Abstract
We study a sequential all-pay auction with two contestants who are privately informed about a parameter (ability) that affects their cost of effort. We characterize the unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium of this sequential all-pay auction and analyze if giving a head start, i.e., an exogenously determined mechanism that increases the winning probability of the first mover for any level of effort she exerts, improves the contestants’ performance. In particular, we analyze the difference between a multiplicative head start and an additive head start with respect to the effect on the contestants’ performance.
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Notes
For example, Dixit (1987) studied a sequential Tullock contest and examined whether the ability to commit to an effort choice before other contestants choose their effort while assuming that they can then observe this choice is advantageous or not. Linster (1993) analyzed two-player sequential Tullock contests and showed that if the stronger player is the first (second) mover in the sequential contest the players’ total effort is larger (smaller) than in the simultaneous contest.
For all-pay auctions under complete information see Hillman and Samet (1987), Hillman and Riley (1989), Leininger (1991), Baye et al. (1993, 1996), Che and Gale (1998, 2000) and Siegel (2009). For all-pay auctions under incomplete information see Hillman and Riley (1989), Amann and Leininger (1996), Krishna and Morgan (1997), Gavious et al. (2003), Moldovanu and Sela (2001, 2006) and Moldovanu et al. (2012).
It is worth noting that this feature of our model can explain why players sometimes choose to stay out of a contest.
In sport contest, for example, the designer wishes to maximize the players’ expected total effort, while in R&D contests she wishes to maximize the expected highest effort.
Siegel (2010) also studied simultaneous all-pay auctions with head starts in which players do not choose weakly-dominated strategies. He provided an algorithm that constructs a unique equilibrium in these contests.
See Konrad (2002) for another application of headstarts in contests.
See Meirowitz (2008) for a more detailed discussion about head starts in political contests (campaigns).
Schotter and Weigelt (1992) similarly to Lazear and Rosen (1981), Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983) and Rosen (1986), studied simultaneous tournaments where players are identical, and the observed output is a stochastic function of an unobservable effort. In addition, they assumed that the output of a player must exceed that of his opponent by some fixed amount in order to win the contest. They showed that this additive head start in their model decreases the players’ total performance.
An equivalent interpretation is that \(a_{i}\) is player’s \(i\) valuation for the prize and his cost is equal to his bid.
Note that the S.O.C. is satsisfied if \(f_{2}^{\prime }(b_{1})<0\) for all \( b_{1}\in [b_{1}(0),b_{1}(1)]\). This condition does not imply that \( F_{2}\) should be concave on all the interval \([0,1].\)
In the simultaneous contest with \(F_{1}\left( x\right) =F_{2}\left( x\right) =\sqrt{x}\) the symmetric equilibrium bid function is \(b\left( a\right) = \frac{1}{3}a^{\frac{3}{2}}\) and then \(HE=\frac{2}{15}=0.1333, TE=\frac{1}{6 }=0.1667\) and \(Eff=1\)
Note that if Condition 1 holds then the density function \(f_{2}\left( x\right) \) is convex. This follows by taking the derivative w.r.t. \(a\) of both sides of the equality \(f_{2}\left( b_{1}\left( a\right) \right) =\frac{1}{a}\). Then we get \(-a^{2}f_{2}^{\prime }\left( b_{1}\left( a\right) \right) b_{1}^{\prime }\left( a\right) =1\). And by taking the derivative w.r.t. \(a\) of both sides of this equality and rearranging we get the following equality \(b_{1}^{\prime \prime }\left( a\right) =-\frac{2b_{1}^{\prime }\left( a\right) }{a}-\frac{f_{2}^{\prime \prime }\left( b_{1}\left( a\right) \right) }{f_{2}^{\prime }\left( b_{1}\left( a\right) \right) }\left( b_{1}^{\prime }\left( a\right) \right) ^{2}\). Since by our assumptions \(f_{2}^{\prime }\left( b_{1}\left( a\right) \right) <0\) and \(b_{1}^{\prime }\left( a\right) >0,\) we conclude that \( b_{1}^{\prime \prime }\left( a\right) >0\Rightarrow f_{2}^{\prime \prime }\left( b_{1}\left( a\right) \right) >0.\)
Strict concavity does not imply that \(G^{\prime \prime }\left( x\right) <0\) on the entire interval. Here we assume that both \(G\left( x\right) \) is strictly concave and \(G^{\prime \prime }\left( x\right) <0\) on the entire interval \(\left[ 0,1\right] \).
Recall that \(\widehat{a}=\frac{1}{tf_{2}\left( 0\right) }\) and therefore \( F_{2}\left( f_{2}^{-1}\left( \frac{1}{t\widehat{a}}\right) \right) =0\)
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Appendix
Appendix
1.1 Proof of Proposition 1
The expected highest effort in the two-player model without a head start is equal to contestant 1’s expected effort, while the expected highest effort in the two-player model with a head start is larger than or equal to contestant 1’s expected effort. Thus, in order to prove that a head start increases the expected highest effort it is sufficient to show that a head start increases contestant 1’s expected effort. However, what we actually show is even stronger. We show that the effort of every type of contestant 1 who made a positive effort when there was no head start increases when there is a head start. Therefore we show that
Note that if Condition 1 holds then since \( b_{1}\left( a_{1}\right) \) is increasing in \(a_{1}\) and \(\tilde{a}\ge 0\) then for all \(t>1,\)
Moreover the lowest type of contestant 1 who is active in the two-player model with a head start is lower than the lowest active type of contestant 1 in the two-player model without any head start. Formally, \(\widehat{a}=\frac{ 1}{tf_{2}\left( 0\right) }\le \frac{1}{f_{2}\left( 0\right) }=\widetilde{a}\) for any \(t\ge 1.\) Thus, we have
such that the expected effort of contestant 1 with a head start \(t\) is higher than her expected effort without any head start. \(Q.E.D.\)
1.2 Proof of Proposition 2
The expected effort of contestant 2 given an effort \(\beta _{1}\left( a_{1},t\right) >0\) of contestant 1 is
The expected effort of contestant 2 is then
The function \(t\beta _{1}\left( a_{1},t\right) =f_{2}^{-1}\left( \frac{1}{ a_{1}t}\right) \) is increasing in \(a_{1}\) as well as in \(t\). By Condition 3, we know that \(f_{2}^{-1}\left( 1\right) <x^{*}\). Therefore we obtain that, for \(t>1\) close enough to \(1\) and for all \(a_{1}\le 1,\)
Thus, by Condition 2 we have
So far we have shown that given a type \(\widehat{a}\le a_{1}\le 1\) of contestant 1 that exerts a positive effort, the expected effort of contestant 2 increases in \(t\) as long as \(t\) is sufficiently close to \(1\). By Condition 1, the interval of types of contestant 1 who exert a positive effort increases in \(t\), i.e., \(\frac{d\widehat{a}}{dt }=\frac{d}{dt}\left( \frac{1}{tf_{2}\left( 0\right) }\right) \le 0\) and therefore, if \(t\) is sufficiently close to \(1\) we established that
\(Q.E.D.\)
1.3 Proof of Proposition 5
The expected highest effort for \(0<t\le f_{2}^{-1}\left( 1\right) \) is given by
Therefore
Now, since \(f_{2}\left( t\right) \rightarrow \infty \) and \(tf_{2}\left( t\right) \rightarrow 0\) when \(t\rightarrow 0\) we have
Moreover, since the expected total effort for \(0<t\le f_{2}^{-1}\left( 1\right) \) is given by
we have
And since \(f_{2}\left( t\right) \rightarrow \infty \) and \(tf_{2}\left( t\right) \rightarrow 0\) when \(t\rightarrow 0\) we obtain that
\(Q.E.D.\)
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Segev, E., Sela, A. Sequential all-pay auctions with head starts. Soc Choice Welf 43, 893–923 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-014-0816-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-014-0816-9