Abstract
We show, by means of an example, that in models where default is subject to both collateral repossession and utility punishments, opportunities for doing Ponzi schemes are not always ruled out and (refined) equilibria may fail to exist. This is true even if default penalties are moderate as defined in Páscoa and Seghir (Game Econ Behav 65:270–286, 2009). In our example, asset promises and default penalties are chosen such that, if an equilibrium does exist, agents never default on their promises. At the same time collateral bundles and utility functions are such that the full repayment of debts implies that the asset price should be strictly larger than the cost of collateral requirements. This is sufficient to induce agents to run Ponzi schemes and destroy equilibrium existence.
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Notes
In other words, we show that moderate penalties can be an effective mechanism (as defined in Ferreira and Torres-Martínez (2010)).
This is not true for equilibria that are not refined since lenders may expect the asset to deliver nothing above the depreciated value of the collateral, despite the fact that default penalties would induce agents to repay fully their debt in case of trade.
The unitary default penalty \(\mu ^i_t\) represents the instantaneous disutility from defaulting in real terms the market value of the bundle \(w_t\).
One of the equilibrium conditions will require that lenders’ expected return \(V_t(\kappa ,p)\) coincides with the actual deliveries of the borrowers in the sense that
$$\begin{aligned} \sum _{i\in I} V_t(\kappa ,p) \theta ^i_{t-1} = \sum _{i\in I} d^i_t. \end{aligned}$$By convention we let \(a_{-1}=(x_{-1},\theta _{-1},\varphi _{-1},d_{-1})=(0,0,0,0)\).
This issue is ignored by Páscoa and Seghir (2009).
By convention \(x^i_{-1}=0\) and \(Y_{-1} = 0\).
This assumption is automatically satisfied if the sequence of functions \((v^i_t)_{t\in \mathcal T }\) is uniformly bounded from above by an increasing function \(\overline{v}^i\). Indeed, in that case we have
$$\begin{aligned} U^i(\varOmega ) \leqslant \overline{v}^i(\overline{\varOmega }) \sum _{t\geqslant 0} [\beta _i]^t < \infty \end{aligned}$$where \(\overline{\varOmega } = \sum _{i\in I} \overline{\varOmega }^i\).
If the promise bundle \(A_t\) and the depreciated collateral bundle \(Y_t C_{t-1}\) are not zero then \(D_t(p)\) (and consequently \(V_t(p)\)) are not zero since \(p_t\) is strictly positive.
By convention we let \(a_{-1}=(x_{-1},\theta _{-1},\varphi _{-1},d_{-1})=(0,0,0,0)\) and \(b_0(\kappa ,p)=0\).
Páscoa and Seghir (2009) assumed that default penalties are moderate and claimed in Theorem 4.1 that an equilibrium exists. Actually, the only difficult step (which is also the only step where the assumption of moderate penalties is used) of their proof consists of proving that if a sequence of finite horizon equilibria converges then for every agent, the limiting plan is optimal for the infinite horizon budget set. If their arguments were correct we would also get existence of an \(\varepsilon \)-equilibrium when default penalties are moderate since optimality of a plan among budget feasible plans is independent of whether we consider equilibria or \(\varepsilon \)-equilibria (individual demand sets coincide for both concepts).
The mistake in the intuitive argument we provide (and in the proof proposed by Páscoa and Seghir (2009)) is that when contemplating an alternative budget feasible plan, an agent does not restrict his choices to be physically feasible. In particular, depending on the sequence of prices, a budget feasible plan may have a sequence of asset short-sales that is inconsistent with the scarcity of goods (recall that when short-selling an agent should constitute collateral in terms of goods).
The set \(\Delta (L)\) is the simplex in \(\mathbb R ^L_+\), i.e., \(\Delta (L)=\{ p \in \mathbb R ^L_+ \ :\ \sum _{\ell \in L} p(\ell ) =1\}\).
Observe that the term \(b_t(\kappa ,p)\) appearing in the market clearing condition (3.1) satisfies \(b_t(\kappa ,p) \leqslant \overline{b}_t\).
The fact that default penalties are moderate is used in Claim 4.1 which is essential in order to get condition (d) in the Theorem of Appendix .
We thank Juan Pablo Torres–Martínez for pointing out that this issue is delicate and deserves some attention.
One should apply the theorem in Appendix by choosing \(L_t = L \cup \{1,2,3\}\) or equivalently \(\mathbb R ^{L_t}=\mathbb R ^L \times \mathbb R ^3\). Condition (L.3) in Appendix follows from Assumptions (A.1) and (A.2). Condition (b) in the theorem of Appendix follows from Remark 2.1. For more details, we refer to Appendix .
