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On the regularity of smooth production economies with externalities: competitive equilibrium à la Nash

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Abstract

We consider a general equilibrium model of a private ownership economy with consumption and production externalities. The choices of all agents (households and firms) may affect utility functions and production technologies. The allocation of a competitive equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium. We provide an example showing that, under standard assumptions, competitive equilibria are indeterminate in an open set of the household’s endowments. Next, we consider a new version of this model, with firms’ endowments in the spirit of Geanakoplos et al. (J Math Econ 19:113–151, 1990). In our model, firms’ endowments impact the technologies of the other firms. We then prove that, generically in the space of endowments of households and firms, each economy has a finite number of competitive equilibria and each competitive equilibrium is locally a differentiable map of the fundamental parameters.

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Notes

  1. Under these assumptions, the set of competitive equilibria is non-empty and compact. The existence of a competitive equilibrium is demonstrated by Arrow and Hahn (Chapter 6, 1971), Laffont (1977), and del Mercato and Platino (2015a).

  2. In Geanakoplos et al. (1990), there are no direct externalities in preferences and production sets. However, their model exhibits pecuniary externalities arising from the incompleteness of financial markets.

  3. We do not rely on logarithmic or quadratic perturbations of the payoff functions that have been used to establish generic regularity in non-cooperative games; see for instance Harsanyi (1973), Ritzberger (1994) and van Damme (2002).

  4. With such an equilibrium notion, agents cannot choose the consumption and production of other agents, i.e., externalities cannot be internalized. The internalization of externalities has been introduced in other equilibrium notions. Markets can be extended in order to obtain the two fundamental theorems of welfare economics also for economies with externalities, i.e., a perfect internalization of the externalities. This is the idea sketched by Arrow (1969) and analyzed in details in the pioneering work by Laffont (1976). They enlarge the choice sets of the agents and introduce personalized prices that agents face on markets for externalities. Recent contributions by Magill et al. (2015), and Crès and Tvede (2013) show how to implement corporate governance policies that induce firms to internalize the externalities by maximizing a “social criterion” to increase the welfare of stakeholders or shareholders, up to their respective contributions.

  5. The Pareto improving analysis of Greenwald and Stiglitz (1986) mainly focuses on economies with incomplete markets and imperfect information. However, in Sect. 1, the authors consider a general equilibrium model of a private ownership economy with consumption and production externalities. They assume that the aggregate excess demand–supply function is well defined, differentiable and its differential is onto. Furthermore, the issue of the existence of such Pareto improving policies is not addressed for the general model provided in Sect. 1. In Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (2008), the Pareto improving analysis deals with economies with consumption externalities only.

  6. More precisely, the possibility of inaction and the “free disposal” condition.

  7. Assumption 3 is analogous to several conditions used to establish the existence of an equilibrium with externalities in production sets, that is, the boundedness condition given in Arrow and Hahn (1971), page 134 of Section 2 in Chapter 6; Assumption UB (Uniform Boundedness) in Bonnisseau and Médecin (2001); and Assumption P(3) in Mandel (2008); Assumption 3 in del Mercato and Platino (2015a).

  8. In Chapter 6 of Arrow and Hahn (1971), the authors have recognized the need to assume the boundedness of a wider set of feasible production allocations than the ones that are mutually consistent, in order to extend their existence proof to the case of externalities. In Bonnisseau and Médecin (2001), Assumption UB is needed to find the cube to compactify the economy in order to use fixed point arguments. Assumption P(3) in Mandel (2008) or Assumption 3 in del Mercato and Platino (2015a) is used to show that the set of feasible allocations is bounded once externalities move along a homotopy arc.

  9. From now on, “KKT conditions” means Karush–Kuhn–Tucker conditions.

  10. First, since the equilibrium set \(F_{E}^{-1}(0)\) is non-empty and compact, as a consequence of the regular value theorem, the economy E has a finite number of equilibria. Second, the implicit function theorem implies that, locally, every equilibrium is a continuous or differentiable mapping of the parameters describing the economy.

  11. Therefore, perturbing the endowments of a single household suffices to establish that the Jacobian matrix \(D_{\xi }F_{E}(\xi ^{*})\) is non-singular for almost all households’ endowments.

