Abstract.
I analyze the admission mechanism used in Spanish universities. The system is open to strategic manipulation. This is because students are not allowed to express the whole list of available options. However, the mechanism implements the set of stable matchings in Nash equilibrium and the student's optimum in strong equilibrium. The mechanism also implements the students' optimum, in Nash equilibrium, under the class of “non-reverse” preferences. All these properties come from the fact that colleges do not have the opportunity to misrepresent their preferences.
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Received: 30 June 1995 / Accepted: 31 January 1997
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Romero-Medina, A. Implementation of stable solutions in a restricted matching market. Rev Econ Design 3, 137–147 (1998). https://doi.org/10.1007/s100580050009
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s100580050009