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Robust rational turnout

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Abstract

We show that equilibria of a class of participation games (Palfrey and Rosenthal in Public Choice 41(1):7–53, 1983; Journal of Public Economics 24(2):171–193, 1984) exhibit minimal heterogeneity of behavior so that players’ mixed strategies are summarized by at most two probabilities. We then establish that, except for a finite set of common costs of participation, these games are regular. Thus, equilibria of these voting games are robust to general payoff perturbations and survive in nearby games of incomplete information.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Political Science, University of Rochester, Rochester, NY, 14627-0146, USA

    Tasos Kalandrakis

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  1. Tasos Kalandrakis
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Correspondence to Tasos Kalandrakis.

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Thanks to participants of the 2006 MPSA conference for comments on an early version.

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Kalandrakis, T. Robust rational turnout. Econ Theory 41, 317–343 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-008-0396-y

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-008-0396-y

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