  12. The possibility functions represent general consumption sets with externalities.

  13. Assumption 10 is in the same spirit as the assumption of diagonally strict concavity introduced in Rosen (1965) on a weighted sum of the payoff functions of the agents. However, compared with the condition of Theorem 6 of Rosen (1965), Assumption 10 is easier to read, it does not involve any vector of weights, and it focuses only on directions \((v_{h})_{h \in {\mathcal {H}}}\) that sum to zero where \(v_{h}\) is orthogonal to the gradient \(D_{x_{h}}u_{h}(x_{h},x_{-h},y)\).

  14. Further research is open to find some kind of auxiliary assumption on the first-order effects of externalities on transformation functions. In Sect. 4, we choose another approach.

  15. In order to get a smooth approximation, one might approximate the function \(\phi \) around \(-\varepsilon ^{2}\) by a polynomial function.

  16. If there are no external effects, this condition is satisfied because \(t_{j}\) is differentiably strictly quasi-convex in \(y_{j}\). Therefore, the sign of the inequality is strictly positive, whereas in Assumption 10, the analogous sign is strictly negative since \(u_h\) is differentiably strictly quasi-concave in \(x_{h}\).

  17. One could consider another model where the production externality is the production decision \(y_{-j}^{\prime }\) of firms other than j, i.e., \(y_{j}^{\prime } \in Y_{j}(y_{-j}^{\prime },x)\). In this case, despite the presence of firms’ endowments, one obtains the same Jacobian matrix \(D_{q} G (q^{*})\) as in (7) of Sect. 3. In other words, firms’ endowments do not impact the technologies of the other firms. Therefore, perturbing the endowments \(\eta \) does not affect firms’ supplies. Moreover, as regards market clearing conditions, perturbing the endowments \(\eta \) has exactly the same effect as perturbing the endowments e. Consequently, this way of introducing firms’ endowments does not lead to the result of generic regularity.

  18. \(I_{C-1}\) is the identity matrix of size \((C-1)\), and \( [ I_{C-1} \vert 0 ]\) is the \((C-1) \times C\) matrix where the last column is the vector 0.

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Correspondence to Elena L. del Mercato.

Additional information

Earlier drafts of this paper circulated as “Regularity of competitive equilibria in a production economy with externalities.” We are deeply indebted to Paolo Siconolfi and Jean-Marc Bonnisseau for much encouragement and many precious suggestions. We also benefited from helpful comments from Vincent Iehlé, Michael Magill, Antoine Mandel, Martine Quinzii, Tarun Sabarwal, Ross Starr and Emily Tanimura. We thank conference participants in the Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory Conference SAET2011, the Summer Workshop in Economic Theory SWET13, the Conference on the Future of General Equilibrium Theory NYU in Abu Dhabi 2015 and the Conference GEDAYS 2016, for constructive comments. We are grateful to the anonymous referees of this journal for their detailed comments and suggestions.

Appendix

Appendix

In this section, we prove all the lemmas stated in Sect. 4. The following notation helps in writing the proofs,

$$\begin{aligned} t_{j}(y_{j} - \eta _{j},y_{-j},x)=(t_{j} \circ g_{j})(y_{j},y_{-j} ,x,\eta _{j}) \end{aligned}$$
(15)

where the mapping \(g_{j}\) is defined by \(g_{j}(y_{j},y_{-j} ,x,\eta _{j}):=(y_{j} - \eta _{j},y_{-j} ,x)\).

Proof of Lemma 11

In order to prove this lemma, one must pay attention to Assumption 1.2 and Lemma 4.

First, notice that for any given endowment \(\eta _{j}\), the function given in (15) satisfies all the assumptions given in Assumption 1, except Assumption 1.2. However, the total production plan \(y_{j}=\eta _{j}\) acts for \((t_{j} \circ g_{j})(y_{j},y_{-j} ,x,\eta _{j})\) as \(y_{j}=0\) acts for \(t_{j}(y_{j}, y_{-j},x)\). Indeed, Assumption 1.2 implies that \((t_{j} \circ g_{j})(\eta _{j},y_{-j} ,x,\eta _{j})=0\), and then using standard maximization arguments, one gets \(p \cdot y^{*}_{j} \ge p \cdot \eta _{j} \) if \(y^{*}_{j}\) solves problem (14). Consequently, the individual wealth \(p \cdot (e_{ h} + \displaystyle \sum \nolimits _{j\in {\mathcal {J}}}s_{jh} y^{*}_{j})\) of household h is greater than \(p \cdot (e_{ h} + \displaystyle \sum \nolimits _{j\in {\mathcal {J}}}s_{jh} \eta _{j} )\) which is strictly positive since \((e,\eta ) \gg 0\).

