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Good News for the Logical Autonomy of Ethics

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Abstract

Toomas Karmo claims that his taxonomy of ethical sentences has the result that there does not exist a sound argument with all non-ethical premises and an ethical conclusion. In a recent paper, Mark T. Nelson argues against this claim. Nelson presents a sound argument that he takes to be such that (i) Karmo’s taxonomy classifies that argument’s single premise as non-ethical and (ii) Karmo’s taxonomy classifies that argument’s conclusion as ethical. I attempt to show that Nelson is mistaken about (ii). For any possible world at which the premise of Nelson’s argument is true, Karmo’s taxonomy classifies the conclusion of Nelson’s argument as non-ethical.

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Notes

  1. Here is the passage: “In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remark’d, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surpriz’d to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is, however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, ’tis necessary that it shou’d be observ’d and explain’d; and at the same time that a reason should be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it” (Hume 1739).

  2. Starting with Prior (1960).

  3. Karmo (1988).

  4. See Nelson (2007). See also, Nelson (1995, 2003). For another interesting argument against Karmo’s taxonomy see Maitzen (1998). See also, Maitzen (2006, 2008). For a defense of Karmo, see Huemer (2007) and Hill (2008). For an interesting attempt to develop and modify Karmo’s taxonomy see Dreier (2002).

  5. The logical-autonomy-of-ethics debate is the debate between those who believe you can derive an ethical sentence from non-ethical sentences and those who believe that you cannot.

  6. Karmo (1988).

  7. Ibid.

  8. A reviewer points out that the term ‘definition’ seems more appropriate than ‘taxonomy’. The reviewer’s point is well taken. But in keeping with tradition I will use the term ‘taxonomy’.

  9. Ibid, pp. 256–257.

  10. Nelson (2007).

  11. Ibid.

  12. Ibid.

  13. This is not to say that I think Karmo’s taxonomy is correct. In fact, I argue against Karmo’s taxonomy in Hill (2008).

References

  • Dreier, J. 2002. Metaethics and normative commitment. Philosophical Issues, 12. In Realism and relativism, ed. Ernest Sosa and Enrique Villanueva, 241–263.

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Acknowledgement

Thanks to Fred Feldman and an anonymous reviewer for Argumentation.

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  1. University of Massachusetts, Amherst, MA, USA

    Scott Hill

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  1. Scott Hill
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Hill, S. Good News for the Logical Autonomy of Ethics. Argumentation 23, 277–283 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10503-008-9126-7

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