Mixed equilibria in games of strategic complementarities
- Federico EcheniqueAffiliated withUniversidad Torcuato Di Tella, Miñones 2177, C1428ATG Buenos Aires, ARGENTINA
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The literature on games of strategic complementarities (GSC) has focused on pure strategies. I introduce mixed strategies and show that, when strategy spaces are one-dimensional, the complementarities framework extends to mixed strategies ordered by first-order stochastic dominance. In particular, the mixed extension of a GSC is a GSC, the full set of equilibria is a complete lattice and the extremal equilibria (smallest and largest) are in pure strategies. The framework does not extend when strategy spaces are multi-dimensional. I also update learning results for GSC using stochastic fictitious play.
- Mixed equilibria in games of strategic complementarities
Volume 22, Issue 1 , pp 33-44
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- Keywords and Phrases: Supermodular games, Strategic complementarities, Mixed strategy equilibria, Learning.
- JEL Classification Numbers: C72, C73.
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- Federico Echenique (A1)
- Author Affiliations
- A1. Universidad Torcuato Di Tella, Miñones 2177, C1428ATG Buenos Aires, ARGENTINA, AR