Second, one needs to establish the result analogous to Lemma 4 for the functions \((t_{j} \circ g_{j})_{j \in {\mathcal {J}}}\) and the vector \(r=\displaystyle \sum \nolimits _{h\in {\mathcal {H}}}e_{h}\). For this purpose, the set K(r) must be replaced with the set \(\left( K(r+\displaystyle \sum \nolimits _{j\in {\mathcal {J}}} \eta _{j}) \right) + {\widetilde{\eta }}\), where \({\widetilde{\eta }}:=(0,\eta )\) and the set \(K(r+\displaystyle \sum \nolimits _{j\in {\mathcal {J}}} \eta _{j})\) is provided by Lemma 4 for the functions \((t_{j})_{j \in {\mathcal {J}}}\) and the vector \(r+\displaystyle \sum \nolimits _{j\in {\mathcal {J}}} \eta _{j}\). The proof of this lemma is then established by adapting the proof of Theorem 8. \(\square \)

Proof of Lemma 13

The main difficulty of adapting classical arguments arises from the presence of consumption externalities in the preferences. More precisely, one must pay attention to equilibrium consumption allocations that may converge on the boundary of the positive orthant. However, Assumptions 5.1 and 5.4 imply that the limit point of the household h’s equilibrium consumptions is strictly positive, even when the limit point of the equilibrium consumption of everybody else is on the boundary. Since the same argument applies for every household h, one concludes that the limit point of the equilibrium consumption allocations has to be strictly positive. A detailed proof of this lemma is given in del Mercato and Platino (2015b). \(\square \)

Proof of Lemma 14

We show that for each \(( \xi ^{*},e^{*}, \eta ^{*}) \in F^{-1}(0)\), the Jacobian matrix \(D_{\xi ,e,\eta } F( \xi ^{*},e^{*}, \eta ^{*})\) has full row rank. It is enough to prove that \(\Delta D_{\xi ,e,\eta }F(\xi ^{*},e^{*}, \eta ^{*})=0\) implies \(\Delta =0\), where

$$\begin{aligned}\Delta :=((\Delta x_{h},\Delta \lambda _{h})_{h \in {\mathcal {H}}},(\Delta y_{j},\Delta \alpha _{j})_{j \in {\mathcal {J}}},\Delta p^{\backslash }) \in {\mathbb {R}}^{H(C+1)}\times {\mathbb {R}}^{J(C+1)} \times {\mathbb {R}}^{C-1} \end{aligned}$$

The system \(\Delta D_{\xi ,e,\eta }F( \xi ^{*},e^{*}, \eta ^{*}) =0\) is written in detail below.Footnote 18

We remind that \((t_{j} \circ g_{j})\) is defined in (15).

