Abstract
In this paper the argument from coherence is submitted to a critical analysis. First, it is argued to be a complex form of coordinative argumentation, structured on various argumentative levels. Then, using the pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation a distinction is brought out between two basic forms of the argument from coherence: in one use this argument occurs as a sequence of two symptomatic arguments; in the other use we have a main symptomatic argument supported by a subordinate pragmatic argument. Finally, from an evaluative point of view it is assessed whether the argument from coherence can be found acceptable as a tool for settling disputes. It is claimed that in general, we can welcome this argumentative structure as sound and fully acceptable provided that we are aware of the interpretative discretion its use implies.
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A preliminary version of this essay was presented at the symposium organised by the Department of Speech Communication, Argumentation Theory, and Rhetoric at the University of Amsterdamon the 27/02/04. I wish to express my indebtedness to Dora Achourioti, Francesco Belvisi, Frans van Eemeren, Eveline Feteris, Bart Garssen, Jean Wagemans, Peter Houtlosser, and Henrike Jansen for their helpful remarks. Needless to say, the responsibility for the views expressed herein as well as for any errors of form or content rests solely with me.
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Bertea, S. Does Arguing from Coherence Make Sense?. Argumentation 19, 433–446 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10503-005-0510-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10503-005-0510-2