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The equilibrium set of two-player games with complementarities is a sublattice

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Summary.

I prove that the equilibrium set in a two-player game with complementarities, and totally ordered strategy spaces, is a sublattice of the joint strategy space.

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  1. Universidad Torcuato Di Tella, Mi{n}ones 2177, C1428ATG Buenos Aires, ARGENTINA, and Facultad de Ciencias Sociales, Universidad de la República, Montevideo, URUGUAY (e-mail: fechenique@utdt.edu) , , , , , , UY

    Federico Echenique

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  1. Federico Echenique
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Received: May 31, 2001; revised version: October 4, 2002

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Echenique, F. The equilibrium set of two-player games with complementarities is a sublattice. Econ Theory 22, 903–905 (2003). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-002-0337-0

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-002-0337-0

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