Abstract
In this paper, the independence of irrelevant alternatives and the Pareto principle are simultaneously weakened in the Arrovian framework of social choice. Moreover, we also relax transitivity of social preferences. We show that impossibility remains under weaker versions of Arrow’s original conditions. Our results complement the recent work by Coban and Sanver (Soc Choice Welf 43(4):953–961, 2014).
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Notes
Pareto decisiveness requires that if there exists a unanimous agreement about judgement on two alternatives, the rule is “decisive” over the choice between the two in the sense that it should clarify which alternative is socially better. That is, a clear social judgement should be made under a “Paretian consensus.” This can be regarded as a necessary function of the decision process because a judgement under a conflict is hardly probable when the axiom is violated.
Positive responsiveness requires that social preference must monotonically respond to the change of individual preferences. A monotonic response of social preferences is desirable for “democratic” decision processes, and indeed this axiom is satisfied by most voting methods, such as the simple majority rule and the absolute majority rule.
Coban and Sanver (2014) refer to weak independence as quasi IIA.
For a comprehensive treatment of these rationality concepts, see Bossert and Suzumura (2010).
The transitive closure of R is defined as follows: \((x,y) \in tc(R)\) if and only if there exist \(K \ge 1\) and \(x^0,x^1,\dots , x^K\) such that \((x^{k-1},x^k) \in R\) for all \(k \in \{ 1,\dots , K \}\).
For an argument on triple consistency, see Cato and Hirata (2010), which provide a characterization of a triple consistent CCR satisfying anonymity and neutrality.
A set \(A \subseteq N\) is decisive for (resp. inversely decisive for) f if, for all \(x,y \in X\) and for all \({\mathbf {R}} \in {\mathcal {R}}^N\), \((x,y) \in \bigcap _{i \in N} P(R_i) \Rightarrow \) \((x,y) \in P(f({\mathbf {R}}))\) (resp. \((y,x) \in P(f({\mathbf {R}}))\)).
Domain richness conditions are implicitly imposed.
Gaertner (2001) contains a review on these works.
See Le Breton and Weymark (2011) for a survey.
In this respect, our problem is closely related to that of Fleurbaey et al. (2005), which introduce various weakenings of IIA in economic environments.
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Acknowledgments
I thank an anonymous referee of this journal and Marc Fleurbaey for their valuable comments. This paper was financially supported by JSPS KAKENHI Grant Number 26870477. I also supported by Postdoctoral Fellowships for Research Abroad of JSPS.
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The author is a Postdoctoral Fellow for Research Abroad of the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science.
Appendix: Proof of Proposition 9
Appendix: Proof of Proposition 9
Let us introduce some definitions. A set \(A \subseteq N\) is said to be decisive over (x, y) for f if, for all \({\mathbf {R}} \in {\mathcal {R}}^N\),
A decisive set A over (x, y) for f is minimal if there exists no proper subset \(A'\) of A that is decisive over (x, y) for f: for every proper subset \(A'\) of A, there exists \({\mathbf {R}}\in {\mathcal {R}}^N\) such that
In the presence of PR, it is the case that for all \(j \in A \), \((y,x) \in f({\mathbf {R}})\) when \((y,x) \in \bigcap _{i \in A {\setminus } \{j\}}P(R_i)\) and \((x,y) \in \bigcap _{i \in \{ j \} \cup (N {\setminus } A) }P(R_i)\).
A coalition \(A \subseteq N\) is said to be almost weakly decisive over (x, y) for f if, for all \({\mathbf {R}} \in {\mathcal {R}}^N\),
Let \(\mathcal {W}^*_f(x,y)\) be the family of coalitions almost weakly decisive over (x, y) for f.
The proof of Proposition 9 proceeds in a similar manner to that of Theorem 3 of Mas-Colell and Sonnenschein (1972).
Lemma 2
Suppose that \(\# X \ge 3\). If a Paretian QSWF f satisfies WI and PR, there exists \(v \in N\) such that \(\{ v \} \in {\mathcal {W}}^*(x,y)\) for some pair (x, y) of alternatives.
Proof
Suppose that \(\{ i \} \notin \mathcal {W}^*(a,b)\) for all \(a,b \in X\) and for all \(i \in N\). Let \(M \subseteq V\) be a minimal set decisive over (y, z) for f. If M is a singleton, the claim is immediately follows. In the rest of the proof, we suppose that \(\# M \ge 2\). Take any \(v,v' \in M\) (\(v \ne v'\)). Let \({\mathbf {R}}^1 \in {\mathcal {R}}^N\) such that
Since M is decisive over (y, z) for f, we have \((y,z) \in P(f({\mathbf {R}}^1))\). Since \(\{ v \} \notin \mathcal {W}^*(x,z)\), \((z,x) \in P(f({\mathbf {R}}^1))\). Quasi-transitivity implies that \((y,x) \in P(f({\mathbf {R}}^1))\).
Let \({\mathbf {R}}^2 \in {\mathcal {R}}^N\) such that
Since M is a minimal decisive set over (y, z), it follows that \((z,y) \in f({\mathbf {R}}^2)\).
Let \({\mathbf {R}}^3 \in {\mathcal {R}}^N\) such that
Comparing \({\mathbf {R}}^3\) with \({\mathbf {R}}^2\), PR implies that \((z,y) \in P(f({\mathbf {R}}^3))\).
Let \({\mathbf {R}}^4 \in {\mathcal {R}}^N\) such that
Since \({\mathbf {R}}^4|_{\{ y,z \}}={\mathbf {R}}^3|_{\{ y,z \}}\), WI implies that \((z,y) \in f({\mathbf {R}}^4)\). Comparing \({\mathbf {R}}^4\) with \({\mathbf {R}}^1\), WI and PR implies that \((y,x) \in P(f({\mathbf {R}}^4))\). Quasi-transitivity implies that \((z,x) \in f({\mathbf {R}}^4)\).
Let \({\mathbf {R}}^5 \in {\mathcal {R}}^N\) such that
Comparing \({\mathbf {R}}^5\) with \({\mathbf {R}}^4\), PR implies that \((z,x) \in P(f({\mathbf {R}}^5))\). In the light of PR, \(\{v,v' \}\) is decisive over (z, x) for f.
Let \({\mathbf {R}}^6 \in {\mathcal {R}}^N\) such that
Since \(\{ v,v'\}\) is decisive over (z, x) for f, we have \((z,x) \in P(f({\mathbf {R}}^6))\). Since \(\{ v \} \notin \mathcal {W}^*(y,x)\), it follows that \((x,y) \in P(f({\mathbf {R}}^6))\). Quasi-transitivity implies that \((z,y) \in P(f({\mathbf {R}}^6))\). This implies that \(\{ v' \} \in \mathcal {W}^*(z,y)\). The proof is complete. \(\square \)
Lemma 3
Suppose that \(\# X \ge 3,\) \(\# N \ge 4,\) and a Paretian QSWF f satisfies WI and PR. Let \(x,y \in X\). If \(\{ v \} \in {\mathcal {W}}^* (x,y),\) then \(\{ v \} \in {\mathcal {W}}^* (x,z) \hbox { for all } z \in X \).
Proof
Suppose that \(\{ v \} \in \mathcal {W}^* (x,y)\). Since \(\# N \ge 4\), there exists a partition \((A_1,A_2,A_3)\) of \(N {\setminus } \{ v \}\). Let \({\mathbf {R}}^1 \in {\mathcal {R}}^N\) such that
Since \(\{ v \} \in \mathcal {W}^* (x,y)\), PR implies that \((x,y) \in P(f({\mathbf {R}}^1))\). Since f is Paretian, we have \((y,z) \in P(f({\mathbf {R}}^1))\). By quasi-transitivity, we have \((x,z) \in P(f({\mathbf {R}}^1))\).
Let \({\mathbf {R}}^2 \in {\mathcal {R}}^N\) such that
Comparing \({\mathbf {R}}^2\) with \({\mathbf {R}}^1\), PR implies that \((x,z) \in P(f({\mathbf {R}}^2))\). Since f is Paretian, \((y,x) \in P(f({\mathbf {R}}^2))\). Thus, \((y,z) \in P(f({\mathbf {R}}^2))\).
Let \({\mathbf {R}}^3 \in {\mathcal {R}}^N\) such that
Since \(\{ v \} \in {\mathcal {W}}^* (x,y)\), PR implies that \((x,y) \in P(f({\mathbf {R}}^3))\). Comparing \({\mathbf {R}}^3\) with \({\mathbf {R}}^2\), WI and PR imply that \((y,z) \in P(f({\mathbf {R}}^3))\). Quasi-transitivity implies that \((x,z) \in P(f({\mathbf {R}}^3))\).
Let \({\mathbf {R}}^4 \in {\mathcal {R}}^N\) such that
Comparing \({\mathbf {R}}^4\) with \({\mathbf {R}}^3\), WI and PR imply that \((x,z) \in P(f({\mathbf {R}}^4))\). Since f is Paretian, \((y,x) \in P(f({\mathbf {R}}^4))\). Quasi-transitivity implies that \((y,z) \in P(f({\mathbf {R}}^4))\).
Let \({\mathbf {R}}^5 \in {\mathcal {R}}^N\) such that
Since \(\{ v \} \in \mathcal {W}^* (x,y)\), PR implies that \((x,y) \in P(f({\mathbf {R}}^5))\). Comparing \({\mathbf {R}}^5\) with \({\mathbf {R}}^4\), WI and PR implies that \((y,z) \in P(f({\mathbf {R}}^5))\). By quasi-transitivity, we have \((x,z) \in P(f({\mathbf {R}}^5))\). From WI, if \((x,z) \in P(R^5_v)\) and \((z,x) \in P(R_i)\) for all \( i \in N {\setminus } \{ v \}\), we have \((x,z) \in f({\mathbf {R}})\). Thus, it follows that \(\{ v \} \in {\mathcal {W}}^* (x,z)\). \(\square \)
The proof of the following lemma is similar to Lemma 3. We omit it.
Lemma 4
Suppose that \(\# X \ge 3,\) \(\# N \ge 4,\) and a Paretian QSWF f satisfies WI and PR. Let \(x,y \in X\). If \(\{ v \} \in \mathcal {W}^* (x,y),\) then \(\{ v \} \in {\mathcal {W}}^* (z,y) \hbox { for all } z \in X \).
Proof of Proposition 9
By Lemma 2, there exists \(v \in N\) such that \(\{ v \} \in \mathcal {W}^*(x,y)\) for some (x, y). Lemmas 3 and 4 implies that \(\{ v \} \in \mathcal {W}^* (w,z) \hbox { for all } w,z \in X\). PR implies that \(\{ v \}\) is a vetoer for f.
Now, we prove the uniqueness. Suppose that there exists two vetoers, v and \(v'\). Let \({\mathbf {R}}^1 \in {\mathcal {R}}^N\) such that
Since both v and \(v'\) are vetoers, it follows that \((x,y) \in f({\mathbf {R}}^1)\) and \((y,x) \in f({\mathbf {R}}^1)\). Let \({\mathbf {R}}^2 \in {\mathcal {R}}^N\) such that
By PR, we have \((x,y) \in P(f({\mathbf {R}}^2))\). This contradicts the fact that \(v'\) is a vetoer. \(\square \)