Abstract
The hypothesis that the retrieval of correct source memory cues, those leading to a correct source attribution, increases confidence, whereas the retrieval of incorrect source memory cues, those leading to a source misattribution, decreases confidence was tested. Four predictions were derived from this hypothesis: (1) confidence should be higher for correct than incorrect source attribution except; (2) when no source cues are retrieved; (3) only the source misattributions inferred from the retrieval of incorrect source cues will be rated with low confidence; and (4) the number of source cues retrieved, either correct or incorrect, will affect the confidence in the source attributions. To test these predictions, participants read two narratives from two witnesses to a bank robbery, a customer and a teller. Then, participants completed a source monitoring test with four alternatives, customer, teller, both, or neither, and rated their confidence in their source attribution. Results supported the first three predictions, but they also suggested that the number of correct source monitoring cues retrieved did not play a role in the monitoring of the accuracy of the source attributions. Attributions made from the recovery of incorrect source cues could be tagged as dubious or uncertain, thus leading to lowered confidence irrespective of the number of incorrect source cues or whether another correct source cue was also recovered. This research has potential applications for eyewitness memory because it shows that confidence can be an indicator of the accuracy of a source attribution.
Notes
The standard way to analyze a source monitoring test is by comparing attributions for a given actual source (i.e., comparing rows in Tables 1, 2). However, such analysis would not allow the direct test of this hypothesis. For example, an examination of the confidence in the three misattributions with the actual source ‘customer’ would miss the key comparison between a misattribution that followed the recovery of a single correct cue and a misattribution that followed the recovery of a single incorrect cue (see first row of Table 1). This comparison is made by comparing the actual sources for a given attribution (i.e., comparing columns in Tables 1, 2) as done here.
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Acknowledgments
Portions of this research were presented at the 8th Meeting of the Spanish Society of Experimental Psychology (SEPEX), First Joint Meeting with the Experimental Psychology Society (EPC), Granada (Spain), April 15–17, 2010. Thanks to Pedro Albuquerque for helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper.
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Appendix
Appendix
Sentences used in the test with their actual source. An asterisk indicates the sentences removed to match accuracy.
Actual source customer
There were bank leaflets above the ticket dispenser. *
After entering, one of the robbers put the shotgun in the security guard’s face.
There were padded chairs in the bank.
There was a computer monitor on the desk.
There was a wooden desk on the office.
One of the robbers kicked the guard on the floor twice.
One of the robbers was wearing a hood over his head.
One of the robbers was wearing army boots.
The director of the bank was in his shirtsleeves.
The robbers carried the money in a black backpack.
The security guard was close to the door. *
The security guard was wearing a blue uniform.
When the robbers entered the bank, the customers screamed.
Actual source teller
There were some pictures on the counter.
There was a fitted carpet on the bank floor.
One of the robbers rubbed his head often.
The director of the bank used glasses.
The pistol of one of the robbers was silver.
The robber with the shotgun had drops of blood on his mouth.
The robber with the shotgun searched in the three cash registers and took the notes.
The robbers had an accomplice outside of the bank.
The robbers left the security guard unconscious after the fight.
The young man that tried to help the old woman who fainted had a problem with the ATM. *
There were paintings on the walls.
There was background music. *
When the old woman fainted, a mobile phone fell out of her bag.
Actual source both
During the fight between the robber and the security guard, the ticket dispenser was knocked over.
It was a rainy day.
One of the robbers had a very deep voice. *
One of the robbers said that if hostages did nothing, they would not be hurt.
One of the robbers was quite tall.
The director of the bank called the police.
The robber in the office told his accomplice that he had the money.
The robber with the gun asked the director where the money was.
The robber with the shotgun backed out of the bank.
The security box had a delay mechanism.
The security box was inside a file cabinet. *
The young man that tried to help the old woman who fainted was blonde.
There was a small wooden door in the counter.
Actual source neither
One of the customers was crying in silence. *
One of the robbers disarmed the security guard.
One of the robbers shouted ‘this is a stick-up!’
One of the robbers threatened to shoot a customer.
One of the robbers told the security guard to lie down on the ground.
The alarm was connected to the police.
The robbers’ car was blue.
The robber with the pistol punched the director of the bank in the face. *
The robber with the pistol was wearing a t-shirt. *
The robbers closed the door so no one could get in.
The robbers left looking satisfied. *
The ticket dispenser made a beep when it fell to the ground.
An ambulance arrived together with the police. *
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Luna, K., Martín-Luengo, B. Monitoring the source monitoring. Cogn Process 14, 347–356 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10339-013-0558-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10339-013-0558-0