Abstract
We consider multiple-principal multiple-agent models of moral hazard: principals compete through mechanisms in the presence of agents who take unobservable actions. In this context, we provide a rationale for restricting principals to make use of simple mechanisms, which correspond to direct mechanisms in the standard framework of Myerson (J Math Econ 10:67–81, 1982). Our results complement those of Han (J Econ Theory 137(1):610–626, 2007) who analyzes a complete information setting where agents’ actions are fully contractible.
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We thank seminar participants at Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)—Université catholique de Louvain, Università degli Studi di Roma “La Sapienza,” and Université de Toulouse 1 for useful comments.
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Attar, A., Campioni, E., Piaser, G. et al. Competing mechanism games of moral hazard: communication and robustness. Rev Econ Design 16, 283–296 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-012-0116-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-012-0116-8