Abstract
We build a simple model of secession crises where a majority of voters may wish to accommodate a minority in order to prevent a secession attempt. We first show the existence of a majority voting equilibrium, where the median voter is decisive and most prefers a government’s type that is biased in favor of the minority. We propose a measure of the secession risk at equilibrium, which depends upon the comparison of the willingness to secede by the minority and to accommodate by the majority. We show that focusing only on the willingness to secede, as previous literature has done, is misleading when studying the impact on the risk of secession of the size of the minority region, the probability that a secession attempt by the minority is successful, and the cultural heterogeneity in the country.
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This paper has been presented at seminars and conferences in Barcelona, Iasi, Malaga, Marseille, Rotterdam, Toulouse and Verona. We thank participants and M. Le Breton for their comments and suggestions. This paper has been written in part while the second author was visiting the CES at the University of Munich. He thanks the CES for its very generous hospitality.
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Anesi, V., De Donder, P. Voting under the threat of secession: accommodation versus repression. Soc Choice Welf 41, 241–261 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-012-0682-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-012-0682-2