Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems

, Volume 29, Issue 6, pp 1091–1124

Complexity of manipulation, bribery, and campaign management in Bucklin and fallback voting

  • Piotr Faliszewski
  • Yannick Reisch
  • Jörg Rothe
  • Lena Schend
Article

DOI: 10.1007/s10458-014-9277-x

Cite this article as:
Faliszewski, P., Reisch, Y., Rothe, J. et al. Auton Agent Multi-Agent Syst (2015) 29: 1091. doi:10.1007/s10458-014-9277-x

Abstract

A central theme in computational social choice is to study the extent to which voting systems computationally resist manipulative attacks seeking to influence the outcome of elections, such as manipulation (i.e., strategic voting), control, and bribery. Bucklin and fallback voting are among the voting systems with the broadest resistance (i.e., NP-hardness) to control attacks. However, only little is known about their behavior regarding manipulation and bribery attacks. We comprehensively investigate the computational resistance of Bucklin and fallback voting for many of the common manipulation and bribery scenarios; we also complement our discussion by considering several campaign-management problems for these two voting rules.

Keywords

Computational social choice Complexity theory Voting theory  Manipulation Bribery Campaign management Bucklin voting Fallback voting 

Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  • Piotr Faliszewski
    • 1
  • Yannick Reisch
    • 2
  • Jörg Rothe
    • 2
  • Lena Schend
    • 2
  1. 1.AGH UniversityKrakowPoland
  2. 2.Heinrich-Heine-Universität DüsseldorfDüsseldorfGermany