We let \(\rho ^i_0=0\) since there is no delivery at the initial period \(t=0\).
By convention, we let \(a_{-1}=(0,0,0,0)\).
See Statement 2 in the theorem of Appendix .
Observe that for any period \(t<\tau \), we have \(\mathcal L ^i_t(a_t,a_{t-1})=\mathcal L ^i_t(a^i_t,a^i_{t-1}) = \varPi _t^i(a^i_t,a^i_{t-1})\); and for any period \(t>\tau +1\) we have \(\mathcal L ^i_t(a_t,a_{t-1}) = \mathcal L ^i_t(0,0) \geqslant 0\).
We borrowed from Páscoa and Seghir (2009) the idea that we can choose exogenously the default penalty such that, endogenously at equilibrium, no agent will decide to default. This is possible due to the bound on marginal wealth obtained in Proposition 4.2. We only succeeded to find such a bound when default penalties are moderate. In particular, we do not know for the examples proposed by Páscoa and Seghir (2009) whether Ponzi schemes reappear when unduly pessimistic expectations on asset deliveries are ruled out.
If we do not consider an \(\varepsilon \)-equilibrium, then one may have \(\kappa _t <1\) and no trade in period \(t\). In that case, our argument does not apply.
In that respect, we show that the arguments in (Páscoa and Seghir (2009), Theorem 4.1) are not correct.
As usual \(\nabla v^i(x) = (\nabla v^i_\ell (x(\ell )), \nabla v^i_g(x(g)))\) is the gradient of \(v^i\) at \(x\) where \(\nabla v^i_{\ell }\) and \(\nabla v^i_g\) are the differential of \(v^i_\ell \) and \(v^i_g\) respectively.
Observe that if we replace \(\omega _t\) by \(\underline{\omega }\) in the definition of \(b_t\) given in Proposition 4.3 then we get \(\underline{b}\). In particular we have \(b_t \geqslant \underline{b}\) for every \(t\geqslant 1\).
Recall that \(b_{t+1}/\underline{b} = v^i(\omega ^i_t)/v^i(\underline{\omega }) \geqslant 1\).
This in particular shows that the sufficient condition proposed by Ferreira and Torres-Martínez (2010) is not necessary.
The arguments can easily be adapted to prove existence of an \(\varepsilon \)-equilibrium and then of a refined equilibrium.
The extension to a model with uncertainty and incomplete markets is only a matter of notation.
If \(f:\mathbb R ^n \rightarrow [-\infty ,\infty )\) is a concave function with \(f(x) >-\infty \), then the derivative of \(f\) at \(x\) in the direction of \(y\in \mathbb R ^n\) is
$$\begin{aligned} df(x;y) = \lim _{\lambda \downarrow 0} \frac{f(x+\lambda y) - f(x)}{\lambda }. \end{aligned}$$We must have \(p_t\mathbf 1 _L >0\) since \(v^i_t\) is strictly increasing.
Observe that
$$\begin{aligned} \lim _{\varepsilon \downarrow 0} \frac{v^i_t(x^i_t + \varepsilon (C_t + \alpha \mathbf 1 _L)) - v^i_t(x^i_t)}{\varepsilon } = dv^i_t(x^i_t;C_t + \alpha \mathbf 1 _L) > dv^i_t(x^i_t;C_t). \end{aligned}$$Condition (A.2) is satisfied if
$$\begin{aligned} \forall i\in I, \quad \inf _{y\in [0,\varOmega _t]} d v^i_t(y;C_t) \geqslant \beta _i \mu ^i_{t+1} \overline{b}_{t+1}. \end{aligned}$$Observe that by concavity we have \(d v^i_t(y;C_t) \geqslant v^i_t(y+C_t)-v^i_t(y)\). Since \([0,\varOmega _t]\) is a compact set and \(v^i_t\) is continuous, there exists \(y^i_t \in [0,\varOmega _t]\) such that
$$\begin{aligned} \inf _{y\in [0,\varOmega _t]} d v^i_t(y;C_t) \geqslant v^i_t(y^i_t+C_t)-v^i_t(y^i_t). \end{aligned}$$Since the function \(v^i_t\) is strictly increasing, we have \(v^i_t(y^i_t+C_t) > v^i_t(y^i_t)\) implying that the infimum is not \(0\). It follows that Condition (A.2) can be satisfied for strictly positive default penalties.
