, Volume 22, Issue 1, pp 33-44

Mixed equilibria in games of strategic complementarities

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Summary.

The literature on games of strategic complementarities (GSC) has focused on pure strategies. I introduce mixed strategies and show that, when strategy spaces are one-dimensional, the complementarities framework extends to mixed strategies ordered by first-order stochastic dominance. In particular, the mixed extension of a GSC is a GSC, the full set of equilibria is a complete lattice and the extremal equilibria (smallest and largest) are in pure strategies. The framework does not extend when strategy spaces are multi-dimensional. I also update learning results for GSC using stochastic fictitious play.

Received: October 16, 2000; revised version: March 7, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" I am very grateful to Robert Anderson, David Blackwell, Aaron Edlin, Peter De Marzo, Ted O'Donoghue, Matthew Rabin, Ilya Segal, Chris Shannon, Clara Wang and Federico Weinschelbaum for comments and advise.