Skip to main content

Advertisement

Log in

Two measures of organizational flexibility

  • Regular Article
  • Published:
Journal of Evolutionary Economics Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

Since the second half of the past century, increasingly flexible organizational forms have been appearing among firms. However, while hierarchies are easily described, too few mathematical tools are available for flexible organizations. In this article, two measures are proposed in order to assess the state and trend of flexible organizations. The first of these measures is based on information waste, which occurs whenever information is classified into categories. The second measure is based on duplication of operations. The underlying idea is that firms have an endogenous drive towards organizational configurations where waste of information and duplication of operations are minimized. However, environmental uncertainty may require some flexibility, which is ensured by cognitive processes that discard some information as well as by parallel undertaking of similar actions.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Fig. 1
Fig. 2

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. “Uncertainty” is here meant in its strongest ontological sense, implying the emergence of novel possibilities. Henceforth, “uncertainty” and “unpredictability” will be used as largely overlapping concepts.

  2. Classifier systems employ the terms “condition” and “action” where we said “category” and “information”, respectively.

  3. Subsequent investigations yielded a much richer, often different picture of Japanese-style manufacturing. However, here the issue is that of comparing idealized structures that have been widely discussed in the literature.

  4. This last figure derives from my own calculations on available data (Foss 2003). The ratio of 3.5 (median number of participated teams from 1991 to 1996) to 1.5 (median number of participated teams since 1996) is \(2.\overline{3}\). If this ratio reflects into the average number of work teams, they must have passed from 70 in 1991–1996 to 30 since 1996, on average.

  5. Theorems with “if” express sufficient conditions: \(condition \: \Rightarrow \: statement\). Theorems with “only if” express necessary conditions: \(condition \: \Leftarrow \: statement\). Theorems with “if and only if”, eventually shortened as “iff”, express necessary and sufficient conditions: \(condition \: \Leftrightarrow \: statement\).

References

  • Allais M (1981) La théorie générale des surplus. Écon Soc 15(1–3):1–718

    Google Scholar 

  • Aoki M (1986) Horizontal vs. vertical information structure of the firm. Am Econ Rev 76(5):971–983

    Google Scholar 

  • Baker WE (1992) The network organization in theory and practice. In Nohria N, Eccles RG (eds) Networks and organizations: structure, form, and action, chapter XV. Harvard Business School Press, Boston, pp 397–429

    Google Scholar 

  • Baker WE, Holmström B, Roberts J (2003) The boundaries of the firm revisited. In Malone TW, Laubacher R, Scott Morton MS (eds) Inventing the organization of the 21st century, chapter II. MIT, Cambridge, pp 25–48

    Google Scholar 

  • Bolton P, Dewatripont M (1994) The firm as a communication network. Q J Econ 109(4):809–839

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Burns T, Stalker GM (1961) The management of innovation. Tavistock, London

    Google Scholar 

  • Chandler AD (1962) Strategy and structure: chapters in the history of the industrial enterprise. MIT, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Clegg SR (1990) Modern organizations: organization studies in the postmodern world. Sage, London

    Google Scholar 

  • Courpasson D, Reed M (2004) Introduction: bureaucracy in the age of enterprise. Organization 11(1):5–12

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Donaldson L (2001) The contingency theory of organization. Sage, Thousand Oaks

    Google Scholar 

  • Foss NJ (2003) Selective intervention and internal hybrids: interpreting and learning from the rise and decline of the oticon spaghetti organization. Org Sci 14(3):331–349

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Goodwin RM, Punzo LF (1987) The dynamics of a capitalist economy. Westview, Boulder

    Google Scholar 

  • Hage J (1965) An axiomatic theory of organizations. Adm Sci Q 10(3):289–320

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hage J, Aiken M (1969) Routine technology, social structure, and organization goals. Adm Sci Q 14(3):366–376

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hage J, Aiken M (1970) Social change in complex organizations. Random House, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Hammond TH (1994) Structure, strategy, and the agenda of the firm. In: Rumelt RP, Schendel DE, Teece DJ (eds) Fundamental issues in strategy, chapter IV. Harvard Business School Press, Boston, pp 97–154

    Google Scholar 

  • Heckscher C (1994) Defining the post-bureaucratic type. In: Heckscher C, Donnellon A (eds) The post-bureaucratic organization: new perspectives on organizational change, chapter I. Sage, Thousand Oaks, pp 14–62

    Google Scholar 

  • Holland JH (1975) Adaptation in natural and artificial systems. The University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor

