Abstract
This paper combines the classical approach to inequality, based on the division of society into classes with different saving propensities, and the social conflict approach, in which inequality inflicts costs to growth. We assume that each consumer’s discount factor is endogenously determined through two channels: (1) it is positively related to the consumer’s relative wealth, and (2) negatively affected by an aggregate measure of social conflict. Unlike in models with exogenous discount rates, steady state equilibria are indeterminate and the set of equilibria is a continuum parameterized by an index of income inequality. Under reasonable assumptions, the relationship between growth and inequality has an inverted-U shape.
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The authors are grateful to an anonymous referee for helping them improve the paper. They also thank Raouf Boucekkine for his comments and suggestions. The authors also benefited from discussions with Nathalie Chusseau and Joël Héllier. This research is the outcome of a collaboration initiated during the project Development of Advanced Teaching in Economics (DATE) of the European University in Saint-Petersburg, funded by the Higher Education Support Programme (HESP) of the Open Society Institute (OSI). It also was supported by the project Inégalités et Qualifications dans l’espace européen (Laboratoire EQUIPPE-Universités de Lille) of the programme Politiques publiques et intégration européenne (IFRESI-CNRS). The usual disclaimers apply.
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Borissov, K., Lambrecht, S. Growth and distribution in an AK-model with endogenous impatience. Econ Theory 39, 93–112 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-007-0307-7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-007-0307-7