In the economic model of this paper, an action \(a_t\) is a vector \((x_t,\theta _t,\varphi _t,d_t)\) called a plan where \(x_t \in \mathbb R ^L\), \(\theta _t \in \mathbb R \), \(\varphi _t \in \mathbb R \), and \(d_t \in \mathbb R \). For this case, we have \(L_t = L \cup \{1,2,3\}\).
In the economic model of this paper, the constraints are the solvency constraint, the collateral requirement, the minimum delivery constraint and non-negativity constraints. For this case, we have \(K_t=\{1,2,3,4\}\cup L\).
Since the domain \(\text{ dom}(g_t)\) of the function \(g_t\) is the whole space \(\mathbb R ^{L_t}\times \mathbb R ^{L_{t-1}}\), concavity already implies that \(g_t\) is continuous.
We denote by \(\text{ dom}(f_t)\) the set of all points \((c_1,c_2)\in \mathbb R ^{L_t} \times \mathbb R ^{L_{t-1}}\) such that \(f_{t}(c_1,c_2)\in \mathbb R \). Then, continuity is in the sense that \(\widehat{f}_t : \text{ dom}(f_t) \rightarrow \mathbb R \) defined by \(\widehat{f}_t(c_1,c_2) = f_t(c_1,c_2)\) is continuous on \(\text{ dom}(f_t)\).
Under (a)–(d) we obtain for every finite-horizon sequence \(c\in C^\tau (L)\),
$$\begin{aligned} \sum _{0 \leqslant t \leqslant {\tau +1}} \mathcal L _t(c_t,c_{t-1}) \leqslant \sum _{t \in \mathcal T } \mathcal L _t(c^\star _{t},c^\star _{t-1}) = \sum _{t \in \mathcal T } f_t(c^\star _{t},c^\star _{t-1}). \end{aligned}$$If \(\nabla \mathcal L _t^\star \) is a super-gradient of \(\mathcal L _t\) at \((c^\star _t,c^\star _{t-1})\) there exist two vectors \(\nabla _1 \mathcal L _t^\star \in \mathbb R ^{L_t}\) and \(\nabla _2 \mathcal L _t^\star \in \mathbb R ^{L_{t-1}}\) such that
$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal L _t(\widetilde{c}_t,\widetilde{c}_{t-1}) - \mathcal L _t(c^\star _t,c^\star _{t-1}) \leqslant \nabla _1 \mathcal L _t^\star \times (\widetilde{c}_t - c^\star _t) + \nabla _2 \mathcal L _t^\star \times (\widetilde{c}_{t-1} - c^\star _{t-1}) \end{aligned}$$for every pair \((\widetilde{c}_t,\widetilde{c}_{t-1})\) in \(\mathbb R ^{L_t} \times \mathbb R ^{L_{t-1}}\). The super-gradient \(\nabla \mathcal L _t^\star \) is then assimilated with the pair \((\nabla _1 \mathcal L _t^\star ,\nabla _2 \mathcal L _t^\star )\). Observe that \(\nabla _1 \mathcal L _t^\star \) belongs to the super-differential of the function \(x\mapsto \mathcal L _t(x,c^\star _{t-1})\) at \(c^\star _t\) and \(\nabla _2 \mathcal L _t^\star \) belongs to the super-differential of the function \(x\mapsto \mathcal L _t(c^\star _{t},x)\) at \(c^\star _{t-1}\).
Observe that the horizon of the sequence \(c\) is \(\tau \). Since \(T > \tau \), it follows that \(c\) also belongs to \(C^T(L)\). From Eq. (B.5) we get
$$\begin{aligned} f(c) + \sum _{0\leqslant t \leqslant T+1} \varPsi _t^T \cdot g_t(c_t,c_{t-1}) \leqslant f(c^\star ). \end{aligned}$$From Assumption (L.1) we know that \(g_ t(c_t,c_{t-1}) = g_t(0,0)\geqslant 0\) for every \(t>\tau +1\). Therefore we get
$$\begin{aligned} f(c) + \sum _{0\leqslant t \leqslant \tau +1} \varPsi _t^T \cdot g_t(c_t,c_{t-1}) \leqslant f(c) + \sum _{0\leqslant t \leqslant T+1} \varPsi _t^T \cdot g_t(c_t,c_{t-1}) \leqslant f(c^\star ). \end{aligned}$$For simplicity, the sum
$$\begin{aligned} \sum _{k\in K_t} \varPsi _{T,k} \nabla _1 g_{T,k}^\star \end{aligned}$$is denoted by \(\varPsi _T \star \nabla _1 g_T^\star \).