    Google Scholar 

  • Holland JH (1986) Escaping brittleness: The possibilities of general-purpose learning algorithms applied to parallel rule-based systems. In: Michalski RS, Carbonell JG, Mitchell TM (eds) Machine Learning: an artificial intelligence approach, chapter XX. Morgan Kaufmann, Los Altos, pp 593–623

    Google Scholar 

  • Holmström B, Roberts J (1998) The boundaries of the firm revisited. J Econ Perspect 12(4):73–94. Reprinted in Baker et al. (2003)

    Google Scholar 

  • Klein JA (1994) Maintaining expertise in multi-skilled teams. In: Beyerlein MM, Johnson DA (eds) Advances in interdisciplinary studies of work teams, Theories of self-managing work teams, vol 1, chapter VI. JAI Press, Greenwich, pp 145–165

    Google Scholar 

  • Krackhardt D (1994) Constraints on the interactive organization as an ideal type. In: Heckscher C, Donnellon A (eds) The post-bureaucratic organization: new perspectives on organizational change, chapter IX. Sage, Thousand Oaks, pp 211–222

    Google Scholar 

  • Krackhardt D, Brass DJ (1994) Intraorganizational networks: the micro side. In: Wasserman S, Galaskiewicz J (eds) Advances in social network analysis: research into the social and behavioral sciences, chapter VIII. Sage, Thousand Oaks, pp 207–229

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Lawrence PR, Lorsch JW (1967) Organization and environment. Harvard University, Graduate School of Business Administration, Boston

    Google Scholar 

  • Lovas B, Ghoshal S (2000) Strategy as guided evolution. Strateg Manage J 21(9):875–896

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Malone TW, Laubacher RJ (1998) The dawn of the e-lance economy. Harvard Bus Rev 76(5):145–152. Reprinted in Malone and Laubacher (2003)

    Google Scholar 

  • Malone TW, Laubacher RJ (2003) The dawn of the e-lance economy. In: Malone TW, Laubacher R, Scott Morton MS (eds) Inventing the organization of the 21st century, chapter V. The MIT Press, Cambridge, pp 103–114

    Google Scholar 

  • Marengo L (1992) Coordination and organizational learning in the firm. J Evol Econ 2(4):313–326

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Marengo L (1993) Knowledge distribution and coordination in organizations: on some social aspects of the exploitation vs exploration trade-off. Rev Int Syst 7(5):553–571

    Google Scholar 

  • Marengo L (1996) Structure, competence and learning in an adaptive model of the firm. In: Dosi G, Malerba F (eds) Organization and strategy in the evolution of the entreprise, chapter V. MacMillan, London, pp 124–154

    Google Scholar 

  • Miles RE, Snow CC (1994) Fit, failure, and the hall of fame. The Free Press, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Morsing M, Eiberg K (eds) (1998) Managing the unmanageable for a decade. Oticon A/S, Hellerup

    Google Scholar 

  • Nooteboom B (2009) A cognitive theory of the firm. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham

    Google Scholar 

  • Oberg A, Walgenbach P (2008) Hierarchical structures of communication in a network organization. Scand J Manag 24:183–198

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Penrose EET (1959) The theory of the growth of the firm. Basil Blackwell, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Perrow C (1967) A framework for the comparative analysis of organizations. Am Sociol Rev 32(2):194–208

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Peters T (1992) Liberation management, chapter XVIII. MacMillan, London

    Google Scholar 

  • Radner R (1992) Hierarchy: the economics of managing. J Econ Lit 30(3):1382–1415

    Google Scholar 

  • Radner R (1993) The organization of decentralized information processing. Econometrica 61(5):1109–1146

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Radner R, Van Zandt T (1992) Information processing in firms and returns to scale. Ann Écon Stat 7(25–26):265–298

    Google Scholar 

  • Ravasi D, Verona G (2001) Organising the process of knowledge integration: the benefits of structural ambiguity. Scand J Manag 17(1):41–66

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rivard S, Aubert BA, Patry M, Paré G, Smith HA (2004) Information technology and organizational transformation, chapter VII Elsevier Butterworth-Heinemann, Amsterdam, pp 165–193

  • Sah RK, Stiglitz JE (1985) Human fallibility and economic organization. Am Econ Rev 75(2):292–297

    Google Scholar 

  • Sah RK, Stiglitz JE (1986) The architecture of economic systems: hierarchies and polyarchies. Am Econ Rev 76(4):716–727

