Abstract
Ancient Greece was wealthy enough to invent many of the foundations of Western Civilization. In order to accomplish this, they had to avoid the trap of dissipating wealth through continuous feuding. We contend that the ancient Olympics was one, of several, institutions that helped achieve this by acting as a signal of city-state strength. Although it could not prevent all battles, it provided information to reduce hostilities between competing cities. This hypothesis explains the rise and fall of the Olympics, and the unique and puzzling characteristics of the rules and events.
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Notes
Although Michaelangelo would have been unaware of the statue of Hermes, then buried in silt, his David is a Renaissance interpretation of the standing heroic male nude, found so often in ancient Greek statues.
Miller (2004, p. 93). Unless otherwise noted, all subsequent dates are B.C.
The population of the ancient Greek city-states was not large: at the height of their development, between 600 and 400, the largest city-states of ancient Greece, Athens and Sparta, each eventually had populations of about 200,000. (Fleck and Hanssen 2006, p. 133). Most of the city-states were smaller, with populations closer to 15,000 (Ober 2010, p. 255). See also Hansen and Nielsen (2004).
Wars between city-states cannot properly be called “civil wars” since no country actually existed. At the same time, the wars between the city-states were between adversaries of the same language, culture, and heritage, and so they were not quite wars between different countries. We will refer to the wars as “feuding wars.”
“...certain features of the Greek economy ... of the fifth and forth centuries B.C.E. appear to compare favorably with the most advanced premodern economies—Holland and England in the fifteenth to eighteenth centuries C.E.” (Ober 2010, p. 247). Ober claims that classical Athens appears to have been “among the most prosperous communities of premodernity.” (2010, p. 242).
Iannaccone et al. (2011) note that this aspect of ancient Greece “remains something of a mystery” (p. 331). From the founding of the city-states, c. 800, until the troubles with Persia in the late 400 s, Greeks were not threatened by outside forces. Indeed, Greeks were colonizing other parts of the Mediterranean during this time.
We do not want to overstate our case. We argue that the ancient Olympics contributed to Greek wealth formation and protection, not that it was the sole source of this formation and protection.
For example, Andronicos claims Olympia was
... a belief in man, in his physical strength and moral worth, in democratic equality and human brotherhood, and in peace and love throughout the world.
[1979, p. 10]
Plutarch notes:
The Romans considered nothing to be the cause of the Greeks’ enslavement and degeneracy as much as the gymnasia and plaestras, which gave rise to much time wasting and laziness in the cities, and also profligacy, paederasty, and the ruination of the youths’ bodies through sleep, strolls, eurhythmic exercises, and precise diets, because of which they stopped practicing with weaponry and were happy to be called nimble and wrestlers and handsome instead of hoplites and good horsemen.
[quoted in Poliakoff 1987, p. 103]
Morgan (1990, p. 6).
As discussed later, their organization changed with these changing roles. Hence, the longevity of the Olympics past their use of signaling is not a refutation of our theory. In the same way modern aristocrats exist, but play none of the roles they did during the pre-modern era, so too the Olympics carried on in name though not in substance. Institutional trappings often persist beyond the original role they play.
Miller (2004, p. 2).
For example, the Oracle of Delphi began around the mid 7th century (Morgan 1990, pp. 106–108).
For example, Pindar’s victory odes, Myron’s statue of Discobolus, the statue of Charioteer of Delphi, the sculpture works of Praxiteles and Phidias.
After the fifth century, there was some specialization by city-states in different military skills. Athens was known for its naval skill, whereas Sparta was known for its excellence in land-based military skills (Thucydides 1972, pp. 1.89–1.117). Still, the hoplite formation dominated (Snodgras 1986, pp. 51–54).
Traditionally, the Olympics began in 776. This date is based on accounts written centuries later. According to Morgan, this date “... is in some respects embarrassingly early in view of the limited range of material remains on site” (1990, p. 47). The games likely became inter-state competitions c. 720 (Miller 2004, pp. 227–230).
Ober notes that the Greek world “changed dramatically at the end of the fourth century B.C.E.,” and that for him it remains an open question whether the Hellenistic period was able to maintain the same economic performance of the classical period (2010, p. 242). See also Pedley (2005, p. 12). Indeed, most scholars of Ancient Greece agree that the unique institutions that existed between 800–300 did not carry on into the Hellenistic era. Although the Olympic games continued, they were a different institution from the earlier games.
One avenue of wealth creation that we do not explore relates to the keeping of time. The Greeks tracked the years by the Olympic Games. The four-year span between two adjoining games were called an “Olympiad.” The Greek method of keeping time count was by referring to the ordinal number of the Olympic Games. Historians agree that this was likely the first case where a great number of dispersed city-states used the same method of time count (Young 2004, p. 56). Having similar time accounts, makes record keeping and dispute resolution easier, and therefore, trade more likely. As mentioned above, we are not claiming that the Olympics were the only institutional innovation of the Greeks, but rather it was a complementary institution that helped solve a particular problem.
Sanchez-Pages (2012, p. 2).