Replacing “\(\liminf \)” by “\(\limsup \)” in Eq. (B.11) we get \(\limsup _{T \rightarrow \infty } f^T(c) \leqslant f(c^\star )\).
Observe that from Eq. (B.12) we have \(\gamma _t p_t \geqslant \beta ^t \nabla v_t \gg 0\) implying that \(\gamma _t>0\).
References
Araujo, A.P., Páscoa, M.R., Torres-Martínez, J.P.: Collateral avoids Ponzi schemes in incomplete markets. Econometrica 70, 1613–1638 (2002)
Dubey, P., Geanakoplos, J., Shubik, M.: Default and punishment in general equilibrium. Econometrica 73, 1–37 (2005)
Ferreira, T.R.T., Torres-Martínez, J.P.: The impossibility of effective enforcement mechanisms in collate- ralized credit markets. J Math Econ 46, 332–342 (2010)
Kubler, F., Schmedders, K.: Stationary equilibria in asset-pricing models with incomplete markets and collateral. Econometrica 71, 1767–1793 (2003)
Martins-da Rocha, V.F., Vailakis, Y.: Harsh default penalties lead to Ponzi schemes: a counterexample. Game Econ Behav 75, 277–282 (2012)
Páscoa, M.R., Seghir, A.: Harsh default penalties lead to Ponzi schemes. Game Econ Behav 65, 270–286 (2009)
Páscoa, M.R., Seghir, A.: Collateralized borrowing: direct (dis)utility effects hamper long-run equilibrium. Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Mimeo (2011)
Acknowledgments
We would like to thank Luis H. B. Braido, Martine Quinzii and Juan Pablo Torres-Martínez for useful comments and suggestions. This paper has benefited from comments by seminar participants and discussants at the University of Warwick (CRETA seminar), the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign (Conference in honor of Wayne Shafer), the University of Copenhagen (Workshop on Economic Theory), the XVII European Workshop on General Equilibrium Theory, the 2009 SAET Conference on current trends in Economics, and the IV Vigo workshop on Frontiers in Economic Theory and Applications. Financial support from CNPq and the GIP ANR of the Risk Foundation (Groupama Chair) is gratefully acknowledged by V. Filipe Martins-da-Rocha. Yiannis Vailakis acknowledges the financial support of an ERC starting grant (FP7, Ideas specific program, Project 240983 DCFM).
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Appendices
Appendix A: Sufficient conditions on primitives to rule out Ponzi schemes
In this section we exhibit a condition relating the marginal utility of consuming the collateral bundle and the marginal penalty of default which ensures that the limits of equilibria of truncated economies are competitive equilibria of the infinite horizon economy.Footnote 31 Our objective is neither to provide a general existence result nor to give a rigorous proof.Footnote 32 We only intend to give a sketch of the proof to illustrate the intuition behind this condition.
Fix an horizon \(T>1\) and consider a competitive equilibrium \((\pi ,\varvec{a})\) of the economy truncated at period \(T\) where \(\pi =(p,q,\kappa )\) and \(a^i=(x^i,\theta ^i,\varphi ^i,d^i)\). Fix an agent \(i\) and a period \(t <T\). Assume that the following inequality is satisfied
where \(d v^i_t(x^i_t;C_t)\) is the derivative of \(v^i_t\) at \(x^i_t\) in the direction of \(C_t\),Footnote 33 and \(\overline{b}_{t+1}\) is the maximum default in real terms at date \(t+1\) defined by
We claim that we must have \(q_t \leqslant p_t C_t\). Indeed, assume by contradiction that there exists \(\alpha >0\) such \(q_t = p_t C_t + \alpha p_t \mathbf 1 _L\).Footnote 34 Suppose agent \(i\) considers deviating from \(\varphi ^i_t\) by “shorting” \(\varepsilon \) more security, using the receipt \(q_t\varepsilon \) to buy \(\varepsilon \) of the collateral and \(\alpha \varepsilon \) of the vector \(\mathbf 1 _L\) (i.e., \(\alpha \varepsilon \) units of each good). This strategy is budget feasible at date \(t\), but also at date \(t+1\). Indeed, agent \(i\) may decide to pay back \(D_{t+1}(p)\varepsilon \) which is smaller than the value of depreciated collateral \(Y_{t+1}C_t \varepsilon \) constituted at period \(t\). The decrease in utility at date \(t\) due to default penalties at date \(t+1\) is
Inequality (A.1) implies that the deviation strictly increases agent \(i\)’s utility,Footnote 35 contradicting that \(a^i\) is optimal.