$$\begin{aligned} \left\{ \begin{array}{l} (1)\; {\displaystyle \sum _{h \in {\mathcal {H}}}}\Delta x_{h} D_{x_{k}x_{h}}^{2}u_{h}(x_{h}^ {*},x_{-h}^{*},y^{*})-\Delta \lambda _{k}p^ {*} - {\displaystyle \sum _{j\in {\mathcal {J}}}}\alpha _{j}^{*}\Delta y_{j}D_{x_{k}y_{j}}^{2} (t_{j} \circ g_{j})(y_{j}^{*},y_{-j}^{*},x^{*},\eta _{j}^{*}) +\\ - \displaystyle \sum _{j \in {\mathcal {J}}} \Delta \alpha _{j} D_{x_{k}} (t_{j} \circ g_{j})(y_{j}^{*},y_{-j}^{*},x^{*},\eta _{j}^{*}) +\Delta p^{\backslash } \left[ I_{C-1}|0\right] =0, \; \forall \; k \in {\mathcal {H}}\\ (2)\; - \Delta x_{h} \cdot p^{*} =0, \; \forall \; h \in {\mathcal {H}} \\ (3)\; {\displaystyle \sum _{h \in {\mathcal {H}}}}\Delta x_{h} D_{y_{f}x_{h}}^{2}u_{h}(x_{h}^ {*},x_{-h}^{*},y^{*})+\displaystyle \sum _{h \in {\mathcal {H}}}\Delta \lambda _{h}s_{fh}p^ {*} - {\displaystyle \sum _{j\in {\mathcal {J}}}} \alpha _{j}^{*}\Delta y_{j}D_{y_{f}y_{j}}^{2} (t_{j} \circ g_{j})(y_{j}^{*},y_{-j}^{*},x^{*},\eta _{j}^{*}) +\\ - \displaystyle \sum _{j \in {\mathcal {J}}} \Delta \alpha _{j} D_{y_{f}} (t_{j} \circ g_{j})(y_{j}^{*},y_{-j}^{*},x^{*},\eta _{j}^{*}) - \Delta p^{\backslash } \left[ I_{C-1}|0\right] =0, \; \forall \; f \in {\mathcal {J}}\\ (4)\; - \Delta y_{j}\cdot D_{y_{j}} (t_{j} \circ g_{j})(y_{j}^{*},y_{-j}^{*},x^{*},\eta _{j}^{*}) =0, \; \forall \; j \in {\mathcal {J}} \\ (5)\; \Delta \lambda _{h}p^{*} - \Delta p^{\backslash } \left[ I_{C-1}|0\right] =0, \; \forall \; h \in {\mathcal {H}}\\ (6)\; -{\displaystyle \sum _{h \in {\mathcal {H}}}}\lambda _{h}^{*}\Delta x_{h}^{\backslash }- {\displaystyle \sum _{h \in {\mathcal {H}}}}\Delta \lambda _{h}\left( x_{h}^{*\backslash }-e_{h}^ {*\backslash }-\displaystyle \sum _{j\in {\mathcal {J}}}s_{jh}y_{j}^{*\backslash }\right) +\displaystyle \sum _{j\in {\mathcal {J}}}\Delta y_{j}^{ \backslash }=0\\ (7)\; - \alpha _{j}^{*} \Delta y_{j} D^{2}_{\eta _{j} y_{j}} (t_{j} \circ g_{j})(y_{j}^{*},y_{-j}^{*},x^{*},\eta _{j}^{*}) - \Delta \alpha _{j} D_{\eta _{j}}(t_{j} \circ g_{j})(y_{j}^{*},y_{-j}^{*},x^{*} , \eta _{j}^{*}) = 0,\; \forall \; j \in {\mathcal {J}} \\ \end{array} \right. \end{aligned}$$

Using the definition of \((t_{j} \circ g_{j})\), we have that

$$\begin{aligned} D_{\eta _{j}} (t_{j} \circ g_{j})(y_{j}^{*},y_{-j}^{*},x^{*} , \eta _{j}^{*}) = - D_{y_{j}} (t_{j} \circ g_{j})(y_{j}^{*},y_{-j}^{*},x^{*} , \eta _{j}^{*}) \end{aligned}$$

and

$$\begin{aligned} D^{2}_{\eta _{j}y_{j}} (t_{j} \circ g_{j})(y_{j}^{*},y_{-j}^{*},x^{*} , \eta _{j}^{*}) = - D^{2}_{y_{j}} (t_{j} \circ g_{j})(y_{j}^{*},y_{-j}^{*},x^{*} , \eta _{j}^{*}) \end{aligned}$$

Therefore, for every \(j \in {\mathcal {J}}\), equation (7) becomes

$$\begin{aligned} \alpha _{j}^{*} \Delta y_{j} D^{2}_{y_{j}} (t_{j} \circ g_{j})(y_{j}^{*},y_{-j}^{*},x^{*} , \eta _{j}^{*}) + \Delta \alpha _{j} D_{y_{j}} (t_{j} \circ g_{j})(y_{j}^{*},y_{-j}^{*},x^{*} , \eta _{j}^{*}) = 0\nonumber \\ \end{aligned}$$
(16)

Multiplying the equation above by \(\Delta y_{j}\) and using equation (4), since \(\alpha _{j}^{*}>0\) one gets

$$\begin{aligned} \Delta y_{j} D^{2}_{y_{j}} (t_{j} \circ g_{j})(y_{j}^{*},y_{-j}^{*},x^{*} , \eta _{j}^{*}) (\Delta y_{j} ) =0 \end{aligned}$$

Then, equation (4) and Assumption 1.3 imply that \(\Delta y_{j}=0\).

