Abstract
According to Bewley, a workers’ morale depends on being treated fairly within firms. This implies that the internal comparison of the own wage with wages paid to other workers within the firm affects individual effort determination. By contrast, the standard efficiency wage models only consider a comparison of the own wage with external income opportunities as the only determinant for individual effort. We provide a simple efficiency wage framework in which both the internal and external perspectives can affect individual effort determination. Our framework suggests that the internal reference is essential for the existence of real wage rigidity while the external reference ensures an upward-sloping wage-setting curve.
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Koskela, E., Schöb, R. A note on internal and external reference in efficiency wage models. J Econ 96, 79–86 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-008-0044-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-008-0044-9