Inequality (A.1) depends on the consumption allocation \((x^i_t)_{i\in I}\) which is an endogenous variable. It is possible to exhibit a stronger condition only in terms of primitives. Indeed, consider the following property:
where \(\text{ F}_t\) is the set of consumption bundles \(\varvec{z}_t=(z^i_t)_{i\in I}\) physically feasible at date \(t\), i.e.,
Under Eq. (A.2) condition (A.1) is automatically satisfied since \(x^i_t\) is physically feasible for any competitive equilibrium.Footnote 36
Consider now that there is an infinite set \(\text{ Barr} \subset \mathcal T \) such that Eq. (A.2) is satisfied for every date \(t\in \text{ Barr}\). Let \((\pi ^T,\varvec{a}^T)\) be a competitive equilibrium for the truncated economy \(\mathcal E ^T\) with finite-horizon \(T\). Observe that for every \(t\in \text{ Barr}\) with \(t<T\), we must have \(q^T_t \leqslant p_t^T C_t\). Following the (standard) arguments in Páscoa and Seghir (2009), passing to a subsequence if necessary, we can assume that the sequence \((\pi ^T,\varvec{a}^T)\) converges to some \((\pi ,\varvec{a})\) such that all markets clear and each action \(a^i\) is budget feasible and optimal among finite-horizon actions in the budget set \(B^i(\pi )\). The difficulty is to show that \(a^i\) is optimal among budget feasible infinite horizon actions. Observe that for every \(t\in \text{ Barr}\) one must have \(q_t \leqslant p_t C_t\). If the utility function \(U^i(x)\) is bounded for every consumption sequence \(x\in X\), then it is easy to show that \(\varvec{a}\) is optimal among all feasible plans. We can then conclude that \((\pi ,\varvec{a})\) is a competitive equilibrium.
Appendix B: Necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of Langrange multipliers
In this appendix we consider an abstract infinite dimensional maximization problem and we present some necessary and sufficient conditions for optimality. Necessary conditions for optimality by means of Lagrange multipliers are first presented (see Sect. ). We then provide sufficient conditions in Sect. . In the last section we restate the previous results for the specific economic model of the associated paper.
For each period \(t \in \mathcal T \), we fix a finite set \(L_t\) of “types of action”.Footnote 37 We denote by \(C(L)\) the space of all sequencees \(c=(c_t)_{t \in \mathcal T }\) where \(c_t\) is a vector in \(\mathbb R ^{L_t}\). By convention, we pose \(L_{-1}=\{1\}\) and \(c_{-1}=0\) for any sequence \(c \in C(L)\). For each period \(T\geqslant 1\), we let \(C^T(L)\) be the subset of \(C(L)\) defined by
Fixing a finite set \(K_t\) of “constraints” on actionsFootnote 38 we can define in a similar way the sets \(C(K)\) and \(C^T(K)\) by replacing \(L_t\) by \(K_t\). For period \(t\), we fix an objective function \(f_t : \mathbb R ^{L_t} \times \mathbb R ^{L_{t-1}} \longrightarrow \mathbb R \cup \{-\infty \}\) and a constraint function \(g_t : \mathbb R ^{L_t} \times \mathbb R ^{L_{t-1}} \longrightarrow \mathbb R ^{K_t}\). For each period \(T\geqslant 1\) and each sequence \(c \in C(L)\), we let
When the limit exists, we denote by \(f(c)\) the following sum
Given \(c \in C(L)\), we denote by \(g(c)\) the sequence in \(C(K)\) defined by
The vector \(g_t(c_t,c_{t-1})\) in \(\mathbb R ^{K_t}\) is denoted by \((g_{t,k}(c_t,c_{t-1}))_{k\in K_t}\) where \(g_{t,k}\) is interpreted as the \(k\)th constraint function from \(\mathbb R ^{L_t} \times \mathbb R ^{L_{t-1}}\) to \(\mathbb R \).
We assume that
-
(L.1)
for each period \(t\), the functions \(f_t\) and \(g_t\) are concave with \(f_t(0,0) = 0\) and \(g_t(0,0) \geqslant 0\);
-
(L.2)
for each period \(t\), the function \(g_t\) is continuousFootnote 39 and the function \(f_t\), when restricted to its domain \(\text{ dom}(f_t)\), is continuous;Footnote 40
-
(L.3)
for each period \(T\geqslant 1\), there exists a sequence \(\widehat{c} \in C^T(L)\) such that
$$\begin{aligned} f(\widehat{c}) \geqslant 0, \quad g_{T+1}(0,\widehat{c}_T) \geqslant 0 \quad \text{ and} \quad \forall t \in \{0,\ldots ,T\}, \quad g_t(\widehat{c}_t,\widehat{c}_{t-1}) \in \mathbb R ^{K_t}_{++}. \end{aligned}$$
1.1 B.1 Necessary conditions
Applying sequentially a finite dimensional convex separation argument, we can prove the following result.
