Abstract
We show that every N-player K 1 × ... × K N game possesses a correlated equilibrium with at least \(\prod_{i=1}^{N} K_i -1 - \sum_{i=1}^{N} K_i (K_i -1)\) zero entries. In particular, the largest N-player K × ... × K games with unique fully supported correlated equilibrium are two-player games.
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We thank an anonymous referee for most useful comments. The first author acknowledges financial support from Spanish Ministry of Science and Technology, grant SEJ2004-03619, and in form of a Ramón y Cajal fellowship. The second author acknowledges support by the PASCAL Network of Excellence under EC grant no.506778, as well as from Spanish Ministry of Science and Technology and FEDER, grant BMF2003-03324. Both authors also acknowledge financial support from BBVA grant “Aprender a jugar.”
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Germano, F., Lugosi, G. Existence of Sparsely Supported Correlated Equilibria. Economic Theory 32, 575–578 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-006-0127-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-006-0127-1