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Dual Causality and the Autonomy of Biology

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Abstract

Ernst Mayr’s concept of dual causality in biology with the two forms of causes (proximate and ultimate) continues to provide an essential foundation for the philosophy of biology. They are equivalent to functional (=proximate) and evolutionary (=ultimate) causes with both required for full biological explanations. The natural sciences can be classified into nomological, historical nomological and historical dual causality, the last including only biology. Because evolutionary causality is unique to biology and must be included for all complete biological explanations, biology is autonomous from the physical sciences.

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Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Donald A. Dewsbury, John A. Alcock, James V. Remsen for providing comments and additional citations, Mary LeCroy for her assistance in gathering literature, and two anonymous reviewers for critiques of the manuscript all of which lead to improvements of this analysis.

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Correspondence to Walter J. Bock.

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I would like to dedicate this paper to my colleague of 60 years, Professor Gerd von Wahlert (1925–2016), who always stressed the ecological aspects of evolutionary biology.

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Bock, W.J. Dual Causality and the Autonomy of Biology. Acta Biotheor 65, 63–79 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10441-016-9303-2

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