Theorem
Assume that there exists \(c^\star \in C(L)\) such that
-
(a)
the sequence \(c^\star \) satisfies the constraints \(g(c^\star ) \geqslant 0\);
-
(b)
the sum \(f(c^\star )\) is well defined;
-
(c)
the sequence \(c^\star \) is optimal among finite-horizon sequences, i.e., for any period \(\tau \geqslant 1\), for every finite-horizon sequence \(c \in C^\tau (L)\) satisfying the constraints \(g(c)\geqslant 0\), we have \(f(c^\star ) \geqslant f(c)\).
Then the following properties hold.
-
1.
There exists \(\varPsi \in C(K)\) with \(\varPsi _t \in \mathbb R ^{K_t}_+\) such that for any period \(\tau \geqslant 1\) and any finite-horizon sequence \(c\in C^\tau (L)\),
$$\begin{aligned} \sum _{0 \leqslant t \leqslant {\tau +1}} \mathcal L _t(c_t,c_{t-1}) \leqslant f(c^\star ) \end{aligned}$$(7.1)where \(\mathcal L _t(c_t,c_{t-1}) = f_t(c_t,c_{t-1}) + \varPsi _t \cdot g_t(c_t,c_{t-1})\).
-
2.
If moreover, we have
-
(d)
for any period \(t\geqslant 1\), there exist \(\tau \geqslant t\) and a finite-horizon sequence \(\check{c} \in C^{\tau +1}(L)\) satisfying \(g(\check{c}) \geqslant 0\), \(f(\check{c}) \geqslant f^{\tau }(c^\star )\) and \(c^\star \mathbf 1 _{[0,\tau ]} = \check{c}\mathbf 1 _{[0,\tau ]}\)
thenFootnote 41
$$\begin{aligned} \forall t \in \mathcal T , \quad \varPsi _t \cdot g_t(c^\star _{t},c^\star _{t-1})=0. \end{aligned}$$(7.2)In particular we obtain the following variational property: for every sequence \(\widetilde{c}\) in \(C(L)\) and every period \(T\geqslant 1\) we have
$$\begin{aligned} \sum _{t=0}^T \mathcal L _t(\widetilde{c}_t,\widetilde{c}_{t-1}) + \mathcal L _{T+1}(c^\star _{T+1},\widetilde{c}_T) \leqslant \sum _{t=0}^{T+1} \mathcal L _t(c^\star _t,c^\star _{t-1}). \end{aligned}$$(7.3)Therefore, for every period \(T\geqslant 1\), there exist a family of super-gradientsFootnote 42
$$\begin{aligned} (\nabla \mathcal L _0^\star , \ldots , \nabla \mathcal L ^\star _T) \quad \text{ where} \quad \nabla \mathcal L _t^\star = (\nabla _1 \mathcal L _t^\star ,\nabla _2 \mathcal L _t^\star ) \in \partial \mathcal L _t(c^\star _t,c^\star _{t-1}) \end{aligned}$$and \(\xi _{T+1}\) a super-gradient of the function \(x \mapsto \mathcal L _{T+1}(c^\star _{T+1},x)\) such that
$$\begin{aligned} \forall t \in \{0,\ldots ,T-1\}, \quad \nabla _1 \mathcal L ^\star _t + \nabla _2 \mathcal L ^\star _{t+1} = 0 \quad \text{ and} \quad \nabla _1 \mathcal L ^\star _T + \xi _{T+1} =0\qquad \quad \end{aligned}$$(7.4) -
(d)
Proof of the theorem
Fix a period \(T\geqslant 1\). We let \(A\) be the subset of \(\mathbb R \times C^{T+1}(K)\) defined by
and we let \(B = (0,\infty ) \times C^{T+1}_+(K)\) where
Following Assumptions (L.1)–(L.3) and conditions (a)–(c), the sets \(A\) and \(B\) are disjoint non-empty convex subsets of \(\mathbb R \times C^{T+1}(K)\). It follows from the finite dimensional separating hyperplane theorem that there exists a non-zero pair \((\mu ^T,\varPsi ^T) \in \mathbb R _+ \times C^{T+1}_+(K)\) such that
Following Assumption (L.3), we can take \(\mu ^T=1\) without any loss of generality.
