International Journal of Game Theory

, Volume 43, Issue 3, pp 579–597

Efficient and strategy-proof social choice when preferences are single-dipped

Article

DOI: 10.1007/s00182-013-0396-4

Cite this article as:
Manjunath, V. Int J Game Theory (2014) 43: 579. doi:10.1007/s00182-013-0396-4

Abstract

We study the problem of locating a single public good along a segment when agents have single-dipped preferences. We ask whether there are unanimous and strategy-proof rules for this model. The answer is positive and we characterize all such rules. We generalize our model to allow the set of alternatives to be unbounded. If the set of alternatives does not have a maximal and a minimal element, there is no meaningful notion of efficiency. However, we show that the range of every strategy-proof rule has a maximal and a minimal element. We then characterize all strategy-proof rules.

Keywords

Single-dipped preferences Strategy-proofness  Group strategy-proofness 

JEL Classification

D71 

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Département de sciences économiquesUniversité de MontréalMontrealCanada