This probability depends on the military technology, which in turn, determines the degree of wealth dissipated by violence. Garfinkel and Skaperdas show that in equilibrium, the more destructive the technology, the more wealth is dissipated. Below we point out that the ancient Greeks restricted the use of technology and tactics in battle.
Two forms of this technology are commonly used: the “power form,” where \(p(G_1,G_2) = G_1^m / (G_1^m +G_2^m)\) and \(m\) is a measure of conflict effectiveness; and the “logit” form where \(p(G_1,G_2) = 1/(1+ e^{G_2-G_1})\). In the former case the probability of winning depends on the ratio of military expenditures, and in the latter it depends on the difference. See Garfinkel and Skaperdas (2007).
See Garfinkel and Skaperdas (2007) for a summary and discussion of general conflict theory results.
Here we use the general framework that Iannaccone et al. (2011) used to model the oracles of Delphi.
The legitimacy function is characterized by: \(l_N>0, l_{NN}<0, l(1,n_i)=0,\) and \(l(N,n_{n+1})=1 > l(N, n_i), i \in (1, \ldots , n)\).
There was never a perfect balance of power among the city-states, and the relative power of various city-states shifted over time. Ober (2010, pp. 263–266) notes the lack of real evidence on the subject but suggests that incomes were likely more evenly spread across Greek city-states than in any other ancient world. Egypt was also protected from outside threats for a long period of time, and as a result amassed great wealth from few wars. No substitute for war arose because Egypt did not have hundreds of independent city-states.
Hanson (2000, p. 27), Snodgras (1986, pp. 51–54). The ritualized form, along with the restrictions placed on weapons and tactics are other factors that suggest the ancient Greeks were able to mitigate the costs of violence amongst themselves. As mentioned above, the conflict literature has shown that such restrictions reduce the dissipation of wealth caused by violence.
The typical city-state army was tiny, around 200 men (Snodgras 1986, p. 52). Such ritualized military exercises have occurred at other times. The conflicts between the Jews and Philistines often revolved around contests, with the most famous being David versus Goliath. During the period of gentleman’s war of the pre-modern era, the various sides would simply count numbers (Glover 1982, p. 45).
Snodgras (1986, pp. 51–54).
Yoram Barzel has noted that this condition can lead to democracy (Barzel 2002).
According to Snodgras, “The Olympic festival, in particular, was clearly the place at which to make any appeal, over the heads of the individual polis governments, ... for recognition outside one’s own polis (1986, p. 54).
Pedley (2005, p. 12).
The theory that the games were entertainment, is ultimately a theory based on taste, and is not really testable. That is, the entertainment theory is consistent with everything. However, we find the institutional design to be unreasonably explained by the entertainment theory.
Miller (2004, p. 116).
Thus, the “training period” was not a training period in modern terms. It was more akin to preliminary trials without an audience. There are no records on how often this occurred; however, there are enough anecdotes of various athletes who achieved aknoiti to suggest that it was not uncommon.
A thousand years later, it would be common to ban women from public events. However, in ancient Greece women were not generally restricted this way. Indeed, as Fleck and Hanssen (2009) have pointed out, Sparta transferred unprecedented rights to women.
Poliakoff (1987, p. 90).
“Refined” being a relative term. This was a culture that maintained slaves, killed prisoner’s of war, and restricted the rights of many people.
Athens gave 500 drachmas (a sheep was worth one). Some cities reportedly gave as many as 30,000 drachmas. They could dine for life at the prytaneion (seat of government), hold seats of honor, often be exempt from taxation, be the subject of poems, odes, and statues (Pentazou 1979, p. 137; Miller 2004, p. 218).
Miller (2004, p. 217).
However, during the Roman period of the games, trades were more common.
Yalouris (1979, p. 78). For the Greeks it was “first among the best” or nothing. Yalouris notes:
No other people, before or after the Greeks, ever set themselves such a target, with such single-mindedness and intensiveness of purpose. And for no other people did the prize for this ideal, the crown of victory, remain so steadfastly the highest good that the gods could bestow upon a man, amongst all the treasures of the world.
[1979, p. 80]
In fact, the time period between games was actually named after one of the victors, reminding everyone—for all time—who the winner was.
One might argue that matching the best of one city-state against the best from other city-states provides an incomplete signal. Certainly having all citizens of one city-state compete against all the citizens of another would provide more information. Or for that matter, have the top 100 of each city-state compete. However, such a signal would be exceedingly costly, and would certainly produce a noisy, and ultimately unsuccessful, signal, since distribution of outcomes would require comparison. Considering only the winner provides a clear signal of an estimate of a city-state’s strength.
Miller (2004, p. 50).
The Pankration was the last event to be added to the early Olympics. In an evolutionary sense, it might be considered the ultimate sport in terms of achieving an institutional purpose. Interestingly, it has the combative features most resembling hand to hand combat.
Miller (2004, p. 17).
