Abstract.
We consider a probabilistic approach to the problem of assigning k indivisible identical objects to a set of agents with single-peaked preferences. Using the ordinal extension of preferences we characterize the class of uniform probabilistic rules by Pareto efficiency, strategy-proofness, and no-envy. We also show that in this characterization no-envy cannot be replaced by anonymity. When agents are strictly risk averse von Neumann-Morgenstern utility maximizer, then we reduce the problem of assigning k identical objects to a problem of allocating the amount k of an infinitely divisible commodity.
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Received: 1 January 2002, Accepted: 5 February 2003,
JEL Classification:
D63, D71, D81
Bettina Klaus: B. Klaus is supported by a Ramón y Cajal contract and by Research Grant BEC 2002-02130 from the Spanish Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología.
The authors thank William Thomson for many helpful comments.
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Ehlers, L., Klaus, B. Probabilistic assignments of identical indivisible objects and uniform probabilistic rules. Review Economic Design 8, 249–268 (2003). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-003-0101-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-003-0101-3