Fix a period \(\tau \in \mathcal T \). The objective is to prove that the sequence \((\varPsi ^T_\tau )_{T\geqslant 1}\) converges in \(\mathbb R _+\). Following Assumption (L.3), there exists a process \(\widehat{c} \in C^\tau (L)\) such that
Observe that for any \(t > \tau +1\) we have \(g_t(\widehat{c}_t,\widehat{c}_{t-1}) = g_t(0,0) \geqslant 0\). It follows from Eq. (B.5) that for all \(k\in K_\tau \),
Using a diagonal procedure and passing to a subsequence if necessary, we can prove that there exists \(\varPsi \in C_+(K)\) such that
Now we fix a period \(\tau \geqslant 1\) and a finite-horizon sequence \(c \in C^\tau (L)\). For each \(T> \tau \), it follows from Eq. (B.5) and Assumption (L.1) thatFootnote 43
Passing to the limit when \(T\) goes to infinite, we get the desired result (B.1):
Now assume that (d) is satisfied. Fix a period \(t \in \mathcal T \), there exist \(\tau \geqslant t\) and a finite-horizon sequence \(\check{c} \in C^{\tau +1}(L)\) satisfying \(g(\check{c}) \geqslant 0\), \(f(\check{c}) \geqslant f^{\tau }(c^\star )\) and \(\check{c} \mathbf 1 _{[0,\tau ]} = c^\star \mathbf 1 _{[0,\tau ]}\). Observe that \(f^{\tau +2}(\check{c}) = f(\check{c}) \geqslant f^{\tau }(c^\star )\). Choosing \(c=\check{c}\) in Eq. (B.1), it follows that
Since
we get the desired result (B.2).
Now fix a sequence \(\widetilde{c}\) in \(C(L)\) and a period \(T\geqslant 1\). For every \(\tau >T\) we let \(c\) be the sequence in \(C^{\tau }(L)\) defined by
It follows from Eqs. (B.1) and (B.2) that
Given the construction of the sequence \(c\), we have
Passing to the limit when \(\tau \rightarrow \infty \) and using the fact that the infinite sum \(f(c^\star )\) is well-defined, we get the desired result
We let \(H\) be the function defined on \(\mathbb R ^{L_0} \times \cdots \times \mathbb R ^{L_T}\) by
This is a concave function having a global maximum at \((c^\star _0,\ldots ,c^\star _T)\). It follows that the super-differential of \(H\) at \((c^\star _0,\ldots ,c^\star _T)\) is non-empty and contains \(0\). Observe that
where
It follows that
Observe that a super-gradient in \(\partial H_t(c^\star _0,\ldots ,c^\star _T)\) is a vector in \(\mathbb R ^{L_0} \times \cdots \times \mathbb R ^{L_T}\) of the following form
where \((\nabla _1\mathcal L _t^\star ,\nabla _2 \mathcal L _{t}^\star )\) is a super-gradient in \(\partial \mathcal L _t(c^\star _t,c^\star _{t-1})\). Observe moreover that a super-gradient in \(\partial h_{T+1}(c^\star _0,\ldots ,c^\star _T)\) takes the following form
where \(\xi _{T+1} \in \mathbb R ^{L_t}\) is a super-gradient of the function \(x \mapsto \mathcal L _{T+1}(c^\star _{T+1},x)\) at \(c^\star _T\). Combining Eqs. (B.6), (B.7) and (B.8) we get the desired result (B.4). \(\square \)
1.2 B.2 Sufficient conditions
In this subsection, we investigate under which conditions the first-order conditions (B.4) in the theorem are sufficient to obtain optimality. Let \(c^\star \in C(L)\) satisfying the conditions (a) and (b) of the theorem, i.e., the sequence \(c^\star \) satisfies the constraint \(g(c^\star ) \geqslant 0\) and the sum \(f(c^\star )\) is well defined. Let \(\varPsi \in C(K)\) be a sequence of Lagrange multipliers \(\varPsi _t =(\varPsi _{t,k})_{k\in K_t} \in \mathbb R ^{K_t}_+\) such that the first-order conditions (B.4) and the binding conditions (B.2) are satisfied. Actually we will assume a stronger property: there exists a sequence of super-gradients
such that
where we recall that \(\mathcal L _t=f_t + \varPsi _t \cdot g_t\).