Fleck and Hanssen (2009) show that Spartan women were unique in ancient Greece for the property rights they held. They owned property, ran estates, were well educated, and freely moved about. These rights extended to exercise, races, and wrestling matches (2009, p. 235). Robertson (2010, p. 333) also confirms that Spartans and other city-states had races for women that were considered “ideal preparation for marriage and childbearing.” Hence, it is not unreasonable that a fast Spartan woman could show up in a racing event. Since even Spartan women did not engage in battle, such participation only adds costly noise to the Olympic signal.
Palaeologos (1979, p. 106).
As Miller states, we should not be surprised that politics and violence were an element of the Olympics, but that “more surprising is that the episodes were so infrequent” (2004, p. 225). Starting in the fifth century, a number of cases arose where violence of one level or another arose (Miller 2004, pp. 219–223). Perhaps the most famous violation occurred in 480 when Leonidas and his 300 men fought the Persians at Thermopylai, while the other Greek soldiers were in Olympia celebrating the 75th Olympiad (Yalouris 1979, p. 81). By the time of the Macedonian domination, there was a tremendous amount of political maneuvering and confrontation surrounding the Olympics (Miller 2004, p. 223).
Most interesting, there were no team events at the games. On the one hand, this may be surprising given that the phalanx formation was essentially a coordination activity. On the other hand, a team event probably produces a noisy signal and is more costly to stage and generate full participation by all states. The one small piece of evidence on team competitions comes from Sparta. The Spartans appear to be the only city-state that engaged in actual “war games” (Poliakoff 1987, p. 101). These games were costly to stage and were tremendously violent, to the extent that few other city-states actually participated. Team events that had little to do with war were likely very poor signals, while war games between city-states would likely mimic wars in terms of cost. Hence, the absence of team events at the Olympics perhaps weakly supports the signaling view.
The stadion was approximately 200 m (Young 2004, p. 102.)
At this distance in history, perhaps the best we can say is that the number of events reached an equilibrium over the first one hundred years. Having a single event would have been simpler and less costly, but would have reduced the amount of information between the games and an actual battle. Having too many events would have increased the total amount of information, but would have been more costly to stage. Like the avoidance of realistic war games, the purpose of a sa signal is to provide a sufficient level of information at a low cost.
Along these lines, it is interesting to note that there were no swimming events. During the formative years of the Olympics and into its golden era, naval battles were never a significant part of Greek warfare.
Other cities had their own games, but quite naturally the events tended to favor their strengths. Athens, for example, had boat races, the Spartans had essentially war games (Miller 2004, p. 140).
The only exception involved Emperor Nero. In 67 A.D., Nero arrived at the games to personally compete in a chariot race. Nero fell from his chariot and did not finish the race, but the judges still declared him victor. The results of these games were later cancelled by the judges when Nero departed back to Rome (Perrottet 2004, p. 89).
Perhaps the finest hour of the judges came during the Thirty Years Peace, a period of absolute peace from 476 to 446. During this time the judges acted as a judicial board that allowed disputing cities to settle their differences by arbitration instead of arms. A city-state would make its case before the Olympic judicial board, the board would review the case, and then make a decision. Both sides of a dispute were obliged to abide by the Olympic board’s ruling. This method worked until the break out of the Peloponnesian war (Young 2004, p. 96).
Miller (2004, pp. 212–215).
The modern Olympics were first established among aristocrats, and were originally intended as a means for aristocrats to demonstrate their amateur investments in sport. It was never the intention for commoners to participate. Coming at the end of the aristocratic era, commoners and professionals soon entered and the designation of “amateur” has caused problems for the Olympic movement ever since (Allen 2012).
Miller (2004, p. 217).
The emergence of full time professional athletes takes place between 340–320, during the Macedonian domination. During this time the venues of stadiums were altered to enhance the entertainment value of the events (Miller 2004, pp. 212–215).
The lack of a distinction between professionals and amateurs is also consistent with the entertainment theory of the Olympics.
Iannaccone et al.. (2011, p. 331).
In addition to this the games would have provided the complementary service of uniting the Greeks against a foreign invader, as would the other similarities of Greek culture.
Miller (2004, pp. 217–225).
Two events related to battle conditions were trumpeters and heralds. By the fourth century these were treated as other athletes.
The keryx [herald] and salpinkles [trumpeter] should probably be understood as the first professionals to compete in the Olympics, for they already had careers in their field of competition. The salpinkles, in particular, was used in military operations, in the same way buglars were employed in modern armies.
[Miller (2004, p. 85)]
Miller (2004, p.221).
Gardiner (1930, p. 45).
Gardiner (1930, p. 101).
Gardiner (1930, p. 102).
Interestingly, the games were banned completely in the late 4th century A.D. by the Roman Emperor Theodosius I in his pursuit to make Christianity a state religion in the Roman Empire. If the Christian Church became a way of screening for trustworthy types, then it would not have liked the competition.
In the same way that Iannaccone et al. (2011) have argued that Delphi was a wealth enhancing institution.
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The authors thanks to Kevin Chen, Rob Fleck, Andrew Hanssen, Shih En Lu, and Christoph Luelfesmann for their excellent comments.
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Allen, D.W., Lantinova, V. The ancient olympics as a signal of city-state strength. Econ Gov 14, 23–44 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10101-012-0119-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10101-012-0119-5