Therefore, Eq. (16) becomes

$$\begin{aligned} \Delta \alpha _{j} D_{y_{j}} (t_{j} \circ g_{j})(y_{j}^{*},y_{-j}^{*},x^{*} , \eta _{j}^{*}) = 0 \end{aligned}$$

and then \(\Delta \alpha _{j}=0\) by Assumption 1.4. Thus, we get \((\Delta y_{j}, \Delta \alpha _{j}) = 0\) for every \(j \in {\mathcal {J}}\).

Since \(p^{*C}=1 \), from equation (5) one gets \(\Delta \lambda _{h}=0\) for all \(h \in {\mathcal {H}}\), and then \(\Delta p^{\backslash }=0\). Thus, the above system becomes

$$\begin{aligned} \left\{ \begin{array}{ll} (1)\;&{} {\displaystyle \sum _{h \in {\mathcal {H}}}}\Delta x_{h} D_{x_{k}x_{h}}^{2}u_{h}(x_{h}^{*},x_{-h}^{*},y^{*}) =0, \; \forall \; k \in {\mathcal {H}}\\ (2)\;&{}- \Delta x_{h} \cdot p^{*} =0, \; \forall \; h \in {\mathcal {H}} \\ (3)\;&{}\displaystyle \sum _{h \in {\mathcal {H}}}\Delta x_{h} D_{y_{f}x_{h}}^{2}u_{h}(x_{h}^ {*},x_{-h}^{*},y^{*})=0, \; \forall \; f \in {\mathcal {J}}\\ (6)\;&{}-{\displaystyle \sum _{h \in {\mathcal {H}}}}\lambda _{h}^{*}\Delta x_{h}^{\backslash }=0 \end{array} \right. \end{aligned}$$
(17)

Since \(F^{h.1}(\xi ^{*},e^{*}, \eta ^{*})=0\), equation (2) in system (17) implies that for every \(h \in {\mathcal {H}}\), \(\Delta x_{h} \in \mathop {\mathrm{Ker}}D_{x_{h}}u_{h}( x_{h}^{*},x_{-h}^{*},y^{*})\). Now, for every \(h \in {\mathcal {H}}\) define \(v_{h}:=\lambda _{h}^{*}\Delta x_{h}\). The vector \((x_{h}^{*},v_{h})_{h \in {\mathcal {H}}}\) satisfies the following conditions.

$$\begin{aligned} (v_{h})_{h \in {\mathcal {H}}} \in {\displaystyle \prod _{h\in {\mathcal {H}}}} \mathop {\mathrm{Ker}}D_{x_{h}}u_{h}( x_{h}^{*},x_{-h}^{*},y^{*}) \quad \text {and}\quad {\displaystyle \sum _{h \in {\mathcal {H}}}} v_{h}=0 \end{aligned}$$
(18)

where the last equality comes from equation (6) in system (17). Multiplying both sides of equation (1) in system (17) by \(v_{k}\), and using the definition of \(v_{h}\), one gets \({\displaystyle { \sum \nolimits _{h \in {\mathcal {H}}}}\frac{v_{h}}{\lambda _{h}^{*}} } D_{x_{k}x_{h}}^{2}u_{h}(x_{h}^ {*},x_{-h}^{*},y^{*})(v_{k})=0\) for every \(k \in {\mathcal {H}}\). Summing up \(k \in {\mathcal {H}}\), we obtain \({\displaystyle { \sum \nolimits _{h \in {\mathcal {H}}}}\frac{v_{h}}{\lambda _{h}^{*}} }\displaystyle { \sum \nolimits _{k \in {\mathcal {H}}}} D_{x_{k}x_{h}}^{2}u_{h}(x_{h}^ {*},x_{-h}^{*},y^{*})(v_{k})=0\).

Note that the gradients \((D_{x_{h}}u_{h}( x_{h}^{*},x_{-h}^{*},y^{*}))_{h \in {\mathcal {H}}}\) are positively proportional because \(F^{h.1}(\xi ^{*},e^{*}, \eta ^{*})=0\) for every \(h \in {\mathcal {H}}\). Therefore, from (18) all the conditions of Assumption 10 are satisfied, and then, \(v_{h}=0\) for each \(h \in {\mathcal {H}}\) since \(\lambda _{h}^{*}>0\). Thus, we get \(\Delta x_{h}=0\) for all \(h \in {\mathcal {H}}\). Consequently, one has \(\Delta =0\) which completes the proof. \(\square \)

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del Mercato, E.L., Platino, V. On the regularity of smooth production economies with externalities: competitive equilibrium à la Nash . Econ Theory 63, 287–307 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-016-1029-5

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