Let \(c\) be a sequence in \(C(L)\) satisfying the constraints \(g(c)\geqslant 0\). Given \(T\geqslant 1\), we denote by \(\mathcal L ^T(c)\) the Lagrangian up to period \(T\) defined by
By concavity and definition of the super-gradients, we have
Rearranging the previous sum we get
Using the Euler Eq. (B.9) we get
Since \(\mathcal L _t = f_t + \varPsi \cdot g_t\) it follows that there exist a super-gradient \(\nabla f_t^\star \) of \(f_t\) at \((c^\star _t,c^\star _{t-1})\) and for each \(k\in K_t\) a super-gradient \(\nabla g_{t,k}^\star \) of \(g_{t,k}\) at \((c^\star _t,c^\star _{t-1})\) such that
We can decompose the above super-gradients as follows
and \(\nabla _1 \mathcal L _T^\star \) can be written as followsFootnote 44
We then get
Since for every period \(t\) we have
it follows that
We obtain immediately the following properties:
Claim
If the sequence \(c^\star \) satisfies the following transversality condition
then \(c^\star \) is optimal among finite-horizon sequences, i.e., if \(c \in C^\tau (L)\) for some \(\tau \in \mathcal T \) and satisfies \(g(c)\geqslant 0\) then we have \(f(c) \leqslant f(c^\star )\).
Now if \(c\) is a (possibly infinite) sequence with \(g(c)\geqslant 0\) and satisfying the following transversality condition
then we haveFootnote 45
In particular, if \(f(c)\) is well-defined then we get \(f(c) \leqslant f(c^\star )\).
1.3 B.3 The economic model of the paper
In the infinite horizon economy of this paper, every agent solves a maximization problem that is a particular case of the abstract problem presented above. We fix a price sequence \(\pi =(p_t,q_t,\kappa _t)_{t\in \mathcal T }\) and consider a generic agent without specifying the index \(i\).
Let \(L_t = L\cup \{1,2,3\}\) and identify the choice \(c_t\) with the plan \((x_t,\theta _t,\varphi _t,d_t)\). We then have
where \(\widehat{v}_t\) coincides with \(v_t\) on \(\mathbb R ^L_+\) and is identical to \(-\infty \) elsewhere. From now on we abuse notations and identify \(v_t\) with \(\widehat{v}_t\).
Let \(K_t=\{1,2,3,4\} \cup L\) and choose
together with
and
Observe that under the assumptions of our model, Assumptions (L.1)–(L.3) are automatically satisfied. A sequence \((\varPsi _t)_{t\in \mathcal T }\) with \(\varPsi _t \in \mathbb R ^{K_t}=\mathbb R ^4 \times \mathbb R ^L\) is denoted by
The first order conditions (B.4) translate into the following form:
-
(a)
first order condition for consumption:
$$\begin{aligned} \forall t \in \mathcal T , \quad \beta ^t \nabla v_t + \gamma _{t+1} p_{t+1} Y_{t+1} + \chi _t = \gamma _t p_t; \end{aligned}$$(7.12) -
(b)
first order condition for asset purchases:
$$\begin{aligned} \forall t \in \mathcal T , \quad \gamma _t q_t = \alpha _{\theta ,t} + \gamma _{t+1} V_{t+1}(\kappa ,p); \end{aligned}$$(7.13) -
(c)
first order condition for deliveries:
$$\begin{aligned} \forall t\geqslant 1, \quad \beta ^t \mu _t \frac{\delta _t}{p_t w_t} + \rho _t = \gamma _t; \end{aligned}$$(7.14) -
(d)
first order conditions for asset sales:
$$\begin{aligned} \forall t\geqslant 1, \quad \gamma _t q_t + \alpha _{\varphi ,t} \!=\! \rho _{t+1} D_{t+1}(p) \!+\! \chi _t C_t \!+\! \beta ^{t+1} \mu _{t+1} \frac{\delta _{t+1}}{p_{t+1} w_{t+1}} V_{t+1}(p);\qquad \quad \end{aligned}$$(7.15)
where \(\nabla v_t\) is a super-gradient of \(v_t\) at \(x_t\) and \(-\delta _t\) is a super-gradient of \(\Delta \mapsto -[\Delta ]^+\) at \(\Delta _t=V_t(p)\varphi _{t-1} - d_t\). The binding conditions (B.2) translate in the following formFootnote 46
and for every \(\ell \in L\),
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Martins-da-Rocha, V.F., Vailakis, Y. On Ponzi schemes in infinite horizon collateralized economies with default penalties. Ann Finance 8, 455–488 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10436-012-0209-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10436-012-0209-y