    Google Scholar 

  • Sah RK, Stiglitz JE (1988) Committees, hierarchies and polyarchies. Econ J 98(391):451–470

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Thompson JD (1967) Organizations in action: social science bases of administrative theory. McGraw-Hill, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Verona G, Ravasi D (2003) Unbundling dynamic capabilities: an exploratory study of continuous product innovation. Ind Corp Change 12(3):577–606

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Walton EJ (2005) The persistence of bureaucracy: a meta-analysis of weber’s model of bureaucratic control. Organ Stud 26(4):569–600

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ward A, Liker JK, Cristiano JJ, Sobek II DK (1995) The second Toyota paradox: how delaying decisions can make better cars faster. Sloan Manage Rev 36(3):43–61

    Google Scholar 

  • Weick KE (1995) Sensemaking in organizations. Sage, Thousand Oaks

    Google Scholar 

  • Van Zandt T (1995) Hierarchical computation of the resource allocation problem. Eur Econ Rev 39(3–4):700–708

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Van Zandt T (1998) Organizations with an endogenous number of information processing agents. In: Majumdar M (ed) Organizations with incomplete information, chapter VII. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 239–305

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Van Zandt T (1999) Decentralized information processing in the theory of organizations. In: Sertel M (ed) Contemporary economic issues, vol 4: economic behavior and design, chapter VII. MacMillan, London, pp 125–160

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Guido Fioretti.

Appendix: Lyapunov functions

Appendix: Lyapunov functions

A simple way to visualize stable equilibria is to think of a surface in a n + 1-dimensional space of n state variables, plus one variable for the height of this surface. Henceforth, this surface will be also called a landscape. The n-dimensional space of the state variables will be called state space.

The projection of a point of this surface on the n-dimensional state space represents a state that a system can attain. Thus, the state of a system may be represented by the position of a ball on the landscape.

According to one possible convention, the lower positions on the surface represent the most preferred states. Thus, a system has a tendency to move from higher positions to lower positions on the surface. Consequently, the bottom of valleys represent stable equilibria. Conversely, the peaks represent unstable equilibria.

According to the opposite convention, the upper positions on the surface represent the most preferred states. Thus, a system has a tendency to move from lower positions to higher positions on the surface. Consequently, the tops of mountains represent stable equilibria. Conversely, the bottoms of valleys represent unstable equilibria.

Figure 3 illustrates one such surface in a case where n = 2. The state space is the X − Y plane.

Fig. 3
figure 3

A surface representing equilibria on a two-dimensional state space. According to one convention, the bottoms of valleys represent stable equilibria. According to the opposite convention, the tops of mountains represent stable equilibria

These conventions are mathematically equivalent to one another. In fact, minimizing a function F is equivalent to maximizing − F. Henceforth the convention will be used that a function F has to be minimized.

The Lyapunov theorem states that, given a system described by state variables x 1, x 2, ...x N , the origin of axes is a stable equilibrium if:

  1. 1.

    \(\exists F(\mathbf{x}) \in \mathcal{C}^{o}: \; F(0)=0, \; F(\mathbf{x})>0\) around the origin;

  2. 2.

    \(\frac{\partial F}{\partial x_{1}} dx_{1} +\frac{\partial F}{\partial x_{2}} dx_{2} + \cdots + \frac{\partial F}{\partial x_{N}} dx_{N} < 0\).

The Lyapunov theorem can be expressed with respect to the origin of axes without any loss of generality. In fact, any point can be made the origin of the state space by means of a linear transformation.

The Lyapunov theorem says that, if we succeed in finding a basin-shaped function such that the state of the system tends to move towards the lowest position, then that position is a stable equilibrium. Note that several Lyapunov functions may be defined for a system, and that no standardized procedure exists to find one. Thus, the Lyapunov theorem requires considerable ingenuity in order to be applied. Furthermore, it is necessarily dependent on a point of view so far as it regards what variables are crucial for stability.

Note also that the Lyapunov theorem provides a sufficient, but not a necessary criterion for stability.Footnote 5 Thus, if a Lyapunov function is found, we are certain that the equilibrium is stable. However, if no Lyapunov function is found, and even if it can be demonstrated that no Lyapunov function exists, we cannot conclude that the equilibrium is unstable, and not even that it is not an equilibrium point.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Fioretti, G. Two measures of organizational flexibility. J Evol Econ 22, 957–979 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00191-011-0229-1

Download citation

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00191-011-0229-1

Keywords

JEL Classification

Navigation