Economics of Governance

, Volume 9, Issue 2, pp 177–196

Bureaucratic corruption and profit tax evasion

Original Paper

DOI: 10.1007/s10101-006-0020-1

Cite this article as:
Goerke, L. Economics of Governance (2008) 9: 177. doi:10.1007/s10101-006-0020-1

Abstract

Firms may evade taxes on profits and can also avoid fulfilling legal restrictions on production activities by bribing bureaucrats. It is shown that the existence of tax evasion does not affect corruption activities at the firm level, while the budgetary repercussions of tax evasion induce less corruption. Policy measures which alter the gains or losses from corruption have a non-systematic impact on tax evasion behaviour.

Keywords

CorruptionFirmsTax evasion

JEL Classification Numbers

D 73H 25H 26

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of EconomicsEberhard Karls University TübingenTübingenGermany
  2. 2.IZABonnGermany
  3. 3.CESifoMünchenGermany