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A note on the Condorcet Jury Theorem with supermajority voting rules

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Received: 12 January 2001/Accepted: 31 July 2001

My thanks to Peter Stone for sparking my interest in this issue. Helpful comments and corrections came from two anonymous referees and the editor.

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Fey, M. A note on the Condorcet Jury Theorem with supermajority voting rules. Soc Choice Welfare 20, 27–32 (2003). https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550200157

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550200157

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