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Ian Carter’s non-evaluative theory of freedom and diversity: a critique

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Abstract

In recent decades there has been a growing interest in the issue of overall freedom-measurement. Consequently, two competing approaches to this issue have emerged: an evaluative approach and an empirical (non-evaluative) approach. Advocates of both approaches agree that one of the most important challenges that they have to meet consists in accommodating the judgement that, all other things being equal, the more diverse a set of freedom is, the more overall freedom it offers us. The diversity of one’s freedoms seems to depend, however, on the degree to which they are significantly different from one another, and the notion of significant difference is a value-based notion. Hence, it seems that, unlike the evaluative approach, the empirical approach cannot meet this challenge. This claim has been contested, though, by Ian Carter. In his seminal book A measure of freedom he argues that his empirical theory of overall freedom-measurement manages to accommodate the aforementioned judgement about freedom and diversity as effectively as any evaluative theory, and shows, moreover, why the evaluative way of dealing with this issue in general is misguided. In this article I argue that, as a matter of fact, it is Carter’s non-evaluative theory of freedom and diversity that is misguided, as it cannot properly accommodate the aforementioned judgement about freedom and diversity. If my argument is sound, then it would not only undermine Carter’s theory of freedom and diversity. It would also cast a very serious doubt on the empirical approach to overall freedom-measurement in general.

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Notes

  1. See, for example, Jones and Sugden (1982), Steiner (1983), Sen (1990, 1991, 1993), Pattanaik and Xu (1990, 1998), Klemisch-Ahlert (1993), Arrow (1995), Puppe (1996), Carter (1999), Rosenbaum (2000), Kramer (2003) and Gustafsson (2010).

  2. See, for example., Sen (1990, 1991, 1993), Pattanaik and Xu (1998), Arrow (1995), Puppe (1996) and Kramer (2003).

  3. That is not to say that this challenge has already been met within the evaluative approach, but rather that it seems that it can only be met within this approach. For various evaluative attempts to meet it see Klemisch-Ahlert (1993), Suppes (1996), Pattanaik and Xu (2000), Rosenbaum (2000), Bavetta and Seta (2001), Bervoets and Gravel (2007), Gustafsson (2010). For a critique of some of these attempts see Van Hees (2004), Dowding and Hess (2009). For studies on the measurement of diversity in general, which are not aimed at measuring freedom in particular, but which may be usefully applied by the evaluative approach to the issue of freedom-measurement, see Weitzman (1998) and Nehring and Puppe (2002).

  4. A more detailed account of Carter’s theory will be provided below.

  5. A similar criticism has already been directed at Carter’s theory by Matthew Kramer (2003, pp. 468–469). However, Kramer’s criticism is that Carter’s theory is incompatible with his—that is, Carter’s—own formula for measuring overall freedom. Thus, as Carter notes (2004, p. 78), this may mean that Kramer’s criticism points to a problem in his formula, rather than in his theory as such. My criticism, on the other hand, is directed at Carter’s theory as such.

  6. Carter borrows the notion of compossibility from Steiner’s work on rights (1977) according to which a set of actions is compossible if there is a possible world in which all of its components actions can be performed in combination.

  7. Note that, while Norman suggests that two identical options do not offer us more freedom that one of these options, what Carter tries to show is that they do offer us more freedom but only slightly more. But Carter is right in doing so. For Norman’s position is untenable. It entails that that we can acquire a new freedom, lose none, and yet remain exactly as free as we were before.

  8. Brighton and Clacton are two seaside towns in England.

  9. I am not claiming that this is not the case. The question of whether this is the case or not is a complicated question, requiring a detailed examination of the physical sizes of all the different elements mentioned above. All I am saying is that there seems to be no obvious difference between these two cases, in the relevant respects, on the basis of which Carter can reasonably claim, without further ado, that his theory can deal with the latter example but not with the former.

  10. Note that if this is what lies behind Carter’s claim that his approach cannot deal with Cohen’s example then it should not be a result of the fact that the Bahamas are simply bigger than Clacton. For the force of the example will not be reduced by assuming, as I shall do henceforth, that their size is identical.

  11. The modalities here are that of physical (rather than metaphysical or logical) possibility/impossibility.

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Acknowledgments

I am very grateful to Ian Carter for his comments on an earlier version of this article, and to the German Research Foundation (Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft) for its financial support.

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Correspondence to Ronen Shnayderman.

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Shnayderman, R. Ian Carter’s non-evaluative theory of freedom and diversity: a critique. Soc Choice Welf 46, 39–55 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-015-0902-7

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