Social Choice and Welfare

, Volume 42, Issue 1, pp 111–138

Strategic voting and nomination

Original Paper

DOI: 10.1007/s00355-013-0725-3

Cite this article as:
Green-Armytage, J. Soc Choice Welf (2014) 42: 111. doi:10.1007/s00355-013-0725-3

Abstract

Using computer simulations based on three separate data generating processes, I estimate the fraction of elections in which sincere voting is a core equilibrium given each of eight single-winner voting rules. Additionally, I determine how often each rule is vulnerable to simple voting strategies such as ‘burying’ and ‘compromising’, and how often each rule gives an incentive for non-winning candidates to enter or leave races. I find that Hare is least vulnerable to strategic voting in general, whereas Borda, Coombs, approval, and range are most vulnerable. I find that plurality is most vulnerable to compromising and strategic exit (causing an unusually strong tendency toward two-party systems), and that Borda is most vulnerable to strategic entry. I use analytical proofs to provide further intuition for some of my key results.

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.UC Santa BarbaraSanta BarbaraUSA