde Fleck—Kognitive Fehler in der Wissenschaft und ihre evolutionsbiologischen Grundlagen. Ontos, Heusenstamm

    Google Scholar 

  • Gächter S, Herrmann B (2009) Reciprocity, culture and human cooperation: previous insights and a new cross-cultural experiment. Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci 364(1518):791–806. doi:10.1098/rstb.2008.0275

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gächter S, Renner E, Sefton M (2008) The long-run benefits of punishment. Science 322:1510. doi:10.1126/science.1164744

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gibson CC, Williams JT, Ostrom E (2005) Local enforcement and better forests. World Dev 33(2):273–284

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gigerenzer G, Todd PM, ABC Research Group (eds) (1999) Simple heuristics that make us smart. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Gintis H (2009) The bounds of reason. Game theory and the unification of the behavioral sciences. Princeton University Press, Princeton

    Google Scholar 

  • Guala F (2012) Reciprocity: weak or strong? What punishment experiments do (and do not) demonstrate. Behav Brain Sci 35(1):1–15. doi:10.1017/S0140525X11000069

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gürerk Ö, Irlenbusch B, Rockenbach B (2006) The competitive advantage of sanctioning institutions. Science 312(5770):108–111. doi:10.1126/science.1123633

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gurven M (2004) To give and to give not: the behavioral ecology of human food transfers. Behav Brain Sci 27(4):543–583. doi:10.1017/S0140525X04000123

    Google Scholar 

  • Hamilton WD (1964a) The genetical evolution of social behaviour. I. J Theor Biol 7:1–16

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hamilton WD (1964b) The genetical evolution of social behaviour. II. J Theor Biol 7:17–52

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Haselton MG, Bryant GA, Wilke A, Frederick DA, Galperin A, Frankenhuis WE, Moore T (2009) Adaptive rationality: an evolutionary perspective on cognitive bias. Soc Cognit 27(5):733–763

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hawkes K (1991) Showing off tests of an hypothesis about men’s foraging goals. Ethol Sociobiol 12(1):29–54. doi:10.1016/0162-3095(91)90011-E

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hawkes K, Bird RB (2002) Showing off, handicap signaling, and the evolution of men’s work. Evol Anthropol 11(2):58–67

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Helbing D, Yu W (2009) The outbreak of cooperation among success-driven individuals under noisy conditions. Proc Nat Acad Sci 106(10):3680–3685

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Henrich J, Heine SJ, Norenzayan A (2010) The weirdest people in the world? Behav Brain Sci 33:61–135

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Herrmann B, Thöni C, Gächter S (2008) Antisocial punishment across societies. Science 319:1362–1367. doi:10.1126/science.1153808

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hill K (2001) Altruistic cooperation during foraging by the Ache, and the evolved human predisposition to cooperate. Hum Nat 13(1):105–128

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hill K, Hurtado MA (2009) Cooperative breeding in South American hunter-gatherers. Proc R Soc B Biol Sci 276(1674):3863–3870

    Google Scholar 

  • Janssen MA, Holahan R, Lee A, Ostrom E (2010) Lab experiments for the study of social-ecological systems. Science 328(5978):613–617

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Koopmans R, Rebers S (2009) Collective action in culturally similar and dissimilar groups: an experiment on parochialism, conditional cooperation, and their linkages. Evolut Hum Behav 30(3):201–211

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ledyard JO (1995) Public goods: a survey of experimental research. In: Kagel JH, Roth AE (eds) The handbook of experimental economics. Princeton University Press, Princeton, pp 111–194

    Google Scholar 

  • Leimar O, Hammerstein P (2001) Evolution of cooperation through indirect reciprocity. Proc R Soc B Biol Sci 268:745–753. doi:10.1098/rspb.2000.1573

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Masclet D, Noussair C, Tucker S, Villeval M (2003) Monetary and nonmonetary punishment in the voluntary contributions mechanism. Am Econ Rev 93(1):366–380

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Nikiforakis N (2008) Punishment and counter-punishment in public good games: can we really govern ourselves? J Public Econom 92(1):91–112. doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2007.04.008

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Nikiforakis N, Normann H (2008) A comparative statics analysis of punishment in public-good experiments. Exp Econ 11(4):358–369. doi:10.1007/s10683-007-9171-3

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ostrom E (1990) Governing the commons: the evolution of institutions for collective action. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Ostrom E (1992) Crafting institutions for self-governing irrigation systems. Institute for Contemporary Studies, San Francisco

    Google Scholar 

  • Ostrom E, Gardner R, Walker J (1994) Rules, games, and common-pool resources. University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor

    Google Scholar 

  • Page T, Putterman L, Unel B (2005) Voluntary association in public goods experiments: reciprocity, mimicry efficiency. Econ J 115(506):1032–1053. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0297.2005.01031.x

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rockenbach B, Milinski M (2006) The efficient interaction of indirect reciprocity and costly punishment. Nature 444:718–723. doi:10.1038/nature05229

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Seabright P (2010) The company of strangers. A natural history of economic life, 2nd edn. Princeton University Press, Princeton

  • Sefton M, Shupp R, Walker JM (2007) The effect of rewards and sanctions in provision of public goods. Econ Inq 45(4):671–690. doi:10.1111/j.1465-7295.2007.00051.x

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Semmann D, Krambeck H, Milinski M (2003) Volunteering leads to rock–paper–scissors dynamics in a public goods game. Nature 425(6956):390–392. doi:10.1038/nature01986

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Voland E (2009) Soziobiologie—Die Evolution von Kooperation und Konkurrenz. Spektrum, Akademischer Verlag, Heidelberg

    Google Scholar 

  • West SA, Griffin AS, Gardner A (2007) Social semantics: altruism, cooperation, mutualism, strong reciprocity and group selection. J Evolut Biol 20(2):415–432. doi:10.1111/j.1420-9101.2006.01258.x

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • West SA, El Mouden C, Gardner A (2011) Sixteen common misconceptions about the evolution of cooperation in humans. Evolut Hum Behav 32(4):231–262. doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2010.08.001

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Wiessner P (2009) Experimental games and games of life among the Ju/’hoan Bushmen. Curr Anthropol 50(1):133–138. doi:10.1086/595622

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Yamagishi T, Kiyonari T (2000) The group as the container of generalized reciprocity. Soc Psychol Q 63(2):116–132

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Zelmer J (2003) Linear public goods experiments: a meta-analysis. Exp Econ 6(3):299–310

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgments

The generosity of James Walker, Martin Sefton and Robert Schupp; Ernst Fehr; Nikos Nikiforakis and Hans-Theo Normann; Simon Gächter and Elke Renner to make their data publicly available or allowing me to analyze them is very much appreciated. Thanks to Eckart Voland and an anonymous reviewer for helpful discussions.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Center for Philosophy and the Foundations of Science, Justus-Liebig-University Giessen, Rathenaustrasse 8, 35394, Giessen, Germany

    Ulrich J. Frey & Hannes Rusch

Authors
  1. Ulrich J. Frey
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  2. Hannes Rusch
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Ulrich J. Frey.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Frey, U.J., Rusch, H. An evolutionary perspective on the long-term efficiency of costly punishment. Biol Philos 27, 811–831 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10539-012-9327-1

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10539-012-9327-1

Keywords

Search

Navigation