Biology & Philosophy

, 26:385

Why reciprocal altruism is not a kind of group selection

Authors

    • Department of PhilosophyUniversity of Notre Dame
  • Robert Brandon
    • Department of PhilosophyDuke University
Article

DOI: 10.1007/s10539-011-9261-7

Cite this article as:
Ramsey, G. & Brandon, R. Biol Philos (2011) 26: 385. doi:10.1007/s10539-011-9261-7

Abstract

Reciprocal altruism was originally formulated in terms of individual selection and most theorists continue to view it in this way. However, this interpretation of reciprocal altruism has been challenged by Sober and Wilson (1998). They argue that reciprocal altruism (as well as all other forms of altruism) evolves by the process of group selection. In this paper, we argue that the original interpretation of reciprocal altruism is the correct one. We accomplish this by arguing that if fitness attaches to (at minimum) entire life cycles, then the kind of fitness exchanges needed to form the group-level in such situations is not available. Reciprocal altruism is thus a result of individual selection and when it evolves, it does so because it is individually advantageous.

Keywords

Reciprocal altruismGroup selectionFitnessKin